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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims to investigate the reasons for the variation in China’s oil diplomacy performance 
in Africa and South America in the period 2000-2010. Lacking sound experience in pursuing oil 
security overseas and enjoying strong financial muscle, China’s oil diplomacy is largely rooted 
in the extension of soft loans for infrastructure to oil-rich countries in exchange for steady oil 
supply and favoured access to oil acreage. Taking Angola and Brazil as case studies this thesis 
argues that differences in the institutional structure of the oil industry in each country, 
determined different outcomes regarding Beijing’s oil security goals. This thesis has found that 
although this template fitted well with the more centralised institutional environment in Angola, 
it was highly unsuitable for the more liberal and regulated Brazil setting. Furthermore, the advent 
of the recent global economic crisis (2008-2009) caused China to adjust its approach to the 
institutional particulars of Brazil becoming more efficient in that country regarding its oil 
security goals. 
Building on foreign policy analysis tools and concepts, an empirical analysis of the interplay 
between Chinese infrastructure-for-oil loans (hereby regarded as positive economic statecraft) 
and the institutional structure it met in each country, is presented. Through the case studies, this 
thesis aims to uncover to what extent the institutional context constrained Chinese oil diplomacy 
efficiency in Brazil for most of the past decade, and how innovation has surfaced in the context 
of the global financial crisis. This analysis thus gives interesting insights not only into the 
dynamics of China’s oil diplomacy in Africa and South America, but also into Chinese economic 
statecraft in general and how constraints that surface at the implementation level feedback into 
foreign policy formulation.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Summary  
China’s rise on the world stage is a direct consequence of its massive economic growth over the past three 
decades. During this process, the regime’s legitimacy became gradually bounded to the sustainability of 
this growth pace. As a consequence, economic development became central not only to domestic policy 
making, but also to foreign policy formulation, and overriding to a great extent ideological and political 
concerns. Within this framework the quest for mineral resources has naturally surfaced as a major driver 
in Chinese foreign policy, since the major reliance on these external resources has threatened China’s 
continued economic growth. This critical concern has become particularly evident in China’s growing 
economic interaction with developing regions, where these resources abound.  
This thesis focuses on the dimension of Chinese foreign policy that concerns its resources diplomacy in 
developing regions. Over the past decade China has extended numerous large soft loans to developing 
countries, through which it has secured steady supply and access to resources assets. Even though the 
bulk of these loans were earmarked for infrastructure, they targeted mainly resource rich countries and are 
in most cases to be repaid in kind. These types of loans have been more frequently extended to oil-rich 
countries. This is why they came to be known as ‘infrastructure-for-oil loans’, also often referred to as the 
‘Angola mode’, since the first deal of this kind was signed with Luanda in 2004. This thesis will focus on 
this type of loan, and will examine the performance of China’s oil diplomacy in Africa and South 
America. This analysis is inspired by a puzzling reality over the past decade. Although apparently 
associated with the same conditions, namely rich endowment of resources and a great need of 
infrastructure development, the extension of generous credit lines for infrastructure have been much more 
successful in pursuing China’s energy security goals in Africa than in South America. 
Despite being a widely acknowledge paradox, there is no scholarly work offering a systematic 
explanation based on empirical evidence, regarding the divide in terms of regional outcomes relating to 
the success of China’s oil diplomacy. Although some possible explanations regarding what drives Chinese 
resources investment can be found scattered in the literature (mostly untested), little has been written on 
what determines outcomes. 
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The present research thus proposes to do an empirical examination to help clarify the reasons behind the 
outcome variation of ‘infrastructure-for-oil’ deals in Africa and South America. In order to do so, the 
study will present a comparative analysis of the performance of these types of loans in these two regions 
over the period 2000-2010. The comparison will be based on two case studies, one in each region (Angola 
and Brazil). The underlying argument is that the regional variation in terms of China’s energy security 
outcomes is explained by a structural difference in the institutional framework of each region. Although 
this foreign policy instrument proved to be appropriate in the African context, it was unsuitable for the 
much more liberalised environment that characterises South America. 
In order to pursue the proposed research, this thesis will use foreign policy analysis concepts and tools. 
The emphasis will be on foreign policy implementation, rather than on policy making, as the object of 
study is the outcome of a specific policy and not its content. In this framework particular attention is 
given to: the role of positive economic statecraft as a foreign policy instrument, as Chinese soft loans fall 
within the category of economic incentives; and the interplay between instrument and target context 
(institutional framework). 
Through this empirical research the candidate aspires to make a valid contribution to the field of Chinese 
foreign policy, by: a) looking at a often neglected segment which regards the implementation phase; b) 
adding to the scant research on China’s oil diplomacy in developing regions; and c) providing a 
pioneering empirical comparison bridging two of the most targeted regions in that regard (Africa and 
South America). Last, but not least, this study proposes to add to the limited research in the field of 
positive economic statecraft, as an effective instrument of foreign policy implementation. 
1.2. Setting the context 
 1.2.1. China’s rise at the world stage 
The rise of China as a key economic player on the world stage is perhaps the most single important shift 
that has taken place in the international system since the end of the Cold War. The economic reforms 
initiated in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, led to three decades of sustained two-digit economic 
growth, which transformed a rural and locked country into the second largest world economy.  
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 played a key role in pushing its economy from a regional to a 
global level. From sixth position in the 2005 global ranking, China became the third largest economy (by 
nominal GDP) in 2007, overtaking on its way France, the UK and Germany. Important shifts in the world 
market can be increasingly traced back to China. The sharp rise in commodities’ value, the decline in 
14 
 
manufacturers’ prices, the decreasing trend in wages, and growing unemployment in the sector around the 
world, are just the tip of the iceberg.  
The onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 that was particularly harmful in developed countries 
propelled China’s economy even further. In 2009 China became the world’s largest exporter (surpassing 
Germany), and in 2010 the second largest economy (nominal GDP US$5.9 trillion) after the US (US$14.7 
trillion), accounting for nearly 9% of global GDP.1 Most estimates project China’s nominal output to 
surpass that of the US around 2020,2 while some project that in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, the 
big shift will take place in 2012.3 
China’s escalating economic might and unique political and social synergies, have over the past decade 
been fuelling a debate on the feasibility of a seismic geopolitical shift in the international system. 
Academic discussions have been set around two major questions: whether China is on track to become the 
next superpower, and if so, what kind of superpower it will be. 
Regarding the question of whether China is on track to become the next superpower, many have 
questioned whether China’s economic ascendancy will automatically lead to its rise to superpower status. 
Gerald Segal was among the first to express his doubts in the late 1990s,4 and downplayed China’s 
economic, military and political might on the global stage. Many others added to this view throughout the 
2000s, emphasising that China still faces many challenges domestically, and has shortcomings at the 
global stage (military, scientific and technological capacity) 5. In addition it has been stated that China still 
lacks a ‘grand strategy’,6 and therefore it has a long way to go before it can achieve ‘great power’ status 
and defy the existing super power, the US. Adding to this, Shaun Breslin argues that ‘Western perceptions 
                                                           
1 Data according to IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011, available online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx (accessed 3 May 2011) 
2 John Ross, “Even optimists underestimated China’s growth”, China.org.cn, 30 January 2011, available online at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-01/30/content_21843443.htm (Accessed 5 May 2011) 
3 Conference Board, “Global Economic Outlook 2011”, available online at: http://www.conference-
board.org/data/globaloutlook.cfm (Accessed 5 May 2011) 
4 Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter” Foreign Affairs 78:5, 1999, p. 24. 
5 Articles on the subject gathered in: Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot (eds.), Does China Matter? A Reassessment 
(London: Taylor and Francis, 2004). 
6 Wang Jisi, “China’s search for a grand strategy: a rising power finds its way” Foreign Affairs 90:2, 2011, pp. 68-
79. 
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on China often exaggerate its wealth and power and this perceived power actually implies a real political 
leverage to the advantage of Beijing at the present stage’.7  
On the other hand, China’s increasing military expenditure and ventures in non-traditional regions, raise 
concerns about the nature of its ascendance on the world stage and the degree of China’s ‘socialization’ 
into dominant normative underpinnings of the international system. This has inspired a significant number 
of studies in International Relations (IR) literature on China, most of which can be condensed in the 
classic realist dilemma: is China a status quo or a revisionist power? Iain Johnston’s review of the 
existing literature concludes that although Beijing’s engagement with the international community is 
consistent with greater compliance, it is hard to determine whether China has internalised the norms, 
principles and values that sustain the current status quo.8 Conscious of these debates and weary of its 
image abroad, China has come up with the concept of ‘peaceful development’ as a means to ward off any 
fears related to its economic rise on the world stage.9 
Notwithstanding the relevance of these debates, it is not the aim of this thesis to engage further in these 
discussions, since it only serves the purpose of setting the broad academic context. Regardless of an 
immediate or still distant reality and the nature of its ascendance, the important fact for the present thesis, 
is that China’s economic rise on the world stage has broadened the scope and caused seismic shifts in 
Beijing’s foreign policy.  
 1.2.2. The primacy of energy security concerns 
In tandem with a dramatic economic growth path, China’s economic reforms also set in motion an 
irreversible opening up process that gradually buried Mao’s dream of a socialist and self-reliant People’s 
Republic of China. The fast expanding industrial base and urban population, led to escalating domestic 
demand for power and mobility that exhausted most of China’s natural resources, and fuelled an ever-
growing external reliance on fossil fuels and strategic minerals.  
China has staged the world’s fastest energy consumption growth rate over the past decade. While its 
primary energy consumption only expanded 27% between 1990 and 1999, it has more than doubled in the 
                                                           
7 Shaun Breslin, “Constructing visions of China: theories and purposes and interests”, paper presented at: China in 
the Eyes of World Intellectuals: Perception and Image, II World Forum on Chinese Studies, China Academy of 
Social Sciences, Shanghai, September 2006. 
8 A.I. Johnston, “Is China a Status quo power?” International Security 27:4, 2003, pp. 5-56; A.I. Johnston, “Trends 
in Theory and Method in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy”, paper presented at: Conference on China Studies, 
50th Anniversary of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, December 2005 (revised version, February 2006). 
9 For an analysis of this topic see: Chris Hughes, “The Global economy and China’s peaceful development” 
Daxiyangguo: Revista Portuguesa de Estudos Asiaticos 2008, pp. 77-92. 
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period 2000-2009. 10 Although China was already then the world’s second largest consumer of primary 
energy,11 in 2000 its consumption was below half of that of the US, the world largest consumer for nearly 
a century. Less than a decade later, in 2009, figures were neck and neck (US: 2.182 million tons of oil 
equivalent; China: 2.177 million tons of oil equivalent), each representing nearly 20% of global energy 
consumption.12 Data advanced by the Paris-based International Energy Agency, claim that China has 
surpassed the US in 2010, owing to slowing American industrial activity and energy use in the context of 
the economic crisis.13  
As of 2009, fossil fuels (coal, natural gas and oil) represented 93% of China’s primary energy 
consumption. Although coal (used for power generation) accounts for the lion’s share (71%), it is oil 
(19% - mostly for industrial and transportation purposes) that represents China’s largest external 
reliance.14 While China’s coal reserves and production allow it to be self sufficient15 (also the case with 
hydroelectric power), China’s oil production has become largely insufficient to provide for its growing 
domestic needs.  
In a relatively short time, China went from self sufficient (up to 1993), to the second largest world oil 
consumer (2003) and importer (2009) after the US. Despite being the world’s fifth largest oil producer, its 
oil output in 2009 (189 million tons) barely provided for half of its needs that year (405 million tons).16 
China’s oil demand has almost doubled in less than a decade (4.8 million barrels per day - bpd - in 2000 
to 8.6 million bpd in 2009)17 and is expected to register the world fastest growth rate over the next two 
decades, according to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) projections.18 In 2010, 
Chinese oil imports stood at 4.8 million bpd, up 17.5% from the previous year.19 According to Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) projections, China’s oil production will peak at around 200 million 
                                                           
10 According to BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2010”, Excel workbook, June 2010, Available online at: 
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview (accessed 20 August 2010) 
11 Primary energy includes both non-renewable and renewable energy sources found in nature, namely: oil, natural 
gas, coal, nuclear power and hydro power. 
12 BP, op. cit. 
13 Spencer Swartz and Shai Oster, “China tops US in energy use”, The Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2010, available 
online at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.html (accessed 20 
August 2010) 
14 Data in this paragraph according to BP, op. cit. 
15
 China is the largest consumer and producer of coal and holds the third largest coal reserves (13%): EIA, Country 
Analysis Brief: China, July 2009, available online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Full.html (accessed 
20 August 2010) 
16 BP, op. cit. 
17 BP, op. cit. 
18 Figures as for the reference case in OPEC, World Oil Outlook 2008 (Vienna: OPEC, 2008) p. 33. 
19 Judy Hua and Chen Aizhu, “China 2010 crude imports up 17.5% to record high”, Reuters, 10 January 2011, 
available online at: http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFTOE70607320110110 (Accessed 5 May 2011) 
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tons in 2010-2015, and is expected to gradually decline after 2020, when 64.5% of China’s oil 
consumption is expected to be met by imports.20 As China’s largest oil fields mature, the demand/supply 
gap is expected to widen, further enlarging substantially its external reliance as evidenced in the chart 
below. 
 
  
 Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, op cit. 
The value of China’s imports of fuels and minerals has shown the fastest growth rate of all Chinese 
import categories, having increased over three-fold between 2004 (US$89 billion) and 2008 (US$307 
billion). According to WTO data, in 2009 minerals and fuels accounted for a quarter of China’s total 
imports.21 Despite the slight slowdown in China’s imports in 2009 due to the global economic downturn, 
China’s demand for hard commodities started to resume their upward course in the final quarter of that 
year, and is expected to expand strongly in coming years as the economy grows.  
In this context, energy security gradually emerged as a serious concern for the Chinese Communist Party. 
As David Zweig and Bi Jianhai 22  point out, not only China’s continued economic growth became 
increasingly reliant on securing resources supply overseas, but also its social stability and ultimately the 
survival of the regime. Energy security concerns surfaced during the third leadership generation headed 
                                                           
20 Xiao Wan - China Daily, “China depending more on imported oil”, 20 January 2010, available online at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/20/content_9346446.htm  (Accessed 5 May 2011) 
21 WTO, “China Trade Profile 2009”, available online at: 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN  
22 For a detailed account on the emergence of energy security as China’s foreign policy major driver, see: David 
Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy’ Foreign Affairs 84:5, 2005, pp. 25-38. 
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by Jiang Zemin. Due to a slow growth pace in energy demand throughout the 1990s, supply strategies 
over this period emphasised self sufficiency, encouraging energy companies to expand domestic 
production.23 The massive surge in domestic demand and the subsequent increasing external reliance in 
the 2000s, pushed energy security to the top of Hu Jintao’s international agenda.  
The rising importance of energy security for the regime is emphasized by the publication of a number of 
white papers. The first to be issued was on mineral resources in 2003 (‘China’s Policy on Mineral 
Resources’), followed by one specifically on energy in 2007 (‘China’s Energy Conditions and Policies’). 
Both white papers lined up strategies aimed at improving the resource security situation.24 Moreover, the 
strategic importance of this issue within CFP was formally emphasised in the White Paper on Diplomacy 
issued in July 2008, which “placed energy security as a major centrepiece of the country’s foreign 
policy”,25 with its first chapter being on “The issue of energy security during the period of high oil 
prices”. 
Although China has until now been able to feed its energy needs by buying in the international market, 
the sheer size of its expanding domestic consumption has made it particularly vulnerable to market price 
flows and potential shortages caused by, inter alia, cartelisation, blockades, and transportation 
disruptions. Indeed, the decision in the early 2000s to establish strategic reserves and a protective system 
for strategic mineral resources (oil and some base metals, namely cooper, aluminium and iron ore), 
underline the growing unease about this issue.  
Due to latent complementarities (discussed in more detail in chapter two), the energy security imperative 
has become particularly evident in China’s interaction with developing regions over the past decade. 
1.2.3. Targeting developing regions 
In addition to diversification and securing steady supply in the international oil market, the acquisition of 
oil acreage abroad plays a key role, as a means to minimise supply risks in the long run, and also to have a 
greater say (from the production side) in the volatile hydrocarbons market. In line with this, Chinese 
NOCs have been expanding hydrocarbons assets overseas, now spanning from neighbouring Central and 
                                                           
23 Michal Meidan, P. Andrews-Speed and Ma Xin, “Shaping China’s Energy Policy: actors and processes” Journal 
of Contemporary China 18:61, 2009, p. 603. 
24 Chinese White Papers available online at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/236955.htm (Accessed 5 
May 2011) 
25 Russel Hsiao, “Energy security the centrepiece of China’s foreign policy” China Brief 8:16, 2008, available online 
at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5095&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=23
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Southeast Asia to far-away regions such as Africa and South America. This is the so called ‘new 
diplomatic frontier’,26 signalling the broadening scope of China’s foreign policy to a global level. 
China’s economic venture into non traditional regions such as South America and Africa is turning into 
one of the most striking features of its emergence as a global economic player in the 21st century. Over the 
past few years, this emerging reality has been attracting attention from politicians and scholars around the 
world, feeding a growing number of studies.  
In terms of the pertinent literature, if only five years ago literature on the topic was very scarce, at present 
information and analysis abound, spanning from numerous articles in journals or online publications, 
through edited books and monographs, doctoral theses, and reports by governmental agencies, 
international organisation27 and non-governamental organisations (NGOs). In addition, several institutions 
have been monitoring developments.28 Reflecting the much faster engagement of China with Africa, 
research in this field has become more conspicuous and the degree of analysis gradually more complex.29 
China’s engagement with Latin America (LA), on the other hand, has produced few academic studies.30 
Unlike the reasonably diversified authorship of studies on China in Africa, in China-Latin America 
studies, US institutions and scholars are predominant. Despite the expansion of the field in recent years, 
                                                           
26 Jianwei Wang, “China’s New Frontier Diplomacy”, in: Sujian Guo & Jean-Marc Blanchard (eds.), Harmonious 
World and China’s New Foreign Policy (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2008) pp. 21-37 
27 These include, namely the World bank: D. Lederman et al. (ed.), China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: 
opportunity or threat? (Washington: IBRD/WB, 2009); Foster et al, Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as 
Infrastructure Financier for Africa (Washington: IBRD/WB, 2008); Harry Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China 
and India’s New Economic Frontier (Washington: IBRD/WB, 2008); and OECD: Andrea Goldstein et al., The Rise 
of China and India, What’s in it for Africa? (Paris: OECD, 2008); Javier Santiso (ed.), The Visible Hand of China in 
Latin America (Paris: OECD, 2007). 
28 These include, namely, the China Africa Project at SAIIA (Johannesburg); the Centre for Chinese Studies at 
Stellenbosch University (South Africa) fully dedicated to China’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa; Beijing Axis 
(Private consulting company based in Beijing) which follows developments in Africa and LA through its major 
quarterly publication: The China Analyst. Also some websites provide regular information on this topic, particularly 
in what concerns China’s ventures in Africa, namely ‘emerging powers watch’ link in Fahamu’s website 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/ ; and Macauhub which provides information on China in 
Portuguese speaking countries http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/news.php?ID=3748 
29 Chris Alden, China in Africa (London & New York: Zed Books, 2007); Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, African 
Perspectives on China in Africa (Cape Town, Nairobi, Oxford: Fahamu, 2007); Marcel Kitissou (ed.), Africa in 
China’s Global Strategy (London: Adonis & Abbey publishers, 2007); Chris Alden, Daniel Large and R. S. Oliveira 
(eds.), China Returns to Africa: a rising power and a continent embrace (London: Hurst, 2008); Robert I. Rotberg 
(ed.), China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Kweku 
Ampiah and S. Naidu (eds.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China (Pietermaritzburg: University of 
Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2008); Ian Taylor, China and Africa: engagement and compromise (London: Routledge, 
2009); Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: the Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
30 R. Roett and G. Paz, China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the 
United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); reports cited above by the World Bank and 
OECD. 
20 
 
studies comparing China’s interaction with both regions remain very scarce.31 The few existing academic 
publications covering China’s relations with more than one developing region, do not pursue comparative 
analysis.32 In recent years Chinese scholars and institutions have also been contributing increasingly to the 
debate on both regions. Chinese scholars have been actively participating in seminars and conferences 
around the world, publishing in English33 and simultaneously engaging a lot more with field research, 
regarded as a major hindrance in Chinese scholarly work until recently. In China, many old Africa and 
Latin America academic research units34 have been revitalised and new centres have been set up.35  
A significant part of the ongoing academic debate on China’s growing engagement with developing 
regions has, however, been locked into a debate of an increasingly ideological tone. This debate is around 
whether China is just another neo-colonialist power in search of raw materials and markets or if Beijing is 
just seizing opportunities in more levelled terrains. Although this debate falls outside the scope of this 
thesis, it underlines a common feature in the existing literature, which is the acknowledgment of China’s 
resources quest as a defining trait of its engagement in Africa and South America.  
The still scarce number of studies on China’s oil diplomacy in developing regions tends to focus on 
Africa.36 It is the candidate’s contention that the debate is lacking empirical, systematic and much needed 
comparative data. By comparing China’s oil diplomacy in Angola and Brazil, the present thesis proposes 
                                                           
31 Namely US Congressional Report Service, which has published several reports concerning China’s engagement in 
LA and Africa: CRS, China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, February 2009, 
CRS online publication; Thomas Lum, China’s Assistance and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities in 
Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, CRS online publication, November 2009, available online at: 
www.crs.gov (accessed 5 January 2010) 
32 The few existing publications on China and the developing world are mostly edited books containing a collection 
of diverse studies on China’s relations with different countries or regions: Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji 
(eds.), China’s New Role in Africa and the South: a Search for a New Perspective (Cape Town, Nairobi, Oxford: 
Fahamu, 2008); J. Eisenman, E. Heginbotham and D. Mitchel, China and the Developing World: Beijing’s strategy 
for the 21
st
 century (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). 
33 Among the very few works published in English stand out: Liu Hongwu and Yang Jiemian (eds.), Fifty Years of 
Sino-African Cooperation: Background, Progress and Significance (Chinese Perspectives on Sino-African 
Relations, Kunming: Yunnan University Press, 2009). 
34 These include the Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) and the Institute of Latin American 
Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, the Center for America Studies, and the Center for West Asian 
and African Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. For an overview of the evolution of African 
Studies in China since the early 20th century, see: Li Anshan, “African studies in China in the twentieth century: a 
historiographical survey” African Studies Review 48:1, 2005, pp. 59-87. 
35 Institute of Latin American Studies; Institute of African Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations in Beijing; and the newly opened Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University. 
36 Ian Taylor, “China’s oil diplomacy in Africa” International Affairs 82:5, pp. 937-959; Erica Downs, “The Fact 
and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Policy” China Security 3:3, 2007, pp. 42-68; Wenran Jiang, “Fueling the 
Dragon: China’s Rise and Its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa” The China Quarterly 199, September 
2009, pp. 585-609. 
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to make a contribution to filling this gap, which is critical for improving the understanding of China’s 
interaction with developing regions. 
1.3. Analytical framework: foreign policy Analysis 
This thesis is concerned with a particular instrument of China’s foreign policy (CFP) that has been 
extensively implemented in developing regions by Beijing in pursuit of its energy security goals: the 
extension of the so called ‘infrastructure-for-oil loans’. In order to analyse this subject one shall draw on 
concepts and tools of foreign policy analysis (FPA).  
1.3.1. Foreign policy analysis and theoretical approaches to Chinese Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy analysis is a subfield of International Relations (IR) that seeks to explain foreign policy, 
drawing much of its insights from IR theory. Theories of international politics, as Waltz acknowledged,37 
cannot fully account for states’ reactions to pressures in a given system. While IR is more concerned with 
patterns of outcomes of states interactions, FPA focuses on the dynamics behind states’ behaviour in the 
international realm. The analysis of this process is in fact much more intricate than the study of 
international politics, since it merges two levels of analysis (domestic and international), in which actors 
and structures interact in a complex manner. This reality makes it difficult to conceptualise, explain and 
assess the role of agent and structure in this process,38 a fact that made FPA a controversial analytical 
subject since its materialization following the Second World War.39  
Defying the challenging complexity of the subject, analysts struggled in the following decades to 
elaborate a general theory drawing on sets of different explanatory factors. Gideon Rose40 divides these 
contributions into four main schools: the Innenpolitik theories which emphasise the role of domestic 
factors in foreign policy formulation; offensive realism which stresses the determining role of systemic 
factors; defensive realism which upholds that systemic factors explain most foreign policy decisions but 
not all; and neoclassical realism which attempts to account for both external and internal factors. 
The Innenpolitik approach assumes internal factors such as political and economic regimes, 
socioeconomic structure, political factionalism, or national identity, are the independent variable. Most 
FPA studies produced between the 1950s and 1970s were of this nature and closely inspired by 
                                                           
37 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979) pp. 71-72. 
38 Walter Carlsnaes, “Actors, structures and foreign policy analysis”, in: Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, op. cit. , p. 86. 
39 For a comprehensive account on the historical evolution of FPA, see: Valerie Hudson, “The history and evolution 
of foreign policy analysis”, in: Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, Ibid., pp. 11-29. 
40 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World politics 51:1, 1998, pp. 146-151. 
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behaviouralism,41 stressed different domestic factors: the structure and process of groups making foreign 
policy decisions (Richard Snyder, 1950s); the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic 
politics (G. Allison and Halperin, 1970s); and the psychological dimension (Harold and Margaret Sprout, 
1950s and 1960s). In the late 1970s the field began to fall out of fashion, set against the rise of rational 
choice modeling and the neorealist theory which emphasized systemic structures. 
Stemming both from neorealist theory, the defensive and offensive realism schools depart from the same 
basic assumptions: states operating in an anarchical international system and the centrality of relative 
distribution of power. The structure of international system is thus the independent variable in both 
approaches. The main difference is that defensive realism (e.g. Waltz) is a little more benign, sustaining 
that states do not seek power beyond that is needed for security and survival, while offensive realism (e.g. 
Mearsheimer) argues that states seek hegemony and are ultimately more aggressive and act therefore to 
prevent the emergence of hegemons in other regions. 42  In this latter view, foreign policy will be 
exclusively shaped by the state’s relative capabilities and the external environment. In the case of 
defensive realism there is less room for domestic variables since aggressive behavior is seen as unnatural 
and dependent on the perception of the threat.43  
Like Innenpolitik, offensive and defensive realism oversimplify the equation by focusing on only one 
level (domestic factors or international structure, respectively) and hence provide inaccurate calculations. 
As Gideon points out, unit-level analysis fails to account why states with similar domestic structures act 
in different ways and why diverse states frequently act alike. The same is true about offensive and 
defensive realism, as different states facing similar systemic frameworks do not always act in similar 
ways, or even the same state in the same situation can act differently at two different points in time.44  
Drawing from a handful of works done in the post Cold War setting, Gideon Rose notes that a new 
approach emerged in the 1990s, that offers a way out of this predicament by inserting an intervening 
variable in the neorealist equation. In this perspective relative material power draws the basic contours of 
a state’s foreign policy, but does not fully determine its foreign policy behaviour, as this depends on 
decision-makers’ perceptions of relative material power. 45  This means, for instance, that leadership 
                                                           
41 Initiated in the US prior to the Second World war, and argued that all social sciences should model themselves on 
the natural sciences in order to move forward. 
42 R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: theories and approaches (Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 3rd ed.) pp. 86-87. 
43 Gideon Rose, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 
44 Gideon Rose, Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
45 Gideon Rose, Ibid., p. 146. 
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changes may account for foreign policy discontinuity in this regard, and that different balances between 
state structure and their respective society may affect their ability to allocate natural resources over time. 
Systemic factors do constrain foreign policy options, but it is the perceptions (sometimes misperceptions) 
at the unit level that influence the choices thereof. 
Nonetheless, one must keep in mind that relative material power assumes a key position in this theoretical 
model46 and therefore this should be the departure point for any foreign policy analysis. Relative material 
power refers to states’ capabilities and resources to influence each other, and the relative position in the 
international system that derives from this. States’ relative material power affects the way they perceive 
systemic forces and subsequently the way they behave.  
Another important assumption of neoclassical realism is that more than security, states seek stability in an 
anarchical international system through attempting to control their external environment. Furthermore, 
states which search for influence, tend to follow closely the expansion or contraction of their material 
resources. The corollary is that the relative amount of material power resources shape the aspirations and 
the range of states’ foreign policy.  
Unlike the defensive and offensive branches of neorealism, which came into existence primarily as a 
means to interpret international politics, the neoclassical realist branch’s core concern is in the analysis of 
foreign policy at a given place and time through the interface between the domestic and systemic realms.  
China’s increasing openness to the outside world and gradual engagement in multilateral fora such as the 
UN and the WTO, has exposed a bit more of the Chinese foreign policy ‘black box’ to scholarly research. 
This allowed for a closer look at the unit level structure and actors, access to which remained restricted 
throughout most of the existence of the PRC. China’s Foreign Policy (CFP) studies emerged in the 1960s 
and 1970s within ‘China’ area studies, a significant part of which related to China’s anti-colonial ventures 
in Africa.47  
International relations scholarly works on CFP remained relatively scarce until recently.48 Nonetheless, 
the amount of literature has been increasing since the early 1990s, and fastened in the 2000s. Iain 
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47 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation 
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California Press, 1977). 
48 A. Iain Johnston, Trends in Theory, op. cit., pp. 6-11. 
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Johnston categorized the existing works on CFP according to a variety of theoretical approaches: 
historical; Mao-centred ideology; Classic realism; constructivism; sociological learning; domestic 
politics; structural realism/neo-realism; and neoclassical realism.49  
Interestingly enough, domestic politics50 and neoclassic realism51 seem to have inspired a significant part 
of contemporary CFP studies. This is partly justified by the increasing access to domestic sources of 
Chinese foreign policy, and the manifest insufficiency of the neorealist school to assess the increasing 
complexity of China’s foreign policy as it enters the global stage.  
Offering arguably the most suitable theoretical framework to analyse CFP making, neoclassical realism 
has, nonetheless, its own shortcomings. The first one is related to the abstract nature of perceptions and 
thus the inability to assess, on the one hand, the ways in which ideational, cultural and psychological 
factors affect unit-level perceptions of their own and others relative to material power, and on the other 
hand how these perceptions turn into foreign policy.52 The second shortcoming relates to the increasing 
influence of new agents in foreign policy orientations. As Shaun Breslin argues, referring to the specific 
case of China’s IR, these approaches miss key determinants such as the interaction of a multiplicity of 
economic and political agents active at the domestic and international levels,53 that need to be equated to 
fully theorise contemporary Chinese foreign policy making.  
1.3.2. Foreign economic policy: economic diplomacy and economic statecraft 
Owing to its object of study (infrastructure-for-oil loans) this thesis is concerned with the economic realm 
of foreign policy. Even though security and political concerns have been predominant in foreign policy 
literature, economic issues have been a constant element in state’s foreign policies from the early days. In 
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fact trade motivated the earliest peaceful contacts and agreements between states, which written records 
date back to ancient civilizations (i.e. Egypt, Greece, China, etc.). Trade was also at the forefront of the 
first contacts between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ worlds initiated by the Portuguese navigators in the 15th 
century. Notwithstanding, war and peace have remained the core concern of foreign policy makers and 
students until very recently.  
Foreign economic policy (FEP) gradually surfaced as a relevant matter in the second half of the 20th 
century as a result of the progressive economic interdependence54 ignited by the array of multilateral 
institutions that surfaced in the aftermath of the Second World War. The technological breakthroughs in 
the following decades steadily contracted time and space boundaries leading to the globalisation of world 
economy. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the ideological divide, economic affairs 
finally gained centre stage in foreign policy.  
To a great extent foreign economic policy has evolved as a tool to manage domestic and international 
economic goals in a context of growing economic interdependence. As noted by Peter Katzenstein ‘the 
main rational of all strategies [of foreign economic policy] is to establish a basic compatibility between 
domestic and international policy objectives’55 and as such these strategies ‘grow out of the interaction of 
international and domestic forces.’56  
Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno identify three main theoretical approaches to explain foreign economic 
policy: international or system-centred; society centred and state centred. 57 Systemic approaches view 
FEP as a function of the state’s relative material power and international constraints or opportunities. 
Society centred approaches explain FEP as a function of domestic politics - the result of the struggle for 
influence among various interest groups or political parties. State-centred approaches emphasize the 
institutional structures of the state and the capacity of government official to realise their objectives in 
light of domestic and international constraints. This thesis subscribes to Ikenberry et al view that seem to 
privilege this last approach as it provides a more comprehensive explanation by integrating domestic and 
international forces and by placing the state at the centre. Although the state is neither a unified entity nor 
the only actor, it ‘is the principal national actor charged with the overall conduct of defense and foreign 
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affairs (…) [which gives its officials] a special legitimacy in the formulation and implementation of 
foreign economic policy’58.   
A significant part of foreign economic policy falls within the scope of what is commonly termed as 
‘economic diplomacy’.   
 A) Economic diplomacy 
As economic interaction across the world intensified, economic diplomacy progressively surfaced in the 
second half of the 20th century as an autonomous subject of analysis within foreign economic policy. 
Throughout this period studies on trade negotiations have predominated in the nascent field, reflecting the 
reality of international economic relations.  
Owing to its yet loose boundaries, the term economic diplomacy still lacks a widely accepted definition. 
Its fuzzy boundaries explain some conceptual confusion with the term ‘economic statecraft’, which is 
important to clarify in the context of the present thesis. 
In their dictionary of diplomacy Berridge and James describe economic diplomacy as: ‘diplomacy 
concerned with economic policy questions, including the work of delegations to conferences sponsored 
by bodies such as the World Trade Organisation.’59 This definition mirrors, to a great extent, the dominant 
literature on commercial diplomacy.   
Economic and commercial diplomacy, however, are not synonyms. As noted by Ambassador Kishan 
Rana60 commercial diplomacy is a subset of economic diplomacy, which in fact has a much wider scope 
as it encompasses economic policy issues. Rana identifies four key pillars in contemporary economic 
diplomacy: 61 (1) trade promotion (exports and imports), (2) investment promotion (inward and outward), 
(3) attracting suitable technologies and (4) management of economic aid/cooperation (be it from donor or 
receiving country perspective); all working towards the broader goal of enhancing the image of the 
country.  
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Bayne and Woolcock have made an invaluable contribution to this debate with three editions of The New 
Economic Diplomacy (2003, 2007 and 2011). Reflecting the increasingly complex and fast changing 
nature of contemporary foreign economic relations they underline the much wider scope and content of 
economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is ‘about how states conduct their international economic 
relations (…): how they make decisions domestically; how they negotiate with each other internationally; 
and how these processes interact.’62 Through their lenses economic diplomacy is concerned with63:  
(1) International economic issues - domestic and international economic realms, however, have become 
closely intertwined due to spiralling interdependence;  
(2) Governmental activities in all its formats (ministries, departments, embassies and agencies) – though 
non-state actors such as private business sector and NGO’s increasingly shape governmental policies;  
(3) The impact of markets – unlike political diplomacy, economic diplomacy is sensitive to market 
developments in that they influence and shape the actors involved;  
(4) A wide range of instruments – from informal and voluntary cooperation to binding regulations as well 
as economic incentives and sanctions, also referred to as economic statecraft.  
This apparent overlap between economic diplomacy and economic statecraft has sometimes led to the 
incorrect use of the two terms as synonyms. The clarification of this confusion is critical in the context of 
this thesis as it justifies why one employs the term ‘economic statecraft’ and not ‘economic diplomacy’. 
Bayne and Woolcock emphasise that economic diplomacy is not defined by its instruments but by the 
economic negotiation that provide its content, namely policies related to trade, investment, services, 
cooperation, aid, information and their regulation.  Further to this they add that while economic 
diplomacy refers to concrete negotiations, economic statecraft has a broader connotation sometimes 
linked to a ‘grand strategy’.64 This distinction is clearly in line with the thinking of one of the founding 
theorists of economic statecraft: D. Baldwin. According to him, diplomacy refers to influence attempts 
primarily through negotiation65 while economic statecraft concerns influence attempts through the use of 
economic sanctions or rewards.  
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The above mentioned reasons justify thus why this thesis is not about economic diplomacy but about 
economic statecraft. Its focus is not on how a particular instrument of foreign economic policy came into 
being, its content and the negotiation process, but rather on the efficacy of the instrument at the 
implementation level in two different institutional contexts.  
 b) Economic statecraft as a foreign policy instrument 
Policies are not self-executing. Channelling intentions into outcomes involves the selection and use of 
what, at the time, is assessed to be the best available means to achieve objectives. The wrong choice of 
means can not only distort original intentions, but also seriously compromise what is achieved by a given 
policy. The choice of the instrument to be used is therefore a key point in the implementation phase.  
The use of instruments by policy makers, in order to pursue a certain foreign goal, is commonly referred 
to as statecraft. While there is no consensual taxonomy of foreign policy instruments, most authors tend to 
list them in ascending order from soft to hard measures, and ranging from diplomacy to military 
intervention. A less controversial sorting is Mastanduno’s division of statecraft instruments into three 
major categories: diplomatic, military and economic.66  
Even though the use of economic instruments can be traced back to ancient Greece, diplomatic and 
military tools have historically occupied the centre stage in foreign policy making - inspiring most 
international relations literature from Machiavelli to Clausewitz. In sharp contrast with diplomacy (an 
attempt to influence through negotiations) and military statecraft (attempt to influence through the use of 
force), the use of economic statecraft has been underestimated by most analysts, and has therefore 
received little attention from scholars.67  
Economic statecraft can be defined as ‘the use of economic instruments by a government to influence the 
behaviour of another state’ and can involve the use of sanctions or inducements’. 68 Negative economic 
statecraft involves the use of economic sanctions, coercion or punishment (sticks, i.e. trade or investment 
restrictions, financial sanctions, assets seizure) to interfere with the economy of the target, so as force a 
change in its behaviour. Positive economic statecraft, on the other hand, involves the extension of 
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economic incentives or rewards (carrots, i.e. trade and investment promotion, financial incentives, and 
technology transfer) in return for compliance with the extender foreign policy goals. 
During the Cold War, the use of economic sanctions became a popular foreign policy instrument. This 
triggered some academic interest on negative economic statecraft.69 Research has focused on two major 
debates: what causes economic sanctions to fail or succeed, and on its usefulness as a foreign policy 
tool.70 While some concluded that economic sanctions are not particularly efficient as a foreign policy 
tool,71 others consider them useful in signalling intentions or in complementing other forms of statecraft.72  
This thesis, however, is not concerned with the study of negative economic statecraft, as China does not 
have a record of making use of these tools bilaterally, nor multilaterally. Since its accession to UN 
Security Council in 1971, China has in most cases abstained from voting on economic sanctions 
resolutions. On the other hand, Beijing has made profuse use of economic inducements in pursuing its 
foreign policy goals since the founding of the PRC. China has, in fact, a long track of resorting to 
economic inducements in pursuing its foreign policy goals. In exchange for political allegiance to the 
communist cause, China extended in the 1960s and 1970s soft loans to African countries, some of which 
were for infrastructure construction using Chinese equipment and labour. The most celebrated example 
under Mao’s rule was the construction of the Tazara railway.73 China has also consistently deployed 
economic inducements to pursue another major political goal - the encirclement of Taiwan, by ‘paying 
off’ countries to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing at the expense of Taipei.74 The success of China’s 
‘dollar diplomacy’ grew alongside its swelling financial resources throughout the 1990s and 2000s.75 
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Positive economic statecraft, as defined by Mastanduno, means “the provision or promise of economic 
benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state.” 76 He distinguishes two types of positive 
economic statecraft in regard to the ends they intent to pursue: tactical linkage and structural linkage. The 
first one (also called specific positive linkage) envisages an immediate outcome through the provision of 
a specific economic inducement (i.e. Marshal Plan). Structural linkage (or general positive linkage), on 
the other hand, involves a long-term engagement providing a steady stream of economic inducements. 
These generally favour economic interdependence that gradually transforms domestic interests in the 
target country, and ultimately leads to a growing influence over the policy options of the weaker state, 
ultimately consolidating a coalition with the sanctioning states.77 This type of economic inducement is in 
a way linked to the concept of ‘soft power’, developed by Joseph Nye (‘getting others to want the 
outcomes that you want’).78  
Although the use of economic inducements has become more apparent in the context of the fast growing 
economic interdependence that characterises the post Cold War World, academic research on positive 
economic statecraft remains scant. Aimed at contributing to filling this gap, this thesis argues that 
economic statecraft is a key tool in China’s current foreign policy towards developing regions, and that it 
has been reasonably successful in achieving Beijing’s goals. 
In order to pursue its ends though, the means need to be deployed in the target country, where the 
interplay with the local environment will determine the outcome. 
1.3.3. Foreign policy implementation  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the performance of a specific foreign policy instrument when put into 
practice. Because foreign policy choices are not self-executing, the emphasis is put on channelling 
intentions into outcomes. This entails the interplay between the actor’s strategy and the targeted context, 
knitting together the domestic with the international. Underlying this exercise is the agency-structure 
dilemma: 79  what best explains foreign policy outcomes: the actor’s preferences/interests or external 
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constrains? In order to better understand this interplay one shall depart from the ‘strategic-relational’ 
approach. 
The strategic-relational model was originally developed by Colin Hay80 and later applied to foreign policy 
analysis by Elisabetta Brighi.81 According to this model neither strategy nor context isolated can explain 
foreign policy outcomes. The success or failure of foreign policies is determined by the dialectic interplay 
between internal preferences and external constrains. It is called strategic, because the actor’s actions 
envisage the attainment of certain goals; and is relational because it only becomes intelligible when 
analysed in relation to its environment.82  
According to Brighi and Hill, in analysing foreign policy implementation through this model, one must 
consider three basic assumptions. First, context has a relational nature. The successful implementation of 
a given foreign policy depends on how strategically placed the actor is and how correctly they interpret 
constraints and opportunities in the surrounding context. Context has thus different meanings to different 
actors. Secondly, there is a constant interplay between actors and context at both material and perceptions 
levels, which are eventually internalised in the political process. And thirdly, this interactive process of 
action and reaction stimulates constant feedback from actor to context and vice versa, which may produce 
changes in the context or in the actor’s strategy.83  
From an analytical perspective, the ‘international’ entails two dimensions at the implementation level: 
horizontal and vertical. The horizontal dimension involves the perimeter scope of its foreign policy, 
spanning from local to regional and global. The scope depends on the actor’s position in the environment, 
the resources at its disposal and the strategic value of these. The vertical dimension results from the 
functional stratification of the actor’s interests/goals: political, economic, military, normative and cultural. 
The hierarchy amongst these varies according the actor.84 
To finalise this conceptualisation, there is always a degree of interaction between the ‘domestic’ and the 
‘international’ spheres in the process of implementing a certain foreign policy. This entails the 
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mobilisation of material and immaterial (nation’s support) resources to achieve certain foreign policy 
objectives, and the pursuit of domestic goals through foreign policy (or vice-versa). 85  
The instrument-context dynamics are therefore critical in determining whether the outcome will coincide 
with (success) or diverge from (failure) the expected ends. The conceptualisation of the context will 
therefore allow for a better understanding of the causes behind different regional outcomes regarding 
China’s oil diplomacy in developing regions.   
1.3.3.1. Conceptualising the host institutional context 
Here again emerges the ‘structure-agency’ dilemma. Even though the candidate argues for the primacy of 
the structure in explaining regional-level variations, agency is acknowledged as an influencing factor in 
explaining country-level discrepancies. This is the case with perceptions regarding the strategic 
importance of China vis à vis the target countries and vice versa.  
Regarding the host country’s perception of the strategic importance of China, these perceptions vary from 
strictly political to largely economic in nature. According to Philip Andrews-Speed, the strategic 
importance of China seems to be higher in countries where: a) there is a need to attract alternative 
investment in the face of sanctions or other international constraints (e.g. Sudan and Zimbabwe); b) need 
to reduce dependence on western international oil companies (IOCs, as a means to increase their 
bargaining power); c) resources on offer are of marginal interest to IOCs (Chad, Peru, Ecuador and 
Tanzania); d) there is a great need for investment in oil and infrastructures (most African cases and South 
America, having the advantage of offering non-conditional aid); e) there is a search for demand security 
(such is the case of major producing countries which in general see Asian partners as most promising in 
this regard); and f) where China is seen as critical political counter-balance vis à vis the West (i.e. 
Venezuela and Iran).86 So, in these cases, China has naturally more chances of success.  
Conversely, Chinese perceptions of the target country may also influence deviations from the regional 
pattern. The most relevant considerations of the Chinese government can be measured in terms of the 
volume of oil reserves of the target country, and its political relevance to China (as a strategic ally in 
international fora or simply in pursuing the encirclement of Taiwan). This is the case, for instance, with 
Venezuela, where the sheer size of its oil reservoirs have to a certain extent balanced the negative impact 
of the unstable institutional structure at play. This explains why, for instances in the face of the 
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nationalisation of some of China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) assets in that country, the 
Chinese government pressed CNPC not only to stay in the country,87 but even to invest more heavily in 
spite of the low return of its investments there - mostly resulting from regulatory volatility.  
However, while agency (i.e. perceptions) is useful in explaining intra-regional deviations (country-level), 
when it comes to regional variations, structures hold a much stronger explanatory power. That is the 
reason why this variable will not be tested and there will be a focus instead on institutional structure, as 
conceptualised below.  
Although the literature still lacks a systematised analysis of the factors operating at the context level - that 
influence the outcome variations in China’s engagement in resources in developing regions - many 
different explanations have been suggested, with most of them of a structural nature. These explanations 
have been pointed out in a scattered manner, and regarding to what attracts Chinese resources investment 
to particular contexts. In table 1.1. (below), there is an attempt to summarize some of the factors that have 
been pointed out, mostly deriving from China-Africa studies as research is more plentiful in this specific 
segment. While this thesis is not concerned with what attracts Chinese investment, some of these factors 
may be useful in explaining what causes them to fail or succeed. 
Table 1.1. Major factors attracting Chinese investment in resources sectors in developing countries 
 
Nature Factor  Hypothesis 
 
 
Political 
Power balance Chinese resources investment is attracted to contexts where there 
is no other major power. 
 
Regime type Chinese resources investment is attracted to autocratic regimes. 
  
Political risk  Chinese resources investment is attracted to stable political 
environments. 
 
Burden costs Chinese resources investment is attracted by low indirect costs 
such as feeble labour and environmental standards. 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
Competition with 
other MNC 
Chinese resources investment is attracted to contexts where there 
is low competition. 
Economic risk Chinese resources investment is attracted to high risk context 
that promises high profit margin prospects. 
 
 Source: Elaborated by the author. 
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Regarding China’s resource security quest, the context factor that seems to be more popular in the 
existing literature is related to the nature of the host’s political regime. Many analysts believe there is an 
ambiguous nexus between China’s resources ventures and autocratic contexts.88 Regarding outcomes, the 
success of this nexus seems to be confirmed by a significant number of cases, i.e. Sudan, Angola, Iran and 
Venezuela, where China has acquired significant resources equity. However, there are other examples 
involving Chinese deals with autocratic regimes, where resources contracts were cancelled or revised 
(Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC - and Gabon). For this reason, regimes, per se, cannot be 
considered a determining factor in China’s resources ventures outcomes.  
Numerous studies analysing the relationship between regime type and FDI flows, produced inconclusive 
results, suggesting an inconsistent correlation between different political regimes and FDI attraction.89 A 
significant number of studies do suggest, nonetheless, a strong nexus between FDI and undemocratic 
regimes in developing countries. Heiner Schultz90 argues that the nature of this correlation is actually 
more sectoral than political, since developing states attracting investments are primarily resource rich 
countries, and as such more frequently have autocratic governments - hence the link.  
If, on the one hand, one may admit that Chinese resource ventures have been more successful in Africa 
where there is a higher incidence of non-democratic regimes compared to South America; on the other 
hand, the above discussion shows that regime type alone, cannot account for the observed regional 
disparity regarding China’s performance in resources industries.  
This thesis argues that, more than the nature of the regime, it is the institutional specificities of the 
business environment in the resources sector in each region that constrain the outcome. It is possible to 
identify, in an abstract manner, a structural difference between both regions that is to a large extent 
influencing this divide in regional engagement patterns. This could be named ‘institutional structure’, as it 
reflects a combination of institutionalised features. In the context of the present thesis, institutional 
structure shall thus be understood as the balance between executive constrains (pluralist and pro-active 
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civil society, government accountability and administrative complexity) and the institutional capacity of 
the state to mediate those.  
The notion of region is, above all, a constructed idea grounded on a given geographic perimeter whose 
reality has been shaped by interactive historical, cultural, political and economic processes. These 
processes produced a certain degree of convergence with regards to the region’s socio-political-economic 
foundations, accounting therefore for its distinctiveness vis à vis other regions. While the state system can 
be said to be primarily composed of democratizing and liberal states in South America,91 in Africa 
regimes assume in general a more authoritarian and monopolistic/oligopolistic nature.92 In the context of 
the present thesis, political-economic-social trends are thus regarded as determining critical differences in 
the institutional structure of resources sectors in each region. The present thesis will focus on a particular 
aspect of these structures, which is the balance between executive constrains and institutional capacity.  
The above claim is inspired by the literature on the relationship between regime type and FDI and, 
particularly, on the findings of O. Bayulgen and J. Ladewig, who argue that FDI attractiveness varies 
according the institutional structure: 
We hypothesize that high degrees of executive constraints  
create an investment environment that is credible for foreign investors only in political 
regimes that have the institutional capacity to build coalitions among veto players and 
resolve conflicts regarding investment policies. Weak executive constraints, 
alternatively, are attractive for foreign investors in political regimes that lack the 
institutional capacity to mediate among veto players. Hence, both consolidated 
democracies and autocratic regimes can produce investment policies that are attractive 
to foreign investors. Democratizing regimes, on the other hand, usually undergo 
increasing pluralism in the context of weak institutional capacity and are therefore less 
attractive for risk-adverse foreign investors.
93 
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The transitional type of states found in South America are in general characterised by a poor institutional 
balance. The weakened central political power has not yet developed the institutional capacity to 
efficiently manage the increasingly decentralised and pluralist system characterised by strong and 
demanding constituencies (local powers, interest groups and civil society). This results in an investment 
environment marked by a convoluted regulatory framework, fragmented decision making process and a 
fuzzy line of authority. 
In the case of Africa, authoritarian governments do not have the institutional capacity, but they do not face 
executive constraints either, since interest groups only exist within the patronage line. Investment wise, 
this is a friendlier environment as authority line is clear and decision making more concentrated in 
general. As Chabal & Daloz94 note, even in apparently successful democratizing states in Africa, where 
multi-party elections have been introduced, in reality not much has changed. This is because political 
legitimacy continues to rest in personalised complex patronage networks, and political elites continue to 
manage state affairs informally and in their own interests and of their clients. 
Stability of the institutional structure is a critical concept in this context, as it is perceived as a key 
determinant for investment to thrive. This is particularly so in resources, since it involves large upfront 
transfers of capital and technology, which are highly immobile thereafter. In the context of the resources 
sector, the concept of stability refers primarily to an enforceable and predictable framework defining 
ownership, dispute settlements, taxation and a regulatory framework that allows for the minimisation of 
investment risks in the medium-long term.  
In China’s case, in a context of high returns prospects, political risk measured purely in terms of 
violence/security threat seems to bear little effect over its involvement in resources sectors (China 
maintained its oil operations in Sudan and Ethiopia even after its nationals were targeted by local 
insurgents). On the other hand, regime stability seems to matter much more due to the negative impact it 
has in terms of contract and general regulatory stability (namely the case with Nigeria, where the 
incoming leadership in 2007 froze Chinese contracts signed during the former government). For this 
reason, one considers of particular importance the stability of the general institutional framework and in 
particular the stability of the regulatory framework of respective oil industries. 
1.3.4. Learning and adaptation in foreign policy 
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There is one last dimension of implementation which is considered relevant in the context of the present 
thesis. This is how success and failure feed back into policy making and whether it is introducing changes 
in China’s economic statecraft in developing regions. As the number of stakeholders and constituencies in 
CFP expands, feedback has become more relevant in the foreign policy making process.95 This introduces 
the concept of learning in foreign policy. 
Although the question of what learning can be drawn from history has always been latent in the minds of 
foreign policy makers and analysts, the issue became theorised for the first time only in the 1970s. The 
inability of structural approaches to explain change in Soviet foreign policy, and the subsequent dismissal 
of the Soviet Bloc, inspired a new wave of research on learning in the 1990s.96 Learning as a tool to 
understand change processes has since been applied to different structures and actors spanning from 
leaders, institutions to epistemic communities, and analysed using diverse theoretical and methodological 
perspectives, from social psychology (heuristic and cognitive approaches) to game theories.97  
This thesis is only concerned with learning from experience and not with deductive learning (e.g. lessons 
from history). Jack Levy understands experiential learning as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of 
confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the 
observation and interpretation of experience.” 98 Levy distinguishes two phases in the political learning 
process: firstly the observation and interpretation of experience that leads to change in individual beliefs, 
and secondly when that belief change influences subsequent behaviour and becomes institutionalised.  
The reason for this distinction is that learning does not necessarily entail political change. As Levy 
stresses, learning is not necessary or sufficient for change.99 It is not necessary because change can occur 
through other variables such as structural adjustments and political change. Also it is not sufficient, 
because even when learning occurs, it may not be translated into policy changes, as it might be blocked 
by political or organizational constraints.  
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There is another experiential process which is often viewed as a lesser type of learning, because it is more 
mechanistic (trial and error, adjustments to constraints and incentives). Since it overlaps to some extent 
with the neorealist concept of structural adjustment,100  it is sometimes referred to as the ‘neorealist 
approach to learning.’ 101  Philip Tetlock refers to it as ‘tactical learning’ 102  and by E. Haas as 
‘adaptation’.103 The main difference between tactical/adaptive learning and learning is that the former 
does not necessarily entail a change in beliefs. Adaptation is ‘the ability to change one’s behaviour so as 
to meet challenges in the form of new demands without having to revaluate one’s entire program of 
reasoning on which that program depends for legitimacy’. 104  Adaptation results from the 
acknowledgement of flaws in the policies being deployed, and the attempt to fix them through a cost-
effective equation between means and ends. It entails adapting means to new constraints or incentives, 
that do not necessarily question the beliefs that underlie the selected ends. Learning, on the other hand, 
pre-supposes the recognition of conflict amongst values. While learning entails a change in means and 
ends, adaptation leads only to a change in means. 
Drawing from the literature on learning in foreign policy, P. Tetlock theorises that foreign policy beliefs 
are hierarchically organised as follows: fundamental assumptions and policy objectives at the top of the 
system, followed by strategic policy beliefs and preferences, and tactical beliefs and preferences at the 
base of the system. He then summarizes four hypotheses on the conditions under which learning is likely 
to occur and the types of learning that come out of this: a) Most learning take place at the tactical level, as 
policy makers are more willing to make frequent tactical adjustments to face constraints than to question 
policy fundamentals; b) policy makers only question their strategic policy beliefs after repeated tactical 
failures; c) they only reconsider fundamental goals after recurrent failure of strategic solutions; d) unit-
level actors tend to minimise changes in beliefs by trying to accommodate new evidence and arguments 
into the pre-existent belief system.105 Since most learning (the adaptive/tactical kind) seems to take place 
at the tactical level, one may conclude that policy changes are more likely to happen at the this stage, 
excluding, of course, the emergence of new systemic or domestic structural constraints.  
                                                           
100 Which is, basically, states’ rational adjustment to systemic (relative power) pressures.  
101 Philip Tetlock, “Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: in Search of an Elusive Concept”, in: G. Breslauer 
and P. Tetlock, Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) pp. 24-27. 
102 Philip Tetlock, Ibid., p. 28. 
103 Ernest B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organization (Berkeley: 
Univ. Of California Press, 1990) p. 33-34.  
104 Ernest B. Haas, Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
105 Philip Tetlock, op. cit., (1991), pp. 28-31. 
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Even though normative changes in Chinese foreign policy are unlikely to occur in the short-term as 
covered by this thesis, it is argued that the implementation of Chinese economic statecraft is producing 
changes of a more practical nature. For this reason, the concept of adaptation/adjustment will be used in 
searching for relevant policy change. Its focus will thus be on changes that occurred through tactical 
learning. This is based on the argument that, at the present time, the most likely cause of change in 
Chinese foreign policy is what it is ‘learning from practice’ through immersion in the context, where it is 
trying to pursue its ends. 
1.4. The use of positive economic statecraft in China’s oil diplomacy  
1.4.1. The economic drive and pluralisation of actors in Chinese Foreign Policy 
In spite the ideological continuity that Chinese officials like to stress in public discourses,106 the fact is 
that China’s contemporary foreign policy hardly resembles that of the early days of the People’ Republic 
of China (PRC), when those guidelines emerged.  
Even though the political structure of the regime remained mostly unchanged, the growing synergies 
between the fast changing domestic and international contexts, led to a profound reappraisal of Chinese 
Foreign Policy (CFP). The master shift behind this reassessment was the emerging economic drive, which 
led to seismic changes in the content of CFP, its formulation, and the way it is implemented.  
Under Mao Zedong’s rule, Chinese foreign policy was geared up around political and military security 
interests, framed by the ideological competition with its former enemies (the US and Soviet Union).107 In 
sharp contrast, economic reforms gradually introduced an element of economic pragmatism in CFP 
decision making. With Deng Xiaoping, economic development became CFP’s top priority in the 1980s. In 
this framework, China’s foreign policy focused in normalizing diplomatic ties with as many countries as 
possible, irrespective of their ideological orientation (zhoubian zhengce, or peripheral policy).108 A more 
friendly international posture was seen as essential to attract investment and boost trade. If under Mao 
                                                           
106 Among these figure the ‘Five principles of peaceful co-existence’, centrality of south-south cooperation, and the 
quest for a new economic order more just towards developing countries. 
107 Under Mao, China’s development strategy had no direct impact on its foreign policy, because of its self reliant 
nature. For a detailed analysis of development strategy impact in CFP during Mao and in the reform period up to the 
mid 1990s, see: Barry Naughton, “The foreign policy implications of China’s economic development strategy”, in: 
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York: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 47-69. 
108 For a detailed account on this peripheral diplomacy and China’s quest to stabilise its relations with its Asian 
neighbours throughout the 1980s and 1990s, see: Suisheng Zhao, “The making of China’s periphery policy”, in: 
Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism & Strategic Behavior (NY & London: M.E. Sharpe, 
2004) pp. 256-275. 
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foreign trade and economic cooperation were used as instruments to pursue CFP international political 
goals, in the reform era the situation reversed as CFP gradually became subservient to domestic 
development imperatives.109 
By the end of the 1990s, the ‘open door policy’ had successfully placed China among the top Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) recipients and leading world exporters. During this process, Chinese enterprises 
became successful exporters as they gained knowledge and experience with foreign capital through joint 
ventures (JV) with multinational corporations (MNC) in China. Facing fierce competition internally 
(output capacity outpacing domestic demand) and scarcity of domestic supply of strategic resources, 
Chinese firms were naturally compelled at the turn of the century to venture overseas. The launching of 
‘going global policy’ by Beijing, surfaced thus as a way to promote the globalisation of Chinese firms 
through specific policy incentives, political backing and financial support. Chinese state owned 
enterprises (SOE) were naturally the major beneficiaries. By accessing strategic inputs abroad (raw 
materials, top end technology and ‘know how’), increasing its market share and by creating/acquiring 
global brands, the regime aspires to upgrade its production value chain, and move beyond the export-
development model, and through this means sustain China’s growth pace. 
Gradually deprived of its ideological legitimacy throughout the economic liberalisation process, the 
regime became increasingly dependent on maintaining the country in a steady development path. In order 
to pursue that goal without causing major doctrinal ruptures, Chinese foreign policy has become 
increasingly characterised by what Suisheng Zhao labelled “pragmatism and strategic behaviour”.110 
If during the ‘open door policy’ period the domestic economic agenda gradually emerged as an influential 
element in CFP formulation, with the implementation of the ‘go out policy’ in the 2000s, Chinese 
economic interests became paramount in China’s foreign affairs. Even though the core national interests 
remain mostly the same, namely regime stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity, national unification 
and economic development,111 the relevance of this last aspect came to be the cornerstone, as all others 
became ultimately reliant on it.  
                                                           
109 For a concise study on Chinese foreign policy drivers from Mao to Jiang Zemin, see: Thomas W. Robinson, 
“Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s”, in: Robinson and Shambaugh, op. cit., p. 568. 
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111 For a detailed analysis of the changing features of China’s national interest from Mao to the present see: Ye 
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2009, pp. 31-37. 
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The primacy of economic concerns over political ones was further reinforced by the wider international 
context. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the information age further accelerated the 
intensification of economic flows at the global stage. Within this rapid changing framework, the 
importance of economic statecraft112 increased substantially vis à vis diplomatic and military instruments 
in foreign relations.  
If during Mao’s rule foreign policy making was highly centralised and the exclusive realm of a handful of 
individuals under the direct control of the Great Helmsman, in the reform period progressive 
professionalization and institutionalisation have made the process significantly more complex.113 While 
senior leaders still have considerable latitude in major issues of strategy, the setting of broad agendas and 
crisis management, an increasingly large number of bureaucratic institutional actors are assuming a more 
active role in routine issue, 114  particularly in what concerns economic affairs. 115  The increasing 
complexity of issues facing decision makers in the context of economic interdependence and the relative 
inexperience of the paramount leaders in the matter, has provided room not only for proliferation of new 
agents in lower bureaucratic echelons, but also for them to have a greater say in decision making.  
According to Lu Ning there are three types of actors intervening in contemporary Chinese foreign policy 
decision making:116 the central leadership, the foreign policy leading small group (LSG), and the central 
bureaucracy. This picture reflects the complexities of interlocking between the party and the 
governmental structures in which the first remains paramount. The central leadership is composed of the 
highest ranks of the party structure (who retain the key posts in the government): the paramount leader 
and his inner circle of trustees, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the Politburo members - in 
this order of authority. The central leadership determines the guiding principles and orientation of foreign 
policy, retaining the ultimate decision making power over all issues. Furthermore, the Central Foreign 
Affairs LSG is an informal decision making consulting body that includes leading members of party, 
government and military ministerial ranking agencies involved in foreign affairs. In addition to its policy 
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consultation prerogative, it also serves as a policy coordination and supervision mechanism. The central 
bureaucracy includes a number of ministerial ranking institutions that are in charge of foreign policy 
implementation. At the governmental level and as far as economic foreign policy is concerned, the most 
important are the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).  
Also, according to Lu Ning, the rationale shift from national security to economic development generated 
critical shifts concerning the role of different actors in foreign policy making. These include the erosion of 
the role of the paramount leader in favour of a collective core, decentralisation of decision making power 
in favour of MOFA at the expense of the central leadership, and growing influence of MOFCOM at the 
expense of MOFA.  
MOFCOM117 has had an increasingly primary role in devising strategies, planning and implementing 
foreign trade and economic cooperation policies. Notwithsatnding, MOFCOM’s control over foreign 
economic policy is also being eroded by the growing economic international assertiveness of sub-national 
bureaucratic and corporate agents such as provincial authorities and state owned enterprises (SOEs).118 It 
is worth noting, as David Lampton underlines, that: 
Decentralization has been most evident in the international economic arena and least 
so in handling of high level diplomacy and national security strategy. 
Decentralization and pluralization are, in fact, intimately related, inasmuch as the 
delegation of authority to lower level actors (for example, provinces), and the 
toleration of increased initiative by them gives rise to the growing number of actors 
that influence Chinese foreign policy.119  
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Pluralisation challenges, though, are not limited to proliferation of actors and decentralisation at the lower 
echelons of the bureaucracy. CFP making has also had to cope with growing inputs from Chinese think 
tanks and public opinion.120  
While the discussion above is important to understand and analytically frame Chinese foreign policy 
making at present, this thesis is particularly interested with foreign policy synergies emanating from 
China’s energy security concerns. The section below will elaborate further on this topic.  
1.4.2. Energy security in CFP: unpacking the domestic institutional structure  
As highlighted above China’s foreign policy choices became increasingly driven by domestic economic 
imperatives. Among these, energy security concerns stand out as it substantiates one of its major external 
liabilities featuring therefore high in CFP agenda.  
The relevance of energy security in a given country’s foreign policy is directly proportional to its reliance 
on external supply of energy sources, which are in most cases non-renewable. Despite the large array of 
energy sources (oil, gas, coal, uranium, etc.), energy security is largely associated with security of supply 
of hydrocarbons due to the more uneven distribution of its reservoirs.  
Ensuring oil security in the current global context is a daunting task.121 The fast expanding gap between 
ever-growing global consumption and finite oil resources has fuelled fierce competition for supplies 
leading to skyrocketing oil prices. To this adds increasing supply uncertainty owing to greater reliance on 
supply markets historically plagued by political instability, manipulation, terrorism, nationalisation 
policies etc.  
There is no single universally recognised definition of energy security. Definitions vary across countries, 
reflecting their particular contexts and concerns. While in producing countries energy security is tied to 
ensuring a steady demand, for an oil importer the security lies on steady supply. Most states though tend 
to address energy concerns in supply and demand sides (namely consumption restraining and expansion 
of renewable sources), and some even integrate environmental and socio-economic concerns. A widely 
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spread and more basic connotation describes energy security as ‘the availability of sufficient supplies at 
affordable prices’122. 
According to the Energy Research Institute at the NDRC123 and official documents,124 China’s energy 
security strategy presently seems to be addressing two equally important fronts: domestic and overseas 
supply. Domestically, the strategy encompasses improving efficiency in consumption (reducing waste and 
diversifying the energy matrix through renewable energy) and increasing production (by attracting foreign 
investment and new exploration technologies). On the overseas front, the strategy encompasses ensuring 
steady supply and the diversification of its import sources.  
This thesis is concerned with the overseas front. As previously discussed, Beijing greatest energetic 
external reliance is oil. For this reason, the present thesis will focus on China’s oil diplomacy, hereby 
understood as the policies and strategies devised to ensure steady supply of oil at reasonable prices and 
the diversification of its import sources.  
Successive institutional reforms in the energy sector in recent years underline the centrality of this issue 
for the present leadership. These reforms featured an attempt to reassert central authority over the sector, 
so as to increase coordination and allow for the implementation of a much needed overarching energy 
security strategy. Following the disbanding of the Ministry of Energy in 1993, energy policy making 
became dispersed between several ministries, bureaucratic bodies and SOEs. The first attempt to 
centralise the sector took place in 2003, with the creation of the Energy Bureau, which was aimed at 
coordinating, regulating and implementing energy policies. This was followed by the establishment of a 
high level Energy Leading Group in 2005 (ELG, advisory role to the State Council), supported by a State 
Energy Office (administrative body). The new institutional structure, however, struggled to assert primacy 
over energy SOEs and the existing energy bureaucracy.125 A new reform was needed. The Energy Bureau 
was replaced by the National Energy Administration (NEA, placed under the National Development and 
Reform Commission, NDRC126) in 2008. An attempt was also made in 2008 to reinstate the Ministry of 
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Energy, but the initiative was blocked by vested interests in the sector. In January 2010, the ELG was 
replaced by the National Energy Commission (NEC, advisory board under the State Council). NEC is 
headed by Premier Wen Jiabao, NDRC’s chairman and the head of NEA. The committee integrates 21 
members of various government agencies, 127  and is a clear effort to accommodate the various 
stakeholders’ interests.128  
The formulation and implementation of China’s energy security goals has become increasingly complex 
integrating inputs from an array of different state actors spanning from supra-ministerial organs, several 
ministries and respective departments, governmental financial institutions and corporate agents. In the 
context of China’s oil diplomacy a handful of NOCs have become paramount in pursuing Beijing’s 
interests overseas.  
Although the new structure represents a significant improvement, Erica Downs notes that its efficiency is 
crippled by insufficient manpower, authority and autonomy necessary to coordinate the interests of all the 
stakeholders (ministries, commissions and SOEs). 129  The fragmented nature of the energy sector is 
particularly evident in the oil industry, its roots laying deep in the history of the sector. Even though China 
had a ministry of oil (Ministry of Petroleum Industry, MOPI130) for a considerable long period of time 
(1955-1988) the liberalisation of the sector in the 1980s led to the gradual fragmentation of authority in 
the sector. In 1982 MOPI established its first oil corporation, China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC). The aim was to facilitate the opening up of the sector to foreign participation in offshore 
fields, envisaging an increase in oil production by accessing their superior technology. The following year 
another enterprise was established, China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) to which 
authority was granted over most of the refining complex of the country. In 1988 MOPI was dissolved to 
give way to another oil corporation, China National Oil Corporation (CNPC), retaining however 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
overseeing China's overall economic development. Energy issues are critical for the country’s development, and this 
is the reason why energy management has been placed under its authority. 
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issues” Survival 48:1, 2006, pp. 179-190; Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “A Chinese view of China’s energy security” Journal 
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ministerial ranking. Oil trading monopoly was given to China National Chemical Import Export 
Corporation (Sinochem). 131 
Although in the beginning CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC had their activities well delimited (CNPC 
concentrating in onshore operations, CNOOC in offshore, Sinopec in downstream), all of them gradually 
integrated upstream and downstream operations in the 1990s. Notwithstanding, Sinopec remains the 
major player in domestic refinery; CNOOC still retains control over offshore production and CNPC in 
onshore output. Mostly owing to its advantage starting point (formerly the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry) CNPC remains China’s largest oil and gas producer and supplier. CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec 
went through major restructuring in the late 1990s, including listings in international stock exchanges, 
namely Hong Kong, New York and London. A recent study, however, suggests that this move was 
prompted by political motivations (increase NOCs profile and prestige overseas) more than commercial 
ones. 132 
Notwithstanding, it should be noted that some studies point to a progressive ascendency of commercial 
interests in NOCs outbound investment strategies, 133  while some others suggest that the central 
government is increasingly struggling to coordinate and retain control over all agents involved in the 
foreign policy process. As pointed out by Erica Downs in regards to the energy sector, the high profile of 
the agents involved makes the authority line fuzzy and the diversity of agendas and sometimes conflicting 
interests makes coordination a very problematic issue not only among them but also with the corporate 
actors at the bottom. 134 These evolving trends raise critical challenges to Beijing regarding the ability to 
efficiently control the outcome of its oil diplomacy, summed up in the classic ‘principal-agent dilemma’. 
The emerging contradictions between China’s foreign policy goals (principal) and its gradual distortion 
along the implementation chain that integrates a plurality of bureaucratic and corporate agents with their 
own interests and agendas.    
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The relationship between Chinese NOCs and the central government does need special mention. While 
these companies have become increasingly moved by profit and managed on a corporate basis as a result 
of SOEs reform in the late 1990s, Beijing still has the means to influence NOCs’ decision making process. 
This is illustrated by a raft of bureaucratic facts. A recent study135 underlines that the central government’s 
grip over SOEs is evidenced by its ownership structure. In most cases, two thirds of the outstanding 
shares are non tradable, directly or indirectly under the government’s control, leaving no room for private 
shareholders to influence corporate decisions. Moreover, the CEOs of the largest NOCs are political 
appointees, nominated by the Communist Party of China with other senior board positions appointed by 
SASAC.136 This means that in most cases these cadres are pursuing political careers and therefore report 
to the Party or SASAC instead of shareholders. Further to this, control by the state is ensured through 
investment approval procedures, which involve clearance by key ministerial ranking bureaucracies such 
as NDRC, MOFCOM and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).137. Ultimately, the 
companies’ compliance with the state strategic interests is ensured through the necessary prior approval 
by NDRC and the State Council.138 In addition to this, a significant proportion of the financing of these 
companies comes from Policy Banks. Finally, the central government plays an important role in directing 
the destination of resources investments either through incentives policies or inter-governmental deals. 
According to Wang, ‘the Chinese government believes that it is not feasible to allow unregulated 
investment in every sector and in every country. The government aim has been to carry out FDI in 
targeted sectors and industries in accordance with China's long-term strategies.’139  
The monitoring role played by the central government suggests that there is still a large margin for 
Beijing’s political and strategic agenda to influence NOCs investments overseas. This, however, is not an 
exclusive feature of Chinese NOCs as noted by Alden and Davies.140 Indeed, this has been the case with 
French NOCs (Elf/Aquitaine and Total) operating in Africa where an interlock between oil companies, 
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armaments industry and Paris’ Africa development policy has recently been exposed. In China’s case, 
however, the interlock between the government and the NOC’s seems to be much tighter. 
This state of affairs seems to corroborate Katzenstein’s postulate of a direct linkage between political 
strategies and domestic structures: the more centralised the state is the wider the range of instruments at 
the disposal of policy makers to conduct its foreign economic policy. This is largely explained by a 
stronger coalition between the state and the business sector and the more integrated policy network 
linking public and private sector.141 This linkage is evidenced by Chinese positive economic statecraft in 
the form of infrastructure –for-oil loans. 
1.4.3. Infrastructure-for-oil loans as positive economic statecraft  
Even though China has resorted to military statecraft in the past,142 it has clearly privileged diplomacy and 
positive economic statecraft as foreign policy implementation instruments since the onset of the economic 
reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping. The preference for peaceful means is largely explained by the 
imperative of creating a friendly international environment, which is favourable to its domestic 
development.  
A significant part of Chinese positive economic statecraft falls under the category that Beijing officially 
designates as ‘foreign aid’.143 Chinese foreign aid dates back to the early days of the PRC in the 1950s, 
when Beijing started channelling economic aid and technical assistance to communist countries first 
(Vietnam and North Korea) and then newly independent African countries - in search of political 
allegiance. In 1995 China started providing medium- and long-term low interest loans to developing 
countries. In the 2000s, using its swelling financial might, Chinese foreign aid increased substantially, 
averaging nearly 30% in the 2004-2009 period.  
Unlike North-South cooperation, Chinese aid has a very distinctive economic and pragmatic nature, 
ultimately justified by its developing economy status. Rooted in the core principles of equality, non-
conditional and particularly common development and mutual benefit, Chinese aid is designed to benefit 
both the extender and the receiver. In this context, while providing assistance, China’s contemporary 
foreign aid is also an instrument to pursue economic goals overseas. 
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The centrality of the Ministry of Commerce in China’s foreign aid administration144 further illustrates the 
strategic role that economic concerns play in Chinese foreign policy.  In the absence of a proper 
cooperation agency, MOFCOM sits at a centre of a complex web that integrates several state institutions. 
MOFCOM is responsible for the formulation, approval, implementation, management and oversight of 
foreign aid projects. The Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) 145  is responsible for the 
management of projects involving concessional loans; and the embassies and consulates responsible for 
local coordination and management of projects in the receiving country. The State Council and NDRC 
play a strategic role in policy making and in monitoring the whole process. MOFCOM regularly consults 
with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in drafting foreign aid 
programmes and funding plans, having established a coordinating mechanism for that purpose in 2008 
(inter-agency coordinating mechanism). 146 
Chinese aid assumes many different forms: technical cooperation, human resource development, medical 
aid, emergency humanitarian aid, overseas volunteer programmes, debt relief and financial aid. Chinese 
authorities distinguish between three types of financial aid: grants, interest free loans and concessional 
loans. 147 While the first two are sourced from China’s state finances, the last one is provided by The 
Export and Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank).  
Concessional loans for infrastructure have been used in the past by China as foreign policy instrument, 
with reasonably successful results in pursuing China’s political aims in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. 
After a long break, the use of concessional loans as a foreign policy instrument resurfaced in the late 
1990s.148  Unlike in the 1970s though, the goals behind this type of economic inducement are now 
primarily economic.  
                                                           
144 For a detailed account of China’s administration of foreign cooperation, see: Penny Davies, China and the End of 
Poverty in Africa: Towards Mutual Benefit? (Sundbyberg, Sweden: Diakonia, July 2007), available online at: 
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats_New/Reports/Kinarapport_A4.pdf (accessed 15 October 2007) 
145 The Export-Import Bank of China was created in 1994, is fully owned by the Chinese government, and is under 
the direct leadership of the State Council. It plays an important role in promoting foreign trade and economic 
cooperation, acting as a key channel of policy that finances the Chinese import and export of mechanical and 
electronic products, equipment and technologies, and in undertaking offshore construction contracts and overseas 
investment projects by Chinese companies. Info according to EXIMBANK official website: 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/profile/intro.shtml (accessed 15 November 2009) 
146 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Foreign Aid, white paper 
issued in April 2011, full text available online at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
04/21/c_13839683_20.htm  (accessed 5 May 2011) 
147 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Ibid. 
148 Paul Hubbard, “Aiding Transparency: what we can learn about China’s Exim Bank concessional loans”, Center 
for Global development, Working Paper 126, September 2007, p. 4, available online at: 
http://cgdev.org/files/14424_file_AidingTransparency.pdf (accessed 18 January 2010) 
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Evidence (see below) suggests that a substantial part of concessional loans have been used by China as a 
positive economic statecraft vehicle to access resources (oil, minerals and other commodities) in 
exchange for infrastructure, hence the name ‘infrastructure-for-resources’ deals. Most of these loans have 
been extended to oil-rich countries, reason why the term ‘infrastructure-for-oil’ is more profuse in the 
literature. Even though the blue print of infrastructure-for-oil formula is often attributed to the 
concessional credit line extended to Angola in 2004 by EXIM Bank (reason it is also dubbed ‘the Angola 
mode’), similar financial facilities had been previously used by China with other oil producing countries, 
namely, Sudan and Republic of Congo in 2001.149   
With the subsequent mushrooming of this kind of loans, references to it started to surface in China-Africa 
literature in the second half of the last decade, rapidly becoming part of its vocabulary. The concept 
however remained somewhat loose. The first attempt to fully conceptualise the term was made in a World 
Bank Report in 2008.150 Although the deal structure is not new in the oil industry (it had been largely used 
by developed countries, including Japanese oil backed loans extended to China in the 1970s)151  the scope 
and sheer size of Chinese oil-for-infrastructure loans pushes it up to a new level.  
Reflecting the general perception, Foster et al stress two major features of Chinese infrastructure-for-oil 
package deals: (1) the extension of concessional loans is largely aimed at infrastructure development and 
(2) repayment is to be done in kind. The candidate would like emphasise a third feature that is of great 
relevance in the context of this thesis: (3) favoured access to oil equity as collateral to the loan, which is 
referred en passant in the above mentioned report. 
In regards to the first dimension it should be noted that, in general this type of loan is rooted in two legal 
instruments: a framework cooperation agreement signed by the two governments stating the general terms 
(volume, purpose, interest rate and maturity) and a loan agreement signed by EXIM Bank and the 
borrower.  What makes these loans concessional is that its interest rate (2 to 3%) is below the benchmark 
of People’s Bank of China, with the difference being subsidised by the central government. The 
reimbursement period is relatively long (up to 15-20 years, including 5-7 years grace).152  Although 
                                                           
149Vivien Foster et al., Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa 
PPIAF/World Bank (Washington, D.C.: WB, July 2008), p. 57 
150idem, pp 52-57. 
151 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) p. 47 
152 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Ibid.  
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designated as foreign aid, Chinese concessional loans do not match most of the OECD criteria153 to be 
classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Chinese economic assistance has a grant level 
below 25%, and is not channelled through a proper state cooperation agency. In the same way, these credit 
lines fall out of the commercial loans category as their interest rates are normally lower. Although 
unconditional, these credit lines come tied to the procurement of services, goods and labour in China 
(minimum of 50%), leaving in general only a small margin for local content in the target country. The 
money never actually leaves China. It is administered on a project basis through the borrower’s account 
with EXIM Bank with payments made directly to Chinese contractors after completion of the construction 
project. Although EXIM Bank concessional loans also target industry, resources development and 
agriculture, they are primarily earmarked for infrastructure construction. 
According to Chinese official statistics, by the end of 2009 nearly 64% of its concessional loans had been 
directed to infrastructure. 154 While only 9% targeted resources development there is a clear geographic 
overlap between China’s infrastructure commitments and its resource investments in Africa as underlined 
by the above mentioned World Bank report. 155  Up until 2008, China had infrastructure finance 
commitments in 35 countries across Sub-Saharan Africa. Three of these countries (Nigeria 34%, Angola 
20% and Sudan 8%)156 alone account for nearly two thirds of the total value, and not surprisingly they are 
all oil-rich countries. 
Regarding the second feature, repayment in kind, it is rooted in the fact that concessional loans require a 
sovereign guarantee, which is largely problematic in developing countries due to their low 
creditworthiness. In oil rich countries this issue is solved by placing the local NOC as the guarantor of the 
loan and by requiring repayment to be done in kind. The reimbursement of the loan is done using 
proceeds from sale of oil from the host country’s NOC directly to Chinese Oil Company. Although in 
general contracts refer to a certain amount of barrels of oil per day (bpd) to service the loan, it is agreed 
that the figure will in fact fluctuate according to oil prices oscillation, which might imply adjustments to 
the term of the loan. In this sense, as noted by Foster et al, ‘credit deals tied to repayment in oil are not 
really a hedge against the future price of oil, but rather provide a way of securing a steady supply into the 
medium term’ in line with Chinese oil security goals. 
                                                           
153 According to OECD, the definition of ODA is: “flows of official financing to developing countries provided by 
official agencies which have a clear development or anti-poverty purpose and are at least partially concessional in 
nature”, containing a grant element of at least 25%. “OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms”, available at: 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/index.htm. (accessed 7 November 2009) 
154 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, op. cit.  
155Vivien Foster et al, op. cit, pp 37-38. 
156 idem., pp 37-38. 
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Lastly, this type of loans has also served the goal of opening the gates for Chinese national oil 
corporations to enter oil-rich countries in the developing world. The diplomatic exchanges at the highest 
level and the inter-governmental cooperation framework agreement that precedes the actual extension of 
the loan, enhances China’s political capital over the receiving country, particularly when the latter is in 
‘dire straits’.  Even though the written deals do not explicitly state that in exchange for the extension of 
the soft-loan the receiving country is to facilitate China’s access to oil acreage, the framework deals 
normally refer to increased cooperation in energy sector and closer ties between the two countries NOCs. 
This usually happens in the form of a joint venture between the local NOC and one of the Chinese oil 
companies (normally CNPC or Sinopec) which is established simultaneously to the loan agreement. 
Shortly after, this is normally followed by the award of exploration rights in the host country’s oil 
industry without having to compete directly with the more experienced and much better equipped 
(technology and expertise) international oil companies (IOCs). These loans thus create the conditions for 
Chinese oil companies to have privileged access to acreage overseas, fulfilling through this positive 
economic statecraft instrument Beijing’s oil security goals.  
The diagram below illustrates the structure of infrastructure for oil deals. 
Diagram 1.1. Structure of China’s infrastructure-for-oil package deal 
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Chinese NOCs penetration in oil markets in developing regions appears to be closely associated with the 
extension of this type of loans. The massive financial resources at the disposal of China and the need to 
turn these into valuable hard assets overseas, combined with China’s growing oil security concerns in the 
2000s, accounts to a great extent for the emergence of this ‘infrastructure-for-oil’ formula as a key 
instrument of positive economic statecraft within China’s oil diplomacy. As highlighted by Brighi and 
Hill, the choice of foreign policy instruments is a function of the resources available to the state and ‘(…) 
the nature of the available instruments tends to shape their policy choices in the first place.’157  
In recent years China Development Bank (CDB)158 has resorted to a similar formula having extended 
large multibillion dollars loans to oil rich countries in the global crisis context (i.e. US$10bn to Brazil’s 
Petrobras and US$ 25bn to Russia’s Rosneft). These loans are different from concessional loans in that 
the borrower is a NOC rather than the national government; they are extended in more commercial terms 
(higher interest rates then EXIM Bank’s concessional loans, but still below market costs) and are not to be 
repaid in kind. These loans are often referred to simply as ‘loans-for-oil’. Nonetheless, China has secured 
through them collateral long term supply contracts covering the repayment term and also favoured access 
to resources equity for Chinese NOCs. According to a recent study on CDB loans to oil rich countries,159 
the credit is calculated on basis of the amount of oil the borrower can service and in view of their actual 
or potential relevance to China’s oil security strategy suggesting that, like concessional loans, they are 
highly synchronised with Beijing’s oil diplomacy.  
The same way NOCs are regarded here as an element within this particular positive economic statecraft 
instrument, devised to serve the interests of China’s oil security policy. Notwithstanding NOCs’ own 
corporate interests and strategies, and the fact that they may on some occasions diverge from the ones 
devised in Beijing, the central government, as previously discussed, still has some leverage over them, 
particularly when it comes to ventures overseas. 
What makes Chinese infrastructure-for-oil loans so unique in the global oil industry is not only its size 
and scope but also the degree of governmental control as all the players involved on the Chinese side 
                                                           
157 E. Brighi and C. Hill, op. cit. (2008), p. 130.  
158 China Development Bank was created in 1994, also under the jurisdiction of the State Council, aiming at 
providing financial support for China’s macro-economic development strategies, namely long-term financing for 
key projects in infrastructure as well as support financially the development of  pillar industries vital to the 
development of the national economy. Info according to CDB official website: 
http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/Column.asp?ColumnId=96 (accessed 15 November 2009) 
159 IMANI, “Don’t put all hopes in $3bn Chinese loan”, in Ghanaweb, 3 January 2012, available online at: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=226868 (accessed 9 January 2012) 
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(MOFCOM, policy banks and oil companies) are state agents, suggesting as such a higher degree of 
coordination and ultimately the prevalence of Beijing’s oil security concerns. 
In the context of the present thesis, it is important to distinguish between two layers of goals underlying 
the use of this type of loans. The first encompasses a long term political goal, in the spirit of what 
Mastanduno termed structural linkage. By instigating the gradual emergence of economic 
interdependence, China hopes to build up its leverage over weaker states, so as to enact a coalition that 
will favour its interests in the long run. Infrastructure-for-oil loans, however, are only one among a set of 
many other positive economic statecraft instruments (such as trade promotion, and setting up of 
multilateral mechanisms such as the Forum for China Africa Cooperation, FOCAC, and Free Trade 
Agreements, FTAs) being applied by China and envisaging this outcome.  
The second layer of goals in relation to soft loans refers to more immediate ends, which are primarily 
economic in nature – such as the promotion of Chinese business overseas (services, goods) and Beijing’s 
oil security goals. This thesis is especially concerned with this layer of goals. Chinese infrastructure-for-
oil loans are an important instrument in this regard, as they attempt to fulfil this goal through the locking 
up of future oil supplies through repayment of loans in kind and by securing oil equity as collateral to the 
deals. These two goals will be the measurement tools used to assess the degree of success of this 
particular positive economic statecraft, in pursuing China’s oil security goals. 
1.5. Methodological notes 
Drawing from the analytical framework set out above, this section will elaborate a bit more on how it will 
be used in the current thesis, in order to analyze a particular dimension of China’s foreign policy 
concerning the pursuance of its energy security goals in developing regions.  
1.5.1. Research question and hypothesis 
Although social/political phenomena lack the straightforward laws of natural science, research in the 
social sciences tends to parallel to the extent possible the methodology in an effort to make social 
phenomena scientifically intelligible. This effort involves dialectic interplay between ideas and evidence. 
In the words of C. Ragin: “ideas help social researchers to make sense of evidence and researchers use 
evidence to extend, revise and test ideas”.160  
                                                           
160 Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research: the Unity and Diversity of Method (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine 
Forge Press, 1994) p. 55. 
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A closer look into China’s economic engagement in Africa and South America, reveals that China’s stakes 
in the latter region have remained much lower throughout most of the decade under analysis. This is 
particularly intriguing if one considers that LA has traditionally attracted a lot more investment than 
Africa (in 2009: LA US$120bn while Africa attracted US$59bn).161 If one considers resources sectors, 
this paradox is even more astounding, particularly so if one takes into account that:  
1) South America and Africa are equally important in China’s resources security strategy. Both regions are 
well endowed in mineral resources, and their relevance in China’s strategy has been confirmed over the 
past decade by the sharp rise in bilateral trade, in which Chinese imports of resources (oil and minerals) 
have had a key participation.  
2) Both regions have a high deficit in infrastructures of all kinds (e.g. transportation, energy, sanitary) and 
are therefore in desperate need of investment, as the existing bottlenecks are increasingly threatening the 
pace of economic growth. 
3) Chinese policy banks and resources companies have time and again throughout the past decade 
pledged to extend loans/increase investment in infrastructure and resources sectors in South America. A 
pledge was made by President Hu Jintao himself, during his first official visit to LA in 2004, to double 
Chinese investment by the end of the decade. 
The above state of affairs thus inspires the research question that underlies this thesis:  
What explains that Chinese oil diplomacy has been less successful in pursuing Chinese energy security 
goals in South America than in Africa?  
In this context this thesis will therefore attempt to answer the research question by analyzing the 
performance of soft loans in Africa and South America. This will aim to explain why this positive 
economic statecraft tool has granted China more acreage and supply contracts in Africa than in South 
America, throughout the past decade.  
In line with preliminary findings, the author’s research hypothesis is thus as follows:  
Owing to its elitist approach and unsophisticated nature, Chinese oil diplomacy is less likely to succeed in 
meeting Beijing’s energy security goals in countries with more liberal institutional structures, where there 
                                                           
161 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, July 2010, ‘Regional trends’, available online at: 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=5544&lang=1 (accessed 20 August 2011) 
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is a lower level of control of the state over the oil industry, and which is more commonly found in South 
America.  
In addition to testing the validity of the stated hypothesis, the analysis of this specific regional paradox 
will also offer a privileged window to assess, on the one hand, the practical strengths and pitfalls of 
China’s positive economic statecraft when exposed to different sets of conditions, and, on the other hand, 
its resilience. In line with this, attention will also be paid to any relevant changes that may have emerged 
in course of the past decade, and which may signal important shifts regarding Chinese energy security 
strategies in both regions. 
1.5.2. Justifying the case studies 
Given time and financial constrains, the hypothesis will be tested through a comparative analysis of two 
carefully selected case studies: Angola and Brazil.  
This choice is justified, in the first instance, because both countries are perceived as the most 
representative in each region regarding Chinese engagement patterns in resources sectors and the 
respective institutional structures. This will thus enable a rigorous hypothesis testing.   
China’s resources security concerns undoubtedly play a major role in its relations with both Angola and 
Brazil. These two countries are China’s largest trading partners in their respective regions, and the bulk of 
China’s imports from both countries are commodities. China-Angola trade accounted for over a fifth of 
China-Africa trade in 2010. Bilateral trade with Angola has grown 25 fold in the period 2002-2010 - the 
bulk of which is Chinese oil imports. Attesting the strategic importance of Luanda in China’s energy 
security strategy, is the fact that it is China’s largest oil supplier in the continent (accounting for half of 
Beijing’s oil imports from Africa), and the second largest in the world following Saudi Arabia, with whom 
Luanda has been disputing the first place in recent years. As for Brazil, bilateral trade as also grown 
exponentially over the past decade, with Chinese commodities imports accounting for nearly half of total 
value, and reflecting the regional trend. Although dominated by resources, China’s import chart from 
Brazil is a bit more diversified, including foodstuffs (soy beans) and mining, along with oil. China’s 
strategic interest in the Brazilian oil industry has spiked in recent years as a result of its newly found 
reservoirs. The fact that Chinese oil imports from Brazil have doubled from 2009 to 2010, confirms this 
preposition. Brazil is China’s second largest supplier in the region after Venezuela. Despite its much 
larger oil reserves, the instability of the oil industry in Venezuela has favoured Brazil’s profile as a more 
reliable oil supplier in the region.  
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In addition, both Angola and Brazil can be said to be particularly representative of the different 
institutional structures found in their respective region. Angola combines a highly oil-dependent economy 
with weak institutional capacity and weak executive constrains, from which emerged a highly centralized 
institutional structure that enables the state to fully control the oil industry. Brazil, however, presents a 
more diversified economy combined with a complex state bureaucracy. This translates into a weak 
institutional capacity vis à vis the high level of executive constraints, which have converged in a more 
fragmented line of authority in resources management.  
Although Brazil has a more diversified economic structure which might suggest an increased negotiation 
leverage with China over resources vis à vis Luanda (since Brazil is less dependent on resources than 
Angola), this is to some extent offset by the fact that Angola also has a negotiating leverage over China 
since its oil sector is, on the other hand, much more diversified than Brazil’s in terms of partnerships. This 
state of affairs thus minimizes the distorting effect that this type of ‘agency’ could have in the research 
design. 
A clarification is due in order to justify the choice of Brazil instead of Venezuela as the most 
representative case study for South America. Despite being China’s largest oil supplier, Venezuela is 
regarded in this context as a deviation from the normal regional institutional pattern. In this case the 
‘agency’ (Chavez voluntarism regarding the oil industry and his eagerness to replace the United States -
US- with China) has to a certain degree caused to deviate from the general structural pattern. As such, 
Venezuela’s context, in a way, resembles more the type of institutional environments found in Africa than 
in South America. This explains why Chinese economic inducements have been able to penetrate more 
easily here than in the rest of the region. Since one is looking at how Chinese oil diplomacy performs in 
different institutional contexts, rather than similar ones, Brazil stands out as the best case study to test the 
hypothesis.  
Further justification is that Angola and Brazil’s potential as oil producing countries is presently within the 
same range (despite its declining production Venezuela has one of the largest oil reserves in the world). 
Furthermore, in both countries oil reservoirs are mostly located offshore in ultra-deep waters (onshore and 
oil sands in the case of Venezuela), and the Chinese oil company acting in both countries is the same: 
Sinopec (China Petrochemical Corporation; Venezuela: China National Petroleum Corporation - CNPC). 
In the framework of the present research which proposes to compare the performance of a specific 
engagement strategy in resources sectors in two different regional institutional settings, Angola and Brazil 
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offer thus a more precise comparative research design. This approach will keep contextual differences to a 
minimum, therefore minimizing possible distortions.  
1.5.3. Research methodology  
In order to test the above hypothesis, the current study will apply a comparative methodology.162 While 
for practical and ethical reasons the experimental method is seldom an option in the social sciences, the 
comparative method allows the social scientist some degree of control, by “holding certain things 
constant while examining and accounting for observed differences”. 163  This method allows for 
generalisations which can then be useful in prediction and in building more general theories. 
The current comparative analysis follows an inductive logic, since the hypothesis stated above draws 
from observation of empirical evidence and aims at adding to explanatory theories. This contrasts with 
deductive analysis, in which the hypothesis is inspired by an existing theory and then applied to the 
selected case studies.164  
The study is based on qualitative research conducted through extensive field work and intensive desktop 
research. Fieldwork was conducted in 2007 (September-December in China), 2008 (January-April in 
Angola; August-September in China), 2009 (February-March in Angola; June-July in Brazil; August-
September in China), 2010 (May in China) and 2011 (February in Angola). In-depth interviews with 
qualified informants conducted throughout this period constitute a major primary source. Interviewing 
was based on an interview guide with open-ended questions to facilitate discussion in a semi-structured 
way. Altogether were conducted 38 in-depth interviews in Angola, 27 in Brazil and 25 in China. 
Interviewees include governmental officials from the ministries of energy, foreign affairs, commerce and 
finances, national banks, investment promotion institutions, and from the national oil companies of the 
three countries concerned. Informants also included scholars, journalists and business associations. 
Written primary sources include official documents (cooperation agreements and business contracts) and 
internal reports and relevant legislation, regarding the oil sectors in Brazil and Angola. The primary 
sources collected during the course of this project enabled the researcher not only to uncover relevant 
information, but also to access and triangulate the views of all contributions involved. Fieldwork was, for 
                                                           
162 The methodology followed is based on the following readings: David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Theories 
and Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan Press, 1995); G. King, R.O. Kehoane and S. Verba, 
Designing Social Theory Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 
1994); Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2000).  
163 Todd Landman, op. cit., p. 14. 
164 Richard Rose, “Comparing Forms of Comparative analysis” Political Studies 39:3, 1991, p. 449. 
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this reason, critical in understanding the context, process and synergies that make up the topic under 
consideration.  
Secondary sources include books, journal articles, conference papers, unpublished theses on related 
themes (namely on Chinese foreign policy, China’s energy security, China in Africa/Angola and China in 
LA/Brazil). Statistical data were drawn from official publications by Chinese, Angolan and Brazilian 
authorities and international organizations (i.e. WTO and UNDP).  
As for the case studies, owing to minimal existing research on the research topic, the analysis is mostly 
rooted in interviews, official documents and legislation, relevant governmental and NOCs websites, 
specialized intelligence (e.g. Upstream online, Oil and Gas Journal Online, Africa-Asia Confidential, 
Africa Mining Intelligence, USGS, Business Monitor International) and media (Bloomberg, Reuters, 
Xinhua, Angop, Agencia Brasil, Macau-Hub and Chinese, Angolan and Brazilian major newspapers).  
Regarding the structure of this thesis, it comprises six chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. 
Following the analytical framing of the object of the study, the second chapter offers a comparative 
overview of China’s engagement in Africa and South America. It presents a synopsis of historical ties, and 
an analysis of the major features of Chinese contemporary economic diplomacy, with particular reference 
to China’s engagement in the oil sector in both regions. The main purpose of this is to uncover the 
paradox regarding China’s much lower degree of success in South America, particularly concerning oil 
acreage access. The third chapter offers an examination of the institutional structures that surround the oil 
sector in both case studies, which is aimed at emphasising the major differences. The fourth and the fifth 
chapters of the thesis dissect the ebb and flow of China’s engagement in the oil sector in each of the case 
studies (Angola and Brazil in this order) over the past decade. This is aimed at explaining how the 
institutional structure impacted the outcome of the infrastructure for oil loans in each country. The 
concluding remarks include the analysis of the hypothesis testing, and what can be drawn from this. 
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CHAPTER 2: CHINA’S ECONOMIC STATECRAFT IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA AND SOUTH AMERICA: FROM IDEOLOGY TO 
RESOURCES 
 
 
This chapter intends to provide an insight into China’s resources drive, with particular reference to 
Southern Africa and South America, which constitute the regional framework of the case studies under 
analysis: Brazil and Angola. The aims of this chapter are: (a) to provide a brief historical background of 
PRC’s foreign policy towards developing regions and to emphasise the gradual increase of the economic 
drive of its diplomacy; (b) to demonstrate the critical role of resources in China’s contemporary relations 
with the regions under study; and (c) to identify regional similarities and differences in China’s patterns of 
engagement, with particular reference to oil. 
The main objective of this chapter is to emphasise that despite fast expanding trade relations with both 
regions and the systematic deployment of other positive economic statecraft instruments, China’s resource 
diplomacy has been much less successful in South America. This question undergirds the present thesis, 
which proposes to explain why Chinese engagement in resources sectors is taking so long to lift off in 
South America, despite the increasing relevance of this region as a hard commodities supplier to China, 
and given that some of China’s earliest resources investments in the 1990s were made in this region. 
2.1. Historical background of China’s foreign policy towards the developing 
world165 
While China’s relations with developing regions such as Southeast Asia and Central Asia date back to 
ancient Middle Kingdom times, in the cases of Africa and LA, relations are relatively recent. Although 
there are records of China-Africa contacts through Muslim traders throughout much of the Christian era, 
the first direct official contacts only occurred through Admiral Zheng, during his short maritime 
incursions in East Africa in the early 15th century, prior to the arrival of Europeans. Contact resumed 
again in the late 19th century through the colonial powers use of importing Chinese labour to work in 
                                                           
165 Parts of this section draws on: C. Alden and Ana C. Alves,, “History and identity in the construction of China’s 
Africa policy” The Review of African Political Economy 35:115, 2008, pp. 43-58. 
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African plantations and mines. However, due to internal turmoil in China and in Africa, bilateral relations 
were insignificant throughout the first half of the 20th century.166  
As for LA, sheer distance made contacts an even more recent phenomenon. Despite uncertain accounts of 
earlier contacts,167 proven encounters seem to have started indirectly with Mexico via the Philippines 
(both Spanish colonies) in the late 16th century. Direct contacts began in the 19th century, mostly through 
the importing of Chinese labour (‘coolies’) by the newly independent countries, to work in railway 
construction and mines. In the late 19th century some LA countries established diplomatic ties with 
imperial China (Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Panama and Cuba), while a few more did so after the republican 
revolution (Chile, Bolivia, Guatemala and Nicaragua).168  
Until the foundation of the PRC in 1949, China’s relations with Africa and LA were mostly ad hoc. From 
that point on, Chinese policy towards those specific regions gradually developed a more proactive and 
assertive approach, framed by its evolving ‘Third World’169 policy.  
This ‘Third World’ policy has its foundations in a raft of facts, guiding principles and official documents, 
that are scattered through the six decades of PRC’s existence. Indeed, China’s Third World policy 
underpinnings integrate the ideological contributions of all four generations of leaders. These are based in 
their respective experiences and the changing nature of national interest, in the context of a shift from a 
planned to a market economy. Two broad phases can be distinguished in CFP towards the Third World: 
the Maoist period, marked by a strong political-ideological motivation, and the reform period initiated in 
1978, increasingly driven by pragmatic political-economic aspirations. 
                                                           
166 For a detailed account on China-Africa relations prior to the establishment of the PRC, see: Gao Jinyuan, “China 
and Africa: the Development of Relations over Many Centuries”, in: African Affairs 83:331, 1984, pp. 241-250; 
Philip Snow, The Star Raft: China’s encounter with Africa (New York: Grove Press, 1988). 
167 Gavin Menzies, 1421: the Year China discovered the World (London: Bantam Press, 2004). 
168 For a brief account on China-Latin America relations prior to the establishment of the PRC, see: Jiang Shixue, 
“On the Development of Sino-Latin American Relations” China International Studies Winter 2007, pp. 76-102, 
available at: http://blog.china.com.cn/jiangshixue/art/915285.html (accessed 15 November 2009) 
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Indifference”, in: S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy faces the New Millennium (Boulder 
and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998) p. 153. Despite the notion having lost its political nexus as a third force 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is nonetheless still a valid concept since all other criteria could be said 
to match the countries that today fall in the category of developing countries. 
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2.1.1. The Maoist period (1949-1977): ideology primacy 
Without doubt, China’s policy towards the developing world had its genesis in the 1950s. In the context of 
its quest for international diplomatic recognition, especially among the newly independent countries, the 
launching of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit)170 emerged as the core foundation. At this time China was a close ally of the Soviet Union, and its 
primary interest was thus to oppose the US. However, by 1960 an ideological rift led to the Sino-Soviet 
split, which further reinforced Beijing’s own Third World policy. 
In 1963 Mao constructed his ‘dual intermediate zones’ theory, according to which a large intermediate 
zone existed between the US and the Soviet Union. This zone was divided into the areas under American 
control (Western Europe, Canada, Australia and Japan) and the areas under Soviet influence, mostly 
comprising developing regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America). China belonged to the latter zone and, 
following the split with the Soviet Union, Beijing embarked on stiff competition with Moscow for the 
leadership of the communist world.  
As a consequence of these developments, China’s Third World policy assumed subversive contours in the 
1960s, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa, where Beijing became actively involved in several 
insurgencies, providing support in the form of military training, financial assistance and weaponry, in an 
attempt to supersede Soviet influence in the newly independent regional nations.171 Due to the fierce anti-
communist stance of most LA countries, under the US aegis, China’s revolutionary policy did not 
penetrate the region at this stage.172 Its influence was limited to unofficial contacts, such as support to the 
Cuban revolution (1959) and episodic statements of rhetorical support condemning US interference in the 
region.173 By the end of the 1960s, nearly 20 African countries had recognised the government in Beijing, 
                                                           
170 These principles were first put forward by Zhou Enlai in 1953 during negotiations with India over the settling of 
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1970); Richard W. Hull, “China in Africa” Issue: A journal of Opinion 2:3, 1972, pp. 49-50; Mohamed A. El-
Khawas, “China’s Changing Policies in Africa” Issue: A journal of Opinion 3:1, 1973, pp. 24-28; For a detailed 
analysis of African response to Chinese Foreign Policy, see: G. T. Yu, “Dragon in the Bush: Peking’s Presence in 
Africa” Asian Survey 8:12, 1968, pp. 1023-1025.  
172 Xiang Lanxin, “An Alternative Chinese view”, in: R. Roett and G. Paz (eds.), China’s Expansion into the 
Western Hemisphere (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008) p. 46. 
173 Jiang Shixue, “The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective”, in: Roett and Paz, op. cit., p. 29. 
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while only one LA country, Cuba (1960), maintained diplomatic ties with China. Instead of raising 
China’s profile internationally, this period of radicalisation in CFP caused severe damage to China’s 
image abroad. This perception, coupled with the advent of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, gradually led 
to the end of China’s subversive incursions overseas in the late 1960s.  
Furthermore, the increased Chinese perception of the Soviet threat, led to a gradual rapprochement with 
the US. From then on China’s foreign policy concentrated on regaining Beijing’s lost prestige through 
normalising diplomatic ties with developed and developing countries alike, regardless of their ideological 
orientation. This shift in Beijing’s foreign policy was critical in gaining its United Nations Security 
Council seat in October 1971, in which developing countries, particularly from Africa, played a crucial 
part.174 By the end of the decade, China was conducting diplomatic relations with 120 countries around 
the world, including 26 new recognitions amongst African states and 13 in LA.175  
In a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, Deng Xiaoping introduced Mao’s ‘Theory 
of the Three Worlds’ (originally developed by Zhou Enlai),176 which divided the world into three zones. 
The first one was led by the US and the Soviet Union. The second was controlled by the remaining 
industrialised countries, namely Western Europe, Japan, Canada and Australia. Lastly, the Third World, 
led by China, was mostly composed of non-aligned developing countries of the three A’s (Asia, Africa 
and Latin America), which shared its peaceful coexistence and anti-hegemonic views, and its pledge to 
bring about a new international economic order. Two aims were therefore behind the speech’s 
formulation: uniting the third and second worlds against the superpowers (US and Soviet Union), and 
organising and mobilising the Third World to form a new and more just international order.177  
During the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, although trade relations were mostly insignificant, China 
played a meaningful role in Africa as an aid provider. 178 Its aid, focusing on agriculture, health, education, 
technical assistance and high prestige projects, was based on the eight guiding principles of China’s 
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foreign aid179 launched in the early 1960s by Zhou Enlai. This was premised during his visit to Ghana and 
Mali, and was designed to help post-colonial states modernise and become self-reliant. China’s aid, 
though, was concentrated in a few countries, namely Tanzania, Algeria, Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville and 
Mali. A particular emphasis was placed on Tanzania, not only because that country was China’s most 
constant ally, but also because of its strategic location as an Indian Ocean gateway to mineral-rich Sub-
Saharan Africa. China decided to concentrate its development aid in fewer countries and in large projects 
to function as showcases. This was in order to acquire a precious leverage over the rest of Africa, by 
undertaking major infrastructure projects denied by Western powers, such as the Tazara railway. 180 
Additionally, loans were given to other African countries (e.g. US$84mn to Ethiopia in 1971 and 
US$190mn to Sudan)181 on very favourable terms: interest free repayment over thirty years, to start after a 
five year period of grace with no strings attached. This was a pattern similar to China’s existing practice 
in the continent. The aim though, was mainly political-ideological: advancing China’s leadership role first 
in international communism, and then in the non-aligned Third World, as well as mitigating the influence 
of Taiwan.182 The full potential of these aid packages was, however, curtailed by the limited resources 
                                                           
179 (1) The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid 
to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral aims [sic] but as something mutual. (2) In 
providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, 
and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges. (3) China provides economic aid in the form of interest-
free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the 
recipient countries as far as possible. (4) In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government 
is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China, but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-
reliance and independent economic development. (5) The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient 
countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient 
governments may increase their income and accumulate capital. (6) The Chinese Government provides the best-
quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material 
provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government 
undertakes to replace them. (7) In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the 
personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique. (8) The experts dispatched by China to help in 
construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. 
The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. (According to the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18001.htm.) (accessed 15 
November 2009) 
180 The railway was built to link Zambia’s rich copper belt to the coastal port of Dar Es Salaam, so as to break the 
dependency on white-ruled Rhodesia. The decision to construct the railway grew out of a direct request from 
Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, and seconded by his Tanzanian counterpart, Julius Nyerere. China assembled a 
US$405mn interest free loan for this project, representing at that point the largest single offer of economic 
assistance granted to an African state by a communist country. 
181 Richard W. Hull, op. cit., p. 50. 
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available to China, since it was still an impoverished developing country, lacking successful domestic 
experience. Its technical and economic assistance, though valuable, was not comparable with that of the 
US or the Soviet Union, and this was the determining factor for its failing to exert meaningful influence 
over the continent at that stage. 
While in the 1950s and 1960s China’s policy towards Africa and LA was largely driven by ideological 
concerns, in the 1970s it gradually became more flexible and pragmatic, reinforcing its prestige through 
fostering state to state relations and motivated by the quest to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. On the LA 
front, China’s rapprochement with the US in the 1970s opened the way for a breakthrough in relations. At 
this stage many countries in the region established diplomatic ties with Beijing, namely Mexico (1972) 
and most South American countries;183 however there is very little to report in terms of bilateral economic 
cooperation in this period.  
2.1.2. The reform period (1978-1999): economic pragmatism awakening  
With the demise of Mao and the subsequent focus on domestic economic reforms initiated by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978, China’s relations with the developing world entered a new phase. At the Twelfth 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in September 1982, Beijing proclaimed its 
independent foreign policy184 vis a vis Washington and Moscow, in spite of the rapprochement underway 
with these two former enemies. It reiterated the validity of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as 
its guiding doctrine, and reaffirmed its commitment to the Third World. This stance took shape in the 
context of increasing competition for the leadership of the Third World, between China and Cuba. Cuba 
assumed a defiant position towards China, mostly due to Beijing’s rapprochement with Washington.185  
a) Adjournment in the 1980s 
The announcement of the new ‘independent policy’ was followed by Premier Zhao Ziyang’s Africa tour 
to eleven countries (December 20, 1982 to January 17, 1983),186 aimed at launching a new African policy 
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summarized in the “Four Principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation”.187 Divorced 
from ideological baggage, these four principles were inspired by economic pragmatism in tune with the 
new domestic developmental priorities, and China’s limited resources 188 . This also signalled the 
realignment of Beijing’s international assistance with its more pragmatic national interests. The growing 
commitment to its domestic modernisation process, however, led China to scale down its aid to Africa, 
bringing to an end the large-scale technical assistance projects. The focus instead was now on low profile 
cooperation projects requiring smaller investments and quicker returns that could enhance mutual self 
reliance and create mutual economic benefit. 
The first high-level Chinese delegation to LA (Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela) was dispatched in 1981, 
headed by Foreign Minister Huang Hua.189  While economic assistance dominated China’s economic 
relations with Africa in the 1980s, LA trade relations showed some dynamism. Prompted by the context 
of simultaneous economic liberalisation processes, China and LA started to explore the complementarities 
of their economies in this decade. The value of trade increased from US$176mn in 1970, to US$1.3bn in 
1980, and thereafter to US$2.9bn in 1989 - with Brazil accounting for half of that volume throughout 
most of the 1990s.190 Like trade, the few Chinese investments in the region over this period were largely 
dominated by resources, mostly mining (at the time China was still an oil exporter). Reflecting the 
upgrading in relations, Premier Zhao Zyang visited the region in 1985 (Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and 
Venezuela). Another distinct feature in China-Latin America relations, vis a vis China-Africa relations 
over this period, was the launching of science and technology cooperation programmes. These were in 
nuclear energy (Argentina and Brazil) and joint construction of satellites (Brazil), and reflecting the 
different stages of development in both regions. Nonetheless, in relative terms, at this stage trade and 
technological and scientific cooperation between China and LA represented an insignificant fraction of 
the former’s respective relations with the developed world. 
In fact, despite the Chinese rhetoric, LA and Africa, and the rest of the developing world, remained low 
on China’s foreign policy agenda throughout the 1980s. Rather, China was preoccupied with the need to 
access capital and technology, which was only available in the developed world. Thus China’s foreign 
policy was increasingly dominated by the imperatives of domestic modernisation and development, and 
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its focus on deepening its relations with the US and Western Europe. As a result of this the proclaimed 
consolidation of relations with the developing world was adjourned.  
b) Revitalising ties in the 1990s 
Structural domestic and international changes at the turn of the decade brought the developing world back 
onto China’s foreign policy agenda in the 1990s. Facing growing diplomatic isolation from the developed 
world in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, Beijing was facing the threat of 
becoming a pariah state, as the remaining communist power in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 
1991. To circumvent the encirclement promoted by the West, China launched a diplomatic offensive 
targeting the Third World, in order to realign its international relations in the emerging new international 
framework. Chinese officials were dispatched on goodwill missions worldwide; exchanges with foreign 
leaders were actively promoted; efforts were made to normalise relations with as many countries as 
possible, irrespective of their ideological allegiance; and a policy of moving closer to developing 
countries within international institutions was pursued.  
Chinese efforts to cultivate closer ties were particularly welcomed by African leaders, not only because 
these arrived at a time when American interest in the continent was fading away (in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union), but also because China’s culturally relativist stance regarding democracy 
and human rights echoed the concerns of many African regimes under pressure from Western donors. 
Between June 1989 and June 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries, 
while numerous African leaders visited Beijing in return. Aid to African countries boomed from right after 
the Tiananmen events, mainly directed to African states that had stood by China during the crisis. In 1990, 
China-Africa aid amounted to US$374.6mn spread among 43 recipients, which is significant when 
compared to US$60.4mn in 1988 distributed among 13 countries. 191  
With regard to LA, most countries adopted a moderate position regarding the Tiananmen episode, 
choosing not to pressure China. Signalling China’s commitment to foster relations with the region, two 
Chinese presidents toured LA (Yang Shangkun and Jiang Zemin) between 1990 and 1993, visiting five 
different countries. Over that same period, nine LA presidents visited China.192 Economic, trade, science 
and technology cooperation agreements intensified: the first major investments by Chinese SOEs in Latin 
America resources took place in the early 1990s. Chinese mining company Shougang acquired major 
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Peruvian iron-mining company, Hierro Peru, for US$120mn in 1992. In the following year CNPC 
engaged in its first oil exploration venture in the region (also in Peru), while other Chinese companies 
expressed interest in investing in Brazil (iron ore) and Chile (copper).  
Another critical factor in the revitalization of CFP towards developing regions was the Taiwan issue, with 
LA and Africa increasingly becoming a battleground for the island’s diplomatic recognition throughout 
this period. The tussle between China and Taiwan for such recognition has been essentially waged with 
financial instruments - the so called ‘dollar diplomacy’ - with Beijing and Taipei trying to better each 
others’ bids. Being in an advantageous position as an emerging global power, China has been gradually 
winning this game, although not without periodic setbacks. Currently, of the 23 states that still recognise 
Taiwan, twelve are located in Central and South America and four in Africa. 
The Taiwan missile crisis in 1996, raised Beijing’s fears of further isolation from the West. Once again the 
developing world materialised as an important supporting platform for China. President Jiang Zemin and 
Premier Li Peng’s Africa-Asia tours in 1996 and 1997, respectively, and Premier Li Peng’s LA visits in 
1995 (Mexico, Cuba and Peru) and 1996 (Brazil, Chile and Venezuela), took place when the Taiwan issue 
was being discussed and a resolution on China’s human rights situation was being voted on at the United 
Nations  Human Rights Commission.  
These high level exchanges were also a prelude for the full revival of both regions in China’s foreign 
policy that materialised at the dawn of the 21st century. In fact, it was during the 1996 Africa tour that 
Jiang Zemin launched the idea of creating the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in order to 
foster economic ties (formally created in 2000), which Li Peng expounded in his visit to LA that same 
year. They were guided by the four key priority areas for expansion of relations: trade, direct cooperation 
among enterprises, joint tapping of natural resources, and exchanges in science and technology. 193 
Although no similar multilateral mechanism emerged with LA, mostly to avoid US discomfort,194 China 
has been engaging in a number of dialogue platforms with the region since the 1990s. These are the Rio 
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Group (since 1990), 195  Mercosur (Southern Common Market) and ALADI (the Latin American 
Association for Integration , as an observer since 1994).  
A few distinctive features of CFP over this timeframe are worth noting with regard to Africa and LA. 
Although in the 1950s and 1960s Africa was a relevant element in CFP when Beijing actively supported 
the anti-colonialist struggle in the continent, the continent’s strategic importance gradually faded as 
China’s position became more moderate. Beijing’s China-Africa policy reached its lowest ebb in the 
1980s, as proven by the lowest levels of Chinese economic assistance in the continent.196 Even though the 
policy was revitalised in the 1990s, to a great extent it continued to be limited to economic assistance, 
mostly servicing China’s strategic politico-diplomatic interests (to isolate Taiwan and ensure support 
within multilateral fora).  
On the other hand, despite the late start in relations with China, LA not only saw bilateral trade flourish 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but also the flourishing of other forms of cooperation: technological and 
scientific. Nonetheless, these carried little weight in the broader picture of LA’s foreign relations. 
Ultimately, LA remained marginal in the context of China’s broad external relations, and like Africa, its 
value for CFP was mostly instrumental in the context of Beijing’s politico-diplomatic constraints 
throughout the 1990s. Notwithstanding, by the end of the 1990s, China’s relations with LA had clearly 
achieved a more diversified cooperation pattern than with Africa.  
The different approach to LA is mostly explained by the wider synergies between China and LA at that 
time, in terms of their stages in economic development. In addition to the inherent complementarities 
emerging from its condition as a resource-rich region, like Africa, countries in LA were undergoing the 
same liberalisation and industrialisation processes as China, which placed their economies at a similar 
level and opening up a large platform of common interests. Indeed, they shared a considerable number of 
concerns: growing protectionism from developed markets, the need to attract investments and improve 
their technological base, and both regions were interested in building up their political, economic and 
technological autonomy vis a vis developed countries.  
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Despite LA and Africa’s relatively low profile in China’s foreign policy during the 1990s, it is worth 
noting that a significant share of China’s first major investments overseas took place in these regions in 
this period: CNPC’s investments in oil exploration in Peru (1994) and in Sudan (1996). These, however, 
resulted from the company’s independent internationalisation drive in the face of growing domestic 
demand and maturing reserves at home (China became a net oil importer in 1993), having ventured 
abroad at its own risk. The government backing only came at a later stage (1998), when the company 
started earning its first profits in Sudan.197 Despite these initial ventures, resources would only become a 
driving force in China’s foreign policy towards these regions in the following decade.  
2.2. Resources drive in China’s economic statecraft towards Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South America  
As shown in chapter one although China’s overall foreign policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s was 
increasingly shaped by an economic rationale, its weight became particularly overwhelming at the turn of 
the century. While its economic diplomacy was previously geared towards developed countries so as to 
attract investment and access to the WTO, over the past decade China’s foreign economic policy has 
exhibited a much broader spectrum. This is due to the emergence of new imperatives: on the one hand, to 
internationalise its companies and access new markets for its exports, and on the other, to secure a steady 
supply for its growing mineral resources needs in order to sustain its domestic economic growth. 
Emulating the same pattern observed in most developed economies during the initial stages of its 
economic expansion overseas, China’s trade, investment and cooperation flows to and from developing 
regions, point to the clear prominence of mineral resources, especially in its relations with Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South America. The upgrading of LA and Africa in CFP in the 2000s, is clearly illustrated by 
these rapidly expanding trade flows, and the intensifying diplomatic exchanges at the highest level. For 
instance President Hu Jintao alone headed four tours to Africa and three to LA since he took office.198 
Starting at US$10bn in 2000, bilateral trade surpassed the US$100bn benchmark with LA in 2007 (three 
years ahead of the timeframe set by Hu Jintao during his first official visit to LA in 2004), and with Africa 
in 2008 (a year before the target set at the 2006 China-Africa summit in Beijing). 
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China’s impressively swift engagement with LA and Africa throughout the 2000s has increasingly 
captured the attention of the rest of the world. While in the 1990s its relations with Southeast Asia were 
dominating the news, in the 2000s its expanding involvement in LA and Africa dominated in the context 
of China’s relations with the developing world. By economically penetrating these regions in search for 
alternative markets and supply sources, China is clearly expanding its diplomatic scope from a regional to 
a truly global level.199  
2.2.1. China’s charm offensive  
Aware of the potential negative charge of its greater economic involvement in developing regions 
(particularly when access to resources plays an important part in this), China has not spared any 
diplomatic efforts to underscore its good intentions and the mutual benefit of a closer economic 
interaction. As such, Beijing’s discourse concerning its growing engagement in these regions, centres on 
the promotion of world peace and the development and emergence of a just and equitable new political 
and economic order by fostering unity amongst developing countries. Adjacent to these principles is a 
subliminal claim of the superior moral justness of China’s policies.200 This stance unmistakably links 
China-Third World ties to the broader Chinese discourse of ‘Peaceful Development and Harmonious 
World’ - Hu Jintao’s legacy to the party’s theory,201 that currently outlines its foreign policy as a rising 
power. This underlines China’s positioning itself as a third path away from the limited US engagement in 
Africa (the narrow pursuit of resource diplomacy) and the EU’s and US’s complex engagement 
(economic, political and military ties) 202 in Africa and LA, respectively; and by doing so mitigating any 
fears of asymmetrical power relations. Indeed the ideational underpinnings of Beijing’s policy towards 
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Hughes, “Harmony and discord in China’s Africa strategy: some implications for foreign policy” China Quarterly 
199, 2009, pp. 563-584.  
202 Chris Alden, “Africa as China’s Cornucopia: the Changing Role of Beijing’s Resource Diplomacy”, in: R. Beri 
and U. Sinha (eds.), Africa and Energy Security: Global Issues, Local Responses (Delhi: Academic Foundation, 
2009) pp. 109-120. 
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developing regions largely account for what can be viewed as China’s ‘exceptionalism’ vis à vis 
traditional donors.203 
Aligned with this purpose, China has sought a closer relationship with Africa and LA. With respect to the 
African continent, China has, amongst other things, established its own multilateral cooperation platform, 
FOCAC;204 it organised the China-Africa summit in Beijing in 2006 (the largest number of African 
leaders gathered outside Africa); it has also revitalised its participation in the African Development Bank 
(a member since 1985) 205  and the African Union; and in 2007 it established the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADF) to finance Chinese ventures in the continent. 
Concerning LA, China’s engagement has been limited to participation in existing multilateral fora, which 
to some extent can be interpreted as a way to circumvent the US’s disquiet. As such, China became a 
permanent observer of the Organisation of American States (OEA) in 2004, with strong support from its 
major trade partners in the region (Brazil, Chile, Venezuela and Mexico); in that same year the Chinese 
National People’s Congress signed a cooperation agreement with the Latin American Parliament 
(Parlatino). Furthermore, and after three years of tough negotiations,206 China finally joined the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB, in January 2009), with an initial contribution of US$350mn, giving 
China donor status and as such, the possibility to bid for IADB-funded infrastructure projects in the 
Americas. China is also soon to be admitted to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC). In addition, it has established FTAs with two South American countries - Chile in 
2006 and Peru in 2010 - while negotiations are underway with Costa Rica. Furthermore, Beijing is 
lobbying to establish a FTA with Mercosur.207  
                                                           
203 C. Alden and D. Large, “China's exceptionalism and the challenges of delivering difference in Africa” Journal of 
Contemporary China 20:68, 2011, pp. 21-38. 
204 According to the founding declaration, FOCAC is a multilateral dialogue platform for cooperation between China 
and Africa based on equality and mutual benefit, and that seeks to promote economic and social development. 
FOCAC assumes as its ideational base the principles stated in the constitutive charters of the United Nations and the 
African Union, plus the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, with particular relevance to peaceful settlement of 
disputes, non interference in domestic affairs, cooperation for mutual benefit and common development. It also 
highlights some other specificities of the Chinese cooperation model, namely the ‘no strings attached’ principle and 
a more flexible approach towards universal human rights. FOCAC, the permanent secretariat of which is based at 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meets at a summit level every three years, alternating between Beijing and 
Africa, in order to approve an action plan for the following three years.  
205 AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/members/non-regional-member-countries/china/ (accessed 5 December 
2010) 
206 China’s bid was initially blocked by the US on the grounds that it was a recipient of WB and IMF loans and 
therefore there was a risk that it could borrow from these to loan to developing countries in the Americas.  
207 This issue has stalled, however, because of Paraguay’s recognition of Taiwan. 
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In addition to these developments, the publication of a white paper on Africa in January 2006, and a 
policy paper on LA in November 2008 outlining China’s policies towards these regions, further 
emphasises the increasing relevance of the two regions within China’s foreign policy. This is particularly 
so if one takes into account that besides these two papers, China has only published another one 
addressing a region -regarding its policy towards Europe (2003). Unlike the situation in the 1950-1970s, 
when China’s policy towards developing regions was driven by politico-ideological reasons, or in the 
1980-1990s, when it was dominated by politico-diplomatic considerations, the two policy papers 
mentioned above clearly reveal that politico-economic motivations increasingly inspire contemporary 
CFP toward these regions.  
The two white papers present a very similar outline. They begin by emphasizing the economic potential 
of each region within the current international context, the common ground with China (in the LA case 
the similar development stage and in Africa’s case the long history of relations) and stress progress in 
relations during recent years. The papers continue by laying down the Five Principles and the One China 
Principle as the foundations of relations and subsequently outline a comprehensive cooperation 
programme covering all features of relations, within which economic aspects clearly stand out. Among 
other things, China commits itself to actively encourage investments by Chinese enterprises; to expand 
mutual benefit exploration of resources; and to engage in infrastructure development, which is a critical 
bottleneck affecting resources development in both regions.  
Both papers were issued in very specific contexts. While, on the one hand, the timing of the Africa Policy 
Paper was symbolic, in that year China-Africa celebrated 50 years of relations (named the year of Africa 
in China), on the other, the Latin America Policy Paper was strategically presented by President Hu Jintao 
at the APEC summit in Peru in November 2008, precisely when the worst period of the world economic 
crisis was unfolding and developed countries were scaling down investments in the region. Furthermore, 
in the context of growing global media scrutiny of China’s expanding economic leverage in Africa 
throughout the crisis period (2009-2010), Beijing released a second white paper on economic and trade 
cooperation with Africa. This document underscores the mutual benefits and positive outcomes of China’s 
closer economic interaction with the continent.208 These timely and quick reactions are clearly indicative 
of these regions’ relevance in China’s contemporary foreign policy.  
                                                           
208 In November 2010, certain Wiki Leaks cables uncovered corruption practices by Chinese firms in Africa and 
exposed comments by a high ranking US official questioning China’s good intentions in Africa. 
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Even though China’s overall economic foothold in these regions still lags far behind that of the traditional 
powers, the gap has been closing rapidly over the past decade. China became Africa’s major single trade 
partner in 2009 and the third largest of LA. In addition to this, Beijing has gained significant clout in 
these regions, through all the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives mentioned above, which 
have substantially increased its soft power. This new reality has raised concerns among the US and the 
European Union (EU) in particular as these regions have long been under their influence. This is not only 
because of economic competition, but is also due to China’s distinctive ‘no strings attached’ approach (the 
‘Beijing Consensus’) that counters the conditional cooperation practices of traditional donors (the 
‘Washington Consensus’).209 The issuing of the policy papers mentioned above, to a certain extent, can 
thus be interpreted as Beijing’s attempt to ease the increasing anxiety among developed countries 
regarding China’s dealings in these regions. In this context, major concerns have clearly been Beijing’s 
growing intake of resource exports from these regions, and the fast growing interests of Chinese SOEs in 
resources sectors there, which was until recently an exclusive realm of Western MNCs.  
2.2.2. Uncovering economic complementarities  
To a great extent, the rapidly flourishing relationship between China and LA and Africa at the dawn of the 
21st century, can be explained by a timely convergence between a cash-loaded China in search of raw 
materials to sustain its domestic growth, and two underdeveloped regions with a vast pool of mineral 
deposits (hydrocarbons and base metals), the exploration of which has been hindered for decades by 
infrastructure bottlenecks. This inherent complementarity provides China with a privileged position to 
implement its economic statecraft, rooted in the provision of much needed infrastructure in exchange for 
access to resources.  
Although the Middle East remains China’s largest oil supplier, its share has been decreasing in relative 
terms as China diversifies its oil sources due to the unstable environment in that region. As a result, China 
has been increasingly active in Africa and LA, which together represent 20% of global oil output and a 
quarter of world known reserves as of 2009.210 The charts below (fig 2.1 and fig. 2.2) offer a global 
perspective on South and Central America and Africa, in the oil resources context. 
                                                           
209
 For a brief discussion on China’s impact on resources sector governance in Africa, see: Alden, C. and Alves, 
Ana C., “La Chine et les resources naturelles de l’Afrique” Les Temps Modernes 657, 2010, pp. 28-51. 
210
 Unless otherwise stated ,all figures in this and the following four paragraphs are according to BP, “Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2010”, Excel workbook, June 2010, Available online at: 
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview (accessed 20 August 2010)  
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Source: BP, Review of World Energy 2010. 
South American countries account for nearly all reserves and production figures under the category of 
South and Central America. South America’s oil reserves (197 billion barrels) are currently the second 
largest in regional terms (15% of global oil deposits), followed by Africa with a share of 10% (128 billion 
barrels). Although much less representative than the Middle East (57% of global deposits), South 
America’s oil reserves have registered the world’s fastest expansion rate, having nearly tripled over the 
past two decades (from 70 billion barrels in 1989 to 197 billion barrels in 2009). This is followed by 
Africa, the reserves of which have doubled over the same period. 
     
 Source: BP, Review of World Energy 2010. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa holds 52% of known oil deposits in the African continent,211 with Nigeria, Angola and 
Sudan accounting for the bulk (86%) of that share (fig. 2.3, above). Unlike Africa, South American 
reserves are geographically very concentrated. Venezuela alone accounts for over 86% of regional crude 
deposits, followed by Brazil with 6.5% (fig. 2.4, above). In fact Venezuelan oil reserves, estimated at 172 
billion barrels by BP in 2009 (13% of global known deposits), are second only to Saudi Arabia (265 
billion barrels = 20% of global reserves). If we add to conventional crude oil, the sand deposits in the 
Orinoco Delta, Venezuela’s reserves become the largest in the world, with estimates of those deposits 
ranging from 380 to 652 billion barrels.212 Brazil oil deposits have also expanded significantly as a result 
of the newly discovered deposits located offshore in ultra-deep waters (see Appendix II). Its reserves have 
increased from 8 billion barrels in 1999 to 13 billion barrels in 2009.  
   
 Source: BP, Review of World Energy 2010. 
 
Some 56% of Africa’s oil production originates in Sub-Saharan Africa (nearly 8% of global output), with 
Nigeria and Angola accounting for 71% of that share.213 Although Northern Africa produces a significant 
share of African oil (44%), in recent years most of these countries (e.g. Algeria, Egypt, and Libya) have 
been showing signs of stabilisation in oil output, which contrasts with the expanding trend observable in 
most SSA producers. In this regard, Angola has registered the fastest growth rate in production over the 
                                                           
211 Northern Africa accounts for the remaining 48% oil reserves, mostly concentrated in Libya (44 bn barrels), 
Algeria (12 billion barrels) and Egypt (4 billion barrels). 
212 USGS, ‘An Estimate of Recoverable Heavy Oil Resources of the Orinoco Oil Belt, Venezuela’, 11 January 2010, 
available online at: http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3028/pdf/FS09-3028.pdf. (accessed 5 December 2010) 
213 Nigeria and Angola accounted for 21% and 18% , respectively, of Africa’s oil production in 2009. Other large 
producers are Algeria (19%) and Libya (17%). 
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past decade (see fig. 2.5, above), and as a result has been disputing, with Nigeria, the first position in this 
ranking since 2006.214  
In spite of its impressive oil reserves, South American oil production still lags far behind most other 
regions, accounting for a meagre 9% of global production in 2009. This is largely explained by the 
declining trend in Venezuelan oil production since the early 2000s (which fell by nearly 700 thousand bpd 
over the last decade), mostly due to Hugo Chavez’s populist interventions in the sector (see fig. 2.6, 
above). In sharp contrast, Brazil has seen its production nearly double from 1.1 million bpd in 2000 to 2 
million in 2009 (fig. 2.6, above). Oil output of other South American countries is much less significant, 
representing altogether 33% of total regional production (Venezuela alone accounts for 36% and Brazil 
for 30%). While Peru and Ecuador have seen modest expansion in their reserves and production over the 
last decade, Colombia and Argentina, the third and fourth largest producers respectively, face dim 
prospects as their reserves are decreasing.215 
China is the world second largest oil consumer after the US, and it become the second largest net oil 
importer in 2009, overtaking Japan, and is projected to account for 37% of expected increase in oil 
demand over the period 2009-2011.216 Even though new oil discoveries in China’s offshore fields are 
expected to offset some of the decline registered in its mature onshore fields (which account for 85% of 
production), its external reliance is expected to continue growing in coming years. The need to ensure a 
steady supply explains why Chinese oil companies have been increasingly looking abroad for oil equity. 
China’s overseas oil production expanded from 140,000 bpd in 2000 to 900,000 bpd in 2008, representing 
23% of China’s total oil production that year. 217  
Sub-Saharan Africa and South America’s rich endowment in oil, perfectly match China’s growing demand 
for this commodity, which is much needed to sustain its fast pace of modernisation and industrialisation.  
2.2.3. Resources factor in bilateral trade
218
  
                                                           
214 Although Angola’s production has been increasing exponentially, this situation is partly due to increasing unrest 
in Nigerian southern oil fields. 
215 Data adapted from BP, op. cit. 
216 EIA, Country Analysis Brief: China, November 2010, p. 3, available online at: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html. (accessed 5 December 2010) 
217 Figures according to EIA, Ibid.,  p. 7. 
218 Unless otherwise stated, all figures for China trade in the following paragraphs are according to WTO 
International Trade Statistics, ‘Merchandise Trade by Product, Region and Major Trading Partner - China’, data 
(various years), available online at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm (accessed 10 January 
2011) 
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One of the most notable changing traits in China’s foreign trade structure over the past decade has been 
the increasing share of minerals and fuels in its global imports, having grown from 15% (US$34bn) in 
2000 to 27% (US$307bn) in 2008. This trend clearly indicates Beijing’s growing external reliance on 
such commodities, and hence the rising profile of resources security within CFP. As seen in the charts 
below (Figs 2.7 to 2.9), the majority of Chinese minerals and fuels imports originate in developing 
regions, justifying to a great deal the increasing relevance of these regions in CFP since the early 2000s. 
      
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics (various years), merchandise trade by product, region and 
major trading partner - China; available online at:  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm 
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Over the past decade, South America and Africa’s shares in China’s global imports of hard commodities 
have seen the fastest expansion amongst all regions. South America’s stake more than doubled from 6% 
in 2000 to 13% in 2008, while Africa’s stake grew from 12% to 16% over the same period. Put together, 
these two regions presently account for nearly one third of China’s mineral and fuel imports. Since all 
other regions’ shares have decreased in relative terms, this further underlines the growing relevance of 
South America and Africa as mineral resource providers to China, throughout the present decade.  
However, in the broader picture, Africa and South America still account for a relatively small part of 
China’s total foreign trade (4% and 5% respectively in 2009); but the fact that their share has more than 
doubled since 2000 (around 2% each), is indicative of the enormous potential for future expansion in 
trade relations. In absolute terms, China-Africa trade has registered a remarkable tenfold expansion, 
growing from US$10.5bn in 2000 to US$106.7 bn in 2008 (see fig. 2.10, below). Bilateral trade growth 
was even more dramatic with regard to South and Central America: from US$10.6bn to US$124.5bn over 
the same period (fig. 2.11). Another notable feature in China’s trade with both regions is its consistent 
deficit since the early 2000s, mostly a result of its swelling resources imports.  
       
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics (various years), merchandise trade by product, region and 
major trading partner - China; available online at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm 
 
The year 2009, though, registered the first decline in bilateral trade with both regions since the late 1990s, 
scaling down to US$89.7bn with Africa and to US$103.2bn with South and Central America. This 
contraction of 16% and 17% respectively is explained by the context of the economic crisis. The 
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contraction in oil imports’ value alone (from US$39bn in 2008 to US$27bn in 2009), represented the 
equivalent of 75% of the drop registered in China-Africa total trade in 2009 (US$90bn down from 
US$106.7bn in 2008), further underlining the critical importance of that commodity in bilateral trade. 
Considering that 2009 thus represents an atypical year as regards China’s trade relations with these 
regions and in the absence of consolidated data for 2010, 2008 data will be used in most cases while 
noting meaningful developments regarding resources in 2009. Preliminary data for 2010 certainly indicate 
a resumption of the growth trend in China’s bilateral trade with both regions, since China’s trade with 
Africa from January to November 2010 amounted to US$115bn.219  
The regression in bilateral trade values in 2009 is partly explained by fluctuations in commodities prices 
(particularly oil: from US$140 a barrel in June 2008 to US$40 in early 2009), not necessarily by the 
contraction of China’s intake from these regions. In fact, and in most cases, the volume of Chinese 
minerals and fuels imports expanded significantly in that year, as illustrated in table 2.1, below. 
Table 2.1. Chinese mineral and fuel imports 2008-2009 
Commodity 2008 2009 
 Volume      
(10,000 
tons) 
 
Value 
(US$ Billions) 
Volume 
(10,000 
tons) 
Value 
(US$ Billions) 
 
  Iron Ore                                       44356 60.5 62778 50.1 
  Manganese Ores                     757 3.5 962 1.8 
  Copper Ores                                   519 10,4 613 8.5 
  Chromium Ores                             684 2.7 676 1.3 
  Aluminum Oxide                           459 1.8 514 1.3 
  Crude Oil                              17888 129.3 20379 89.3 
 
Source: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2010   
The crisis context provided an opportunity for China to further increase its purchases from Africa. Indeed, 
there was a considerable increase in Beijing’s intake of oil and minerals, taking advantage of the ‘sale’ 
prices, in order to fuel its strategic stockpiling programme initiated in recent years. In the first five months 
of 2009, China’s oil imports reached the volume of the entire previous year (3.6 million bpd). For 
instance, from January to March 2009 imports from Sudan (217 thousand bpd) surpassed the total volume 
                                                           
219 Information Office of State Council, “China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation White Paper”, 23 
December 2010, available online at: http://english.gov.cn/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603.htm.  
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of 2008 (209 thousand bpd), while in that same period imports from Angola reached 76% of the volume 
of the previous year.220  
It was actually in this crisis context, that China became Africa’s major single trading partner in 2009. As 
for LA, in less than a decade China has displaced Japan as the region’s major Asian trading partner. 
Moreover, China already features among the top three regional trading partners, and is projected to 
overcome the EU to become LA’s second largest trading partner around 2015.221  Beijing has made 
impressive inroads into South America, already ranking as the number one export destination for Brazil 
(12th in 2000) and Chile (from 5th), the number two in Peru (from 4th) and Argentina (from 6th), and 
number three in Venezuela (from 37th) 222  – with all these countries being major mineral resource 
producers. 
As illustrated in table 2.2, China’s growing appetite for mineral and fuels from Africa and South America 
has greatly contributed to the rapid expansion in bilateral trade. If Asia (Australia and Southeast Asia) and 
the Middle East are still China’s major hard commodities suppliers, imports from South America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa have displayed the fastest growth rate of all regions (expanding 21 and 12 fold 
respectively, from 2000 to 2008). This illustrates the growing relevance of both regions in Beijing’s 
resources supply diversification strategy over the past decade. 
Table 2.2. China fuel and mineral imports by region (US$bn) 
 2000 2004 2008 2009 
South & Central America 1.89  8.80 39.88  36.30 
Africa 4.21  12.31 49.49  37.73 
Comm. of Indep. States 
(CIS) 
2.60  7.00 22.57  19.23 
Middle East 8.85  17.74 72.22  47.52 
Asia 13.18  33.84 102.90  88.12 
Rest of world 3.21  9.81 19.82  21.45 
Total 33.34 89.5 306.87 250.46 
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics (various years), merchandise trade by product, region and 
major trading partner - China; available online at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm  
                                                           
220 EIA, op. cit. (accessed 10 January 2011) 
221 CEPAL,”La Republica Popular de China y America Latina y el Caribe: hacia una relacion estrategica”, April 
2010, p. 14, available online at: http://www.eclac.org/cgi-
bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/2/39082/P39082.xml&xsl=/comercio/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl 
(accessed 10 January 2011) 
222 CEPAL, Ibid., p. 18. 
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China’s resources drive in South America and Africa throughout the 2000s is certainly confirmed by the 
fact that imports from these regions are increasingly concentrated in hard commodities at the expense of 
manufactured and agricultural products, as illustrated in Figs 2.12 to 2.14, below. While Chinese import 
flows from Africa only confirm a trend towards concentration already initiated in the late 1990s, there is a 
structural change underway with respect to South America, as hard commodities are quickly dwarfing the 
proportion contributed by agriculture and manufacturing in LA’s exports to China.  
   
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics (various years), merchandise trade by product, 
region and major trading partner – China; available online at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm 
In terms of the structure of Chinese imports of hard commodities from these regions, a few differences 
need to be emphasised. While Beijing’s major import product from Africa is crude oil (US$39.6bn or 73% 
of total imports from that continent in 2008), as regards Central and South America, the bulk of Chinese 
imports comprises ores and other minerals (US$33bn or 47% of imports from that region in 2008). 
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Nonetheless it should be noted that the share of ores and minerals in China’s imports from Africa has been 
rapidly increasing (to18% in 2008), which is also the case with the share of fuels in South America (to 
16%). This indicates that there is much room for the share of resources to grow in China’s trade with both 
regions.  
According to WTO data, in 2008 South and Central America accounted for 21% of China’s total minerals 
imports and 6% of its oil imports. Africa, on the other hand, accounted for 24% of total Chinese oil 
imports, followed by minerals at 7%. Combined, these two regions currently account for nearly 30% of 
China’s minerals and fuels imports, up from 18% in 2000. This suggests that these regions are playing an 
increasingly important role in China’s global strategy to ensure resources security. 
As illustrated in fig. 2.15 and fig. 2.16 (below), the bulk of China’s trade with Latin America and Africa is 
accounted for by South America and Southern Africa,223 respectively. 
     
 Source: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
The figures also show that over 60% of China-Africa imports originate in Southern Africa (8% in North 
Africa and 30% in the rest of Africa), while this concentration is even higher in LA where South America 
accounts for 90% of Chinese imports from the region (Mexico and Central America with 5% each).224 In 
                                                           
223 For the purpose of this thesis, Southern Africa’s geographical boundaries are those of the SADC (Southern 
African Development Community) countries: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
224 NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2010, Value of Imports and Imports by Country of Origin/Destination (Beijing: 
NBS, 2010). 
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2008 approximately 90% of Chinese imports from the SADC consisted of mineral resources (63% oil and 
roughly 24% mining commodities).225 The fact that the bulk of China’s imports from South America and 
Southern Africa comprise minerals and fuels again suggests that resources are a key element in Beijing’s 
foreign policy towards these sub-regions, therefore justifying the focus of this thesis. 
In each of the sub-regions, a handful of countries alone account for the lion’s share of China’s resource 
imports (see fig. 2.17 and 2.18 below). 
        
Source: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
In Southern Africa two countries alone (Angola and South Africa) account for 87% of Chinese imports. 
Virtually all Chinese oil imports from the SADC originate in Angola (US$22.4bn in 2008). This 
represents 58% of its oil imports from Africa and 17% of its global oil imports, which makes Luanda 
China’s second largest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia.226 Apart from Southern Africa, other important oil 
suppliers are Sudan and Libya, both among China’s top ten oil suppliers in 2009 (5th and 9th respectively), 
according to Chinese customs statistics. Together, Angola, Sudan and Libya accounted for over a quarter 
                                                           
225 TRALAC, “Africa’s Trading Relationship with China 2010” (data sourced from World Trade Atlas), available 
online at: http://www.tralac.org/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cat=1044&limit=10&page=0&sort=D&cause_id=1694&cmd=cause_dir_news#china. (accessed 20 
August 2010) 
226 TRALAC, Ibid. 
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of China’s global volume of oil imports in 2009.227 Other less significant African oil suppliers to China 
include Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Gabon and Algeria. 
With respect to South America, five countries alone account for 96% of Chinese imports from the region. 
Argentina’s exports to China are mostly agricultural products (soy and oilseeds). However, Chinese 
imports from the other four countries are dominated by mineral resources. In less than a decade some of 
these countries ascended to the top ranking of China’s mineral commodities suppliers: Chile (copper), 
Peru (copper and lead), Bolivia (tin) and Brazil (iron ore).228  
Although nearly one-fourth of Brazil exports to China comprised soy in 2008, the remaining share is 
largely dominated by minerals, with iron ore taking the largest share (nearly two thirds), followed by 
crude oil with a share of 10%, and which is expected to grow further in coming years as Brazil’s oil 
output expands.229 Venezuela is China’s major oil supplier in LA and ranks 11th in its global suppliers’ list, 
accounting for nearly 3% of China’s overseas oil intake. Other minor Chinese oil suppliers in South 
America include Peru and Ecuador. Here too, Chinese oil imports are expected to grow further in the near 
future, as more recent Chinese investments start to come on stream.   
In addition to sourcing resources overseas, China’s energy security strategy is also targeting the 
acquisition of production equity overseas, so as to guarantee a steady supply and a say in international 
market developments. For this reason a review of investment flows will offer further insight into China’s 
strategy in these regions.  
2.2.4. Resources factor in China’s investments overseas 
Chinese outbound investment is a relatively new development, which only began to expand in 2000, 
propelled by the ‘go out’ policy. Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has registered 
remarkable growth over the past decade, having expanded from US$2.7bn in 2002 to US$56.5bn in 2009. 
In that year it became the fifth largest foreign investor in the world, after the US, France, Japan and 
Germany, accounting for over 5% of global investment flows. Unlike trade, the financial crisis seemed to 
                                                           
227 China Customs data cited by: Xiao Wan, “China Depending More on Imported Oil”, China Daily, 20 January 
2010, available online at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/20/content_9346446.htm (accessed 20 
August 2010). 
228 All figures in this paragraph according to: Pui-Kwan Tse, “The Mineral Industry of China”, in 2009 Minerals 
Yearbook, USGS, November 2010, p. 26, available online at: 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2009/myb3-2009-ch.pdf (accessed 5 December 2010). 
229 SECEX/MDIC, ‘Exportacao Brasileira por Produto: China, 2008-2009’, statistical data available online at: 
http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=2033&refr=576 (accessed 5 December 
2010). 
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have little impact on Chinese investment flows. Against the backdrop of global FDI contraction in 2009 
(43%), China’s OFDI grew 1.1%. 230 
Not surprisingly, nearly one-fourth (US$13.3bn) of its OFDI for 2009 was directed at mining industries. 
Chinese official investment figures, however, are believed to only partially cover the real picture. 
According to a recent survey,231 for instance, of 34 mergers and acquisitions over US$100mn undertaken 
by Chinese enterprises in 2008/2009, 15 cases were in the mining industry (US$26.2bn), whereas 13 
(US$27.8bn) involved the energy industry. 
Another aspect that one must take into consideration when analysing official Chinese OFDI statistics, is 
that all investment flows across the mainland’s customs are considered outward investment, including 
therefore Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Hong Kong alone accounted for nearly two thirds (US$35.6bn) 
of Chinese total outward investment in 2009 (see figure 2.19. below), and 88% of what shows as OFDI 
into Asia. Most of this investment in Hong Kong is actually round tripping, eventually ending up back in 
China, since Hong Kong is the single largest investor in the mainland (US$42bn in 2008).232  
 
 
  Source: MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward FDI 2009. 
                                                           
230 Unless otherwise stated, All figures for Chinese investments referred to in this and the following paragraphs, are 
according to: MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of China's outward FDI 2009, December 2010, available online at: 
http://hzs2.mofcom.gov.cn/statistic/statistic.html (accessed 10 January 2011). 
231 Wang Duanyong, A Report on China’s Overseas FDI Risks: 2008-2009, SAIIA Policy Report, January 2011, p. 
7. 
232 Beijing Axis, The China Analyst, January 2010, p. 35. Available online at: 
http://www.thebeijingaxis.com/en/news-a-media/the-china-analyst (accessed 7 February 2010) 
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In addition to Hong Kong, there are two other major safe havens that absorb a significant part of Chinese 
outward investment, and therefore contribute to further distortion of the overall picture: the Cayman and 
the British Virgin Islands. In 2009 they together accounted for over 12% (US$7bn) of China’s total OFDI 
and 96% of Chinese investment in LA. Although it is difficult to determine the final destination of that 
investment due to the nature of these financial markets, as is the case with Hong Kong, a significant part 
of that money is likely to revert back to China. This is because, according to Chinese official statistics, the 
Cayman and the British Virgin Islands are the second and fifth largest investors in the mainland 
(US$15.9bn and US$3.1bn, respectively, in 2008).233  
The elimination of these two categories, which in 2009 together represented nearly 75% of China’s OFDI, 
will thus provide a much smaller figure, but a more accurate representation of Chinese investment abroad 
(see table 2.3. and figs. 2.20. and 2.21. below). For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher shall refer to 
it as ‘overseas FDI’, adopting the terminology defined by Wang Duanyong.234  
Table 2.3. Chinese overseas FDI by region (2003-2009) US$ million 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2009 
Stock 
Asia 0.318 0.343 0.942 0.773 1.603 4.267 4.351 19.211 
Africa 0.075 0.317 0.400 0.520 1.570 5.490 1.439 9.332 
Europe 0.150 0.170 0.510 0.590 1.090 0.880 3.353 8.677 
North America 0.058 0.126 0.320 0.260 1.130 0.360 1.522 5.185 
Latin America 0.023 0.088 0.080 0.102 0.420 0.052 0.355 1.958 
Oceania 0.034 0.120 0.200 0.130 0.770 1.950 2.480 6.419 
Total amount 0.658 1.164 2.452 2.375 6.583 12.999 13.500 50.782 
 
Source: Data 2003-2008, adapted from Wang Duanyong, A Report on China’s Overseas FDI Risks: 
2008-2009; data for 2009 as in MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of China's outward FDI 2009. 
                                                           
233 Beijing Axis, Ibid. 
234 Wang Duanyong, Ibid., p. 3. 
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  Source: MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of China's outward FDI 2009. 
Asia, a category of Chinese statistics that includes all countries from Japan to Turkey, absorbs the largest 
share of Chinese overseas investment. Within this region, Southeast Asia has been traditionally the largest 
destination of Chinese overseas FDI, having accounted for nearly 70% of it (US$2.7bn) in 2009, the 
remaining stake (US$1.7bn) being divided among Northeast Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. The 
fact that most Chinese investment in Southeast Asia is directed to infrastructure construction and 
manufacturing, and that the other of China’s major regional resources suppliers, namely Central Asia and 
the Middle East, account for only a marginal share of China’s Overseas FDI, suggests that China’s 
investments in resources sectors have privileged Oceania (Australia mainly) and Africa.  
Nonetheless, Chinese investments in Africa have registered a steady and fast increase from 2003 to 2008 
(from US$75bn to US$5.5bn in only five years), having even surpassed Asia that year. This was largely 
due, though, to a single major investment in South Africa (the ICBC acquisition of a 20% stake in 
Standard Bank for US$5.5bn). According to Chinese statistics, however, Chinese investment in Africa 
dropped significantly in 2009. A white paper on China-Africa Relations released in December 2010 by the 
information office of the State Council, however, provides a much larger figure for Chinese investment in 
Africa in 2009: US$9.3bn. This would confirm African as the largest regional destination of Chinese 
overseas investment, which accounts for nearly 70% or over twice as much as Asia. In fact, this figure 
may be much closer to reality, given the large number of resources assets acquired by Chinese companies 
since the onset of the recent financial crisis. Further stressing the relevance of Africa in Chinese OFDI, 
the continent ranks second in terms of investment stock after Asia and ahead of Australia. Conversely, 
China’s share in Africa’s investment inflows has expanded considerably, having accounted for 7.6% of 
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total Africa investment inflows in 2008 (US$72bn), most of which was resource seeking and involved 
state owned enterprises.235  
Chinese investment flows have generally fluctuated in both China and Africa; for this reason, an 
examination of investment stocks will provide a more accurate view. As of 2009 52% of China’s 
investment stock in the continent (US$9.3bn) was located in Southern Africa (US$4.8bn), confirming the 
importance of this sub-region for China. Indeed, half of the top ten African investment destinations are 
SADC countries, among which stand out South Africa (US$2.3bn, accounting alone for nearly one-
quarter of the total), Zambia (US$844mn) and the DRC (US$397mn). Outside the SADC, other large 
Chinese investment stocks are located in Nigeria (US$1bn), Algeria (US$751mn) and Sudan 
(US$564mn), further confirming Beijing’s preference for resource rich countries. 
With regards to LA, 79% of China’s investment stock in the region (US$1.96bn) is located in South 
America (US$1.55bn), with Brazil (US$361mn), Peru (US$296mn) and Venezuela (US$272mn) at the 
forefront, emulating the same geographical pattern found in bilateral trade. However, in sharp contrast 
with trade figures, LA’s intake of Chinese investment is well below that of Africa. In fact, Chinese 
overseas investment into LA ranks last in terms of flows (2%) and stock (4%). China’s investment there 
has yet to take off, remaining at comparatively low levels and presenting a very variable pattern over the 
last decade. This reality is particularly striking when compared with the steady increase, over the same 
period, of China’s investment flows towards African, which shares a very similar pattern to LA regarding 
bilateral trade with Beijing. Moreover, LA has historically attracted a much larger volume of global FDI 
than Africa. Conversely, investments by LA companies (mostly from Brazil and Mexico) in China, over 
the past decade, have been well above those of African companies. 
A survey of announcements and pledges (rather than actual economic assistance) of Chinese preferential 
loans, assistance and state sponsored investments in the 2002-2007 period, conducted by the Wagner 
School of New York University and the US’s Congressional Research Service on China’s foreign aid to 
developing regions,236  suggests, however, that this reality cannot be blamed on the lack of Chinese 
interest in LA.  
                                                           
235 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, p. 34, available online at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010ch2_en.pdf. (accessed 13 November 2010) 
236 Wagner School - New York University, Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development 
Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, April 2008, cited by: CRS, China’s Economic Assistance 
and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities, Nov. 2009, available online at: 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf.  (accessed 15 November 2010) 
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According to this study, even though presenting a lower volume in total, LA has attracted a significant 
share of China’s attention, particularly concerning investment intentions in resource sectors (see table 2.4. 
below). In this context, the low volume of Chinese investment in LA is particularly striking, taking into 
consideration that Chinese investors have actually shown a strong willingness to invest in that region in 
recent years. This is especially so in resources, a sector where this interest has enjoyed a sturdy political 
and financial backing from Beijing. In his tour to the region in 2004, President Hu Jintao pledged to 
invest heavily in LA. This fact is at the very foundation of this thesis: analysing why Chinese investment 
in South American resources is slow in growing, despite evidence of the importance of the region.  
 
Table 2.4. China’s reported economic assistance 2002-2007 (US$ millions) 
 
By Sector 
Africa Latin 
America 
By Type 
Africa Latin 
America 
 Natural 
resources 
extraction and 
production 
 
 
9,432 
 
18,585 Government 
sponsored 
investment 
 
8,042 
 
24,389 
Infrastructure 
and public 
works 
17,865 7,535 
Concessional 
loans 
 
22,379 
 
1,950 
 
Not specified 
 
5,024 
 
608 
Grant 1,851 421 
 
Humanitarian 
 
802 
 
32 
Debt  
Cancellation 
 
850 
 
0 
 
Military 
 
4 
 
0 
 
In kind aid 
 
21 
 
1 
 
Technical 
Assistance 
 
10 
 
1    
Total 33,137 26,761 Total 33,137 26,761 
Source: CRS, China’s Economic Assistance and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities, Nov. 2009. 
The above survey also suggests that the bulk of Chinese economic engagement in resources in both 
regions is channelled through government initiatives (government sponsored investment and concessional 
loans), justifying as such a more in depth analysis of Chinese economic statecraft in these regions.  
2.2.5. Resources factor in China’s economic statecraft 
According to Chinese official economic cooperation statistics - which include overseas contracts, labour 
exports and consulting services (integrated in Chinese aid programmes or gained through normal bidding 
processes) - such cooperation expanded six fold from US$11bn in 2000 to US$65bn in 2008, being much 
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larger figures than overseas investment. Africa is the second major recipient of Chinese cooperation, 
having absorbed US$20bn (33%) in 2008 (see fig. 2.22 below), one-fourth of which (US$5.6bn) was 
directed at Southern Africa, with Angola as the largest recipient (US$3.3bn, second largest in the 
continent). Notably, four countries alone, Algeria, Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria, accounted for over half of 
China’s cooperation with Africa that year.237  
       
Source: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook (2009, 2008, 2006, 2004, 2002). 
As with China’s overseas investment flows, LA only accounts for a modest 5% (US$3bn) of total 
cooperation flows, and has shown a much slower increase throughout the past decade (see fig. 2.23. 
above). Again, most of Chinese economic cooperation with LA ends up in South America (US$2.2bn or 
73% in 2008), with Brazil (US$935mn) and Venezuela (US$777mn) being major recipients. 
The first recipients in Africa of Chinese economic cooperation were oil-rich countries, namely Angola, 
Sudan and Nigeria. Only at a later stage did China begin its outreach to mineral producers like Gabon, 
DRC and Zambia, based on the same package-deals aimed at funding infrastructure in exchange for 
access to mining supplies and equity.  
As previously mentioned, the blueprint of such cooperation deals (provide infrastructure in return for 
resources) was devised with Angola in 2004. The deal included a concessional loan of US$2bn by China’s 
EXIM Bank. The loan was earmarked for infrastructure development listed in Luanda’s public works 
budget, and is to be repaid in oil supplies. As collateral for the loan, Sinopec acquired its first equity stake 
                                                           
237 Figures in this and the following paragraph according to: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Beijing: NBS, 
2010. 
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in the Angolan oil industry.238 Even though the infrastructure to be constructed with the EXIM Bank 
credit line is not directly related to oil exploration, which is largely located offshore, the deal undoubtedly 
paved the way for China to enter Angola’s oil sector.  
Nigeria under Olegun Obasanjo also embraced the infrastructure-for-oil formula, with loans from EXIM 
Bank reportedly totalling US$12 bn. 239 Indeed, Chinese NOCs (CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec) obtained 
their first stakes in the Nigerian oil sector during Obasanjo’s final years of rule (2005-2007), in exchange 
for engaging in major infrastructure projects. These include the rehabilitation of the Kaduna oil refinery 
by CNPC (US$2bn), the Lagos-Kano railway (1,350km), and the Mambilla hydroelectric station to be 
funded by EXIM Bank (US$2.5bn) with partial backing by Nigerian oil blocks. Most Chinese oil 
exploration contracts awarded by Obasanjo and loans signed under his rule were, however, frozen by his 
successor Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, right after the elections in 2007. 240  
Other African countries who signed massive infrastructure-for-resources deals with China include DRC241 
and Gabon242. More recently, Ghana discovered major oil reserves offshore. In September 2010 it signed a 
US$10bn loan for infrastructure development with EXIM Bank, to be repaid in oil over 20 years, and 
thereafter signed another US$3bn with China Development Bank (CDB) for oil sector development. 
Many other African countries received much smaller loans from China throughout the past decade, in 
most cases targeting specific infrastructure projects. This trend has intensified after the onset of the 
financial crisis. According to the recent white paper on China-Africa cooperation (December 2010), 
Beijing will make available US$10bn in preferential loans for infrastructure to African countries between 
2010 and 2012, doubling the figure for the 2007-2009 period. These developments demonstrate that 
                                                           
238 This deal will be explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
239 Interview, ExIm Bank, Beijing, China, 26 August 2009. 
240 For a detailed study on China’s engagement in Nigeria, see: “Gregory Mthembo-Salter, “Elephants, Ants and 
Superpowers: Nigeria Relations with China”, SAIIA Occasional Paper, Nr. 42, October 2009. 
241 In September 2007 China signed a similar deal with the DRC. The initial US$5bn loan was extended to US$9bn 
in January 2008. Under the agreement, US$6bn would be allocated in the first phase to the rehabilitation and 
construction of infrastructure, and US$3bn to mining exploration. A joint venture named Sicomines was set up 
between the Congolese state mining company Gecamines; Sinohydro; and China Railway Engineering Corporation 
(CREC) - 68% owned by the Chinese partners241. The loan (for both infrastructure and mining) is to be repaid with 
revenue obtained through the exploration rights over two copper and cobalt concessions located in Katanga 
Province. The project development, however, has been stalled by the DRC’s vulnerability to the IMF’s criticism, the 
loan having been revised and downsized to US$6bn in 2009 on Kinshasa’s request. 
242 In 2006 the Gabonese government granted a Chinese consortium led by a construction company (China National 
Machinery and Equipment Corporation, CMEC) the right to develop Belinga mines, the largest known untapped 
deposit of iron ore in the world.242 The US$3bn deal, to be funded by ExIm Bank, included the construction of a new 
560 km railway line linking Belinga to the coast, a deep-water mining harbour, a hydroelectric dam and a steel mill. 
These would be in exchange for exploration rights through the establishment of a new mining company (Compagnie 
Minière du Belinga, COMIBEL), 75% owned by the Chinese partner. The Belinga project, however, is yet to begin, 
apparently due to the inaccurate planning and lack of capacity of the Chinese consortium. 
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China’s infrastructure-for-resources loans model is set to continue driving its engagement strategy in 
Africa for the foreseeable future. Southern Africa received a significant share of this type of loan over the 
past decade (Table 2.5. below). 
Table 2.5. Major Chinese ‘resources for infrastructure’ loans in Africa (2002-2010) 
Country  Main 
export to 
China  
Year Pledged 
amount  
Loan Provider Major funded 
projects  
Collateral to 
agreement 
Angola Oil 2004 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2009 
 
 
US$2bn 
 
 
US$2.5bn 
 
 
US$1.5bn 
 
 
US$2.5bn  
 
 
US$6bn 
EXIM Bank 
(repaid in oil) 
 
EXIM Bank 
(repaid in oil) 
 
CDB 
 
 
ICBC 
(repaid in oil) 
 
EXIM Bank 
(repaid in oil) 
 
Public Infrastructure 
 
 
Public Infrastructure 
 
 
Public Infrastructure 
and Agriculture 
 
Public Infrastructure 
 
 
Public Infrastructure 
 
4 oil blocks 
(Sinopec) 
 
 
Gabon 
 
Iron ore 
 
2006 
 
US$3bn 
 
EXIM Bank 
(repaid in 
cobalt) 
Infrastructure and 
mining development 
Iron ore mining 
equity 
 
 
DRC 
 
 
 
Cobalt 
 
2007 
 
US$5bn* 
 
EXIM Bank 
(repaid in 
cobalt) 
 
 
Infrastructure and 
mining development 
 
Cobalt mining 
equity 
Total 
amount 
pledged 
   
US$22.5 
billion 
   
 
* extended to US$9 bn in Jan. 2008, reduced to US$6 bn in Aug. 2009. 
Source: Beijing Axis, The China Analyst, May 2009, September 2009 and January 2010; various media 
reports and interviews by the author. 
 
Among the African countries that recently signed for smaller loans regarding infrastructure with Beijing, 
were Zimbabwe (2009, US$950mn)243 and Tanzania (2009, US$400mn to build a coal power plant).244 
                                                           
243 BBC News, “China Agrees huge Zimbabwean loan”, 30 June 2009, available online at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8126555.stm (accessed 5 November 2009). 
244 Steelguru, “China to give loan to Tanzania for coal based power plant”, 16 June 2009, available online at: 
http://www.steelguru.com/raw_material_news/China_to_give_loan_to_Tanzania_for_coal_based_power_plant/1070
75.html (accessed 5 November 2009). 
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China’s eagerness to provide cheaper and unconditional aid and willingness to embrace large 
infrastructure projects neglected by Western donors is a valuable competitive advantage in accessing 
resources in the African continent.  
It should be pointed out, though, that the first Chinese investments in resource sectors in Africa, namely 
CNPC in Sudan (1996) and China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Company (CNMC) in Zambia (through 
the acquisition of 85% of Chambishi copper mine in 1998), followed a different pattern (that of greenfield 
investments). This is where these companies acted on their own, enjoying no significant support from 
Beijing at the beginning of their operations. Nevertheless, Beijing’s active involvement in infrastructure 
funding in both countries has undoubtedly contributed to cementing its companies’ position vis à vis 
Khartoum and Lusaka.  
The 2008/2009 economic crisis context provided China with a golden opportunity to further expand its 
equity portfolio in Africa. Among the resource assets snapped up by Chinese companies in Africa - the 
acquisition of Addax Petroleum by Sinopec stands out as the largest successful overseas takeover by a 
Chinese company. The purchase of the Swiss-based company, listed in London and Canada, has given 
Sinopec access to sizeable oil and gas equity. Proven and probable reserves are estimated at 537 million 
barrels and annual production at seven million tons per year in 2009 (143,000 bpd), 72% originating from 
Nigeria, 20% in Gabon and 8% from the Kurdistan region in Iraq. 245  Chinese NOCs have been 
particularly active, not only in major oil producers such as Libya, Nigeria and Angola, but also in the 
newest oil producing countries where the industry is still in formation, namely in Ghana, Uganda and 
Niger. In Southern Africa Chinese mining companies have been particularly successful over this period. 
While China’s formula of infrastructure-for-resources has proved reasonably successful in accessing 
resources equity in Africa, particularly so Southern Africa, this seems not to be the case in South America. 
This is particularly intriguing if one considers that the necessary conditions are met: on the one hand there 
is growing Chinese demand for South America’s mining and fuels, and on the other hand South America 
is facing serious infrastructure bottlenecks. Although the infrastructure scenario in South America is better 
than in Sub-Saharan Africa,246 the region is also facing serious logistical shortcomings as a result of over 
                                                           
245 Brunswick Group - Sinopec, “Sinopec Group Completed the Acquisition of Addax”, 18 August 2009, available 
online at: http://www.addaxpetroleum.com/press_room/159 (accessed 5 November 2009). 
246 The World Bank estimates that US$ 93bn will need to be injected every year in infrastructure development over 
the next decade. Angie Gentile, “Africa’s Infrastructure: Closing the ‘Efficiency Gap’”, 10 April 2009, available 
online at: http://blogs.worldbank.org/meetings/africa-s-infrastructure-closing-the-efficiency-gap (accessed 5 
November 2009).  
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two decades of public divesting.247 The new growth cycle prompted by resource revenues is therefore 
being challenged by infrastructure bottlenecks, namely in transport structures (roads, railways and ports) 
that are obstructing export corridors, and thereby placing infrastructure development at the top of South 
American governments’ agendas.  
Although a number of infrastructure projects in South America involving China’s funding have been 
mentioned in the press throughout the past decade, including a mega transcontinental railway linking 
Santos Port (Brazil) on the Atlantic coast to Antofagasta Port (Chile) on the Pacific coast, the reality is 
that most of these credit lines for infrastructure failed to materialise. Despite the strong interest shown by 
both parties and a number of cooperation framework agreements signed, at bilateral high level exchanges, 
the few credit lines that materialised involved relatively small projects (bridges and roads in Argentina) 
and no significant resources assets were produced as collateral. 
Most resource assets China possessed in South America before the onset of the global financial crisis 
were acquired by Chinese state enterprises in the 1990s. These include CNPC oil assets in Peru (1994), 
Venezuela (1997); and Shougang Group, who acquired Peru´s biggest iron ore mine in 1993. At that point 
these had little support from Beijing,248 and no major engagement with infrastructure. These investments, 
however, have been struggling to take off, as these companies have faced many unanticipated obstacles, 
from strong trade union action to violation of property rights by nationalist governments (Venezuela and 
Peru). 
The onset of the global economic crisis in late 2008, however, seems to have reversed this picture, 
judging by the number of deals (loans and investment) that were signed in 2009 and 2010 alone (see table 
2.6, below).  
 
 
 
                                                           
247 The last significant investment in infrastructure in the region dates back to the 1970s, when governments were 
awash with cash from rising raw materials revenues. In the 1980s the debt crisis led to a contraction of public 
spending in infrastructure, while the liberalisation in the 1990s failed to bring private investment into the sector, 
discouraged by high risks and widespread nepotism. For a brief account on the status quo of LA infrastructure, see: 
Latin American Logistics, ‘The State of Latin American Infrastructure and Logistics’, undated, available online at: 
http://www.latinamericanlogistics.org/articles/the-state-of-latin-american-infrastructure-and-logistics.htm.  
248 Interview, CNPC, Beijing, China, 24 August 2009. 
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 Table 2.6. China’s major loans to South America (2009-2010) 
Country  Main 
export to 
China  
Year Pledged 
amount  
Loan 
Provider 
Major funded 
projects  
Collateral to 
agreement 
  
Brazil 
 
 
Iron ore, 
Oil, 
Agriculture  
 
 
Feb. 
2009 
 
 
US$10bn 
 
 
CDB  
(to 
Petrobras)  
 
 
Oil exploration and 
production in the 
pre-salt layer 
 
 
10 year oil supply 
contract + Sinopec 
JV with Petrobras to 
explore 2 oil blocks  
 
 Venezuela  Oil April 
2010 
US$20bn  
 
CDB  
(to be 
repaid in 
oil)  
Oil, gas 
exploration/producti
on, refining and 
various kinds of 
infrastructure 
CNPC JV with 
PDVSA to explore 
and refine oil from 
Orinoco Delta 
 
Argentina 
 
Soy 
complex 
 
July 
2010 
 
US$10bn 
 
 
CDB  
 
 
Railway and 
underground 
network and rolling 
stock 
 
 
Sinopec and 
Sinohydro JV with 
ENARSA  
Ecuador Oil June 
2010 
 
Aug. 
2010 
US$1.7bn 
 
 
US$1bn 
EXIM 
Bank  
 
CDB 
Hydroelectric dam 
 
 
Various 
infrastructure and 
oil and mining 
sector projects 
 
 
 
4 year oil supply 
contract 
Source: Various news reports (Bloomberg & Reuters). 
As table 2.6 shows, the crisis period has been particularly positive for China in its outreach to South 
America, having finally succeeded in extending loans for infrastructure there. However, with the 
exception of Venezuela, none of these are to be repaid in oil. Nonetheless, in some cases they have 
produced access to equity and oil supply contracts. 
Venezuela was the first South American country to embrace large amounts of Chinese funding, having 
established a joint investment fund of US$6bn in 2007 with China, directed at various development 
projects in infrastructure, industry and energy. This fund was doubled in 2008 to US$12bn and is also to 
be repaid in oil (presently 450,000 bpd).249 The US$20bn loan announced in April 2010 is actually the 
combined sum of two soft loans (one in dollars and the other in Chinese currency, US$10bn each) 
directed at infrastructure and to be repaid by oil over a ten year period, 250  thus emulating the 
                                                           
249 Business News Americas, “Chavez Signs 26 Cooperation Agreements with China”, 27 September 2008, 
available online at: 
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/waterandwaste/Chavez_signs_26_cooperation_agreements_with_China (accessed 
5 November 2009).  
250 Starting with 250,000 bpd in 2010; 250,000 bpd in 2011 and 300,000 bpd from 2012 onwards. 
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infrastructure-for-resources formula Beijing is applying in Africa. This loan constituted collateral for 
another JV between Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and CNPC (for 25 years), who secured a larger 
stake this time (40%), to explore oil in the Junin-4 field in the Orinoco belt. This is an investment 
estimated at US$16bn, most of which is expected to be injected by China. This block is expected to 
produce 400,000 bpd of extra heavy oil by 2016, most of which will be sent to China to be processed in 
the refineries presently being jointly built by PDVSA and CNPC.251 In December 2010, PDVSA signed 
another two agreements with Sinopec (to develop Junin1 and 8 which are expected to produce 200,000 
bpd plus the Cabruta refinery) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC; to develop a 
natural gas project expected to produce 37,000 bpd of condensed gas). The combined planned 
investments of the three Chinese NOCs in Venezuela are expected to reach US$40bn by 2016.252  
After many years trying to enter the oil sector in Brazil, the global crisis context finally provided a 
breakthrough when Petrobras (Brazil’s NOC) was struggling to attract funding from international markets 
to develop its newly discovered (2007) offshore oil reserves in the pre-salt253 layer (see Appendix 2). The 
US$10bn CDB loan to Petrobras provided China with a long term supply contract, and Sinopec with its 
first equity in Brazil: two oil blocks to be explored in partnership with Petrobras.254 Demonstrating its 
growing interests in Brazil, which is set to become a major oil producer in the near future, Sinopec 
acquired a 40% stake in Repsol Brazil for US$7.1bn in late 2010, accessing by these means equity in the 
newly discovered pre-salt layer deposits. Moreover, earlier that year Sinochem succeeded in acquiring a 
stake in the Peregrino oilfield (offshore) that went up for sale, having paid US$3.1bn. 255 In addition to oil, 
Chinese companies obtained important mining assets in Brazil in 2009-2010, mostly by acquiring stakes 
of private mining companies that came up for sale; some of the deals included infrastructure upgrades.  
In Argentina, which has been excluded from financial markets for years, China Development Bank 
clinched another US$10bn loan to upgrade and expand the national railway system and acquire the rolling 
                                                           
251
 PDVSA, “PDVSA and CNPC form a JV to produce and improve 400 mbd of crude oil”, 19 April 2010, available 
online at: 
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/salaprensa/readnew.tpl.html&newsid_obj_id=8566&news
id_temas=1(accessed 8 June 2010).  
252 Energy-pedia News, “CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC Sign Oil and Gas Agreements with Venezuela”, 5 December 
2010, available online at: http://www.energy-pedia.com/article.aspx?articleid=143265(accessed 7 January 2011).  
253 The pre-salt refers to a geological formation first found in the continental shelf off Brazil, where major 
hydrocarbons reserves were found. The deposits are located in deep sea waters (2,000-3,000m), under a thick layer 
of rock (2,000) and salt (2,000). Drilling is very expensive (around US$100 million, twice as much as deep waters) 
and technologically challenging. 
254 This deal will be explored in detail in chapter five of this thesis. 
255 Leslie Hook and Jude Webber, “China Taps into Argentina’s Oil Prospects”, Financial Times, 12 December 
2010, available online at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7acec448-0626-11e0-976b-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BNkQPlWN (accessed 7 January 2011) 
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stock. At the same time a cooperation agreement was signed between the state energy company, 
ENARSA, and Sinopec and Sinohydro, which points to closer ties in the energy sector. Although 
Argentina’s main export to China is soy complex, one must not forget that it offers huge mineral potential, 
as a large part of the country remains unexplored. Furthermore, despite declining oil production, 
Argentina boasts potentially rich offshore oil and gas reserves, the exploration of which has been 
constrained by price controls and its tough fiscal regime.256 Argentinean energy companies also possess 
important equity in the region, which in conjunction with the divesting strategies of some IOCs in the 
crisis context, explains the Chinese NOC’s acquisition spree in 2010. Indeed, in early 2010 CNOOC 
acquired 50% of Bridas Corporation (a private Argentinean oil company that owns proved oil reserves of 
636 million barrels across Argentina, Bolivia and Chile) for US$3.1bn. Soon after, CNOOC/Bridas 
acquired BP’s 60% stake in Argentina’s Pan American Energy (the other 40% belonged to Bridas) for 
US$7bn. In December 2010 Sinopec acquired Occidental Petroleum operations in Argentina for 
US$2.45bn.  
 Table 2.7. Major Chinese investments in South American Oil Sector 2009-2010 
Country Year Pledged 
amount 
Chinese Company Deal 
  
Brazil 
 
 
2010 
 
US$7.1bn 
 
 
US$3.1bn 
 
Sinopec 
 
 
Sinochem 
 
40% stake in Repsol Brazil 
 
 
Acquisition of stake in Pelegrino oilfield 
 
Argentina 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 US$3.1bn 
 
 
US$7bn 
 
US$2.45bn 
CNOOC 
 
 
CNOOC/Bridas 
 
Sinopec 
50% stake of Bridas Corp. 
 
 
60% stake Pan American Energy  
 
Occidental Petroleum operations in Argentina 
 
Venezuela 2010-2016 US$40bn CNPC, Sinopec and 
CNOOC 
Various E&P and refining operations 
    Source: various news reports (Upstream online, Reuters, Bloomberg). 
On the back of souring relations with the World Bank and the IMF, China has also recently extended 
significant loans to Ecuador. EXIM Bank is funding 85% of a US$2 bn hydroelectric dam which is 
expected to supply one-third of the country’s power needs. In August 2010 another US$1bn loan for 
                                                           
256 L. Hook and J. Webber, op. cit. 
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infrastructure was extended by CDB to Ecuador, which is, allegedly, tied to an oil supply contract.257 
Taking into consideration that Ecuador is known for failing to meet its repayment commitments, these 
two loans again signal China’s willingness to take higher risks and buy political sympathies that may 
benefit its companies.  
In early 2011, Colombia announced it was negotiating a US$7.6bn loan from China to build a 710 km 
railway line linking the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. The Trans-Colombian railway would facilitate coal 
exports to China and function as an alternative to the Panama Canal258. These specific projects signal 
China’s willingness to engage in mega infrastructure projects that would facilitate the outflow of natural 
resources, as in Africa. 
China extended smaller loans to other South American countries, for example Bolivia, with whom it 
signed a US$67mn loan in April 2010 to fund infrastructure in a mineral-rich region and another 
US$60mn credit line to purchase natural gas drilling rigs. The nature of these loans further discloses the 
resources drive underlying China’s credit facilities to South America.  
Interestingly enough, Peru and Chile, China’s largest lead and copper suppliers respectively, have not 
signed any significant loans or investment deals with China over the same period. This is even more 
striking if one takes into consideration that these are the only countries in South America that have signed 
FTA agreements with China, one of the stated aims being to foster Chinese investment.  
2.3. Chapter conclusions 
From a historical point of view, in terms of China’s relations with LA and Africa, two main interacting 
patterns can be discerned. First, Chinese foreign policy towards developing regions has gradually moved 
from confrontation (revolution) to de facto peaceful coexistence and cooperation, as ideology gave place 
to economic pragmatism and China became more integrated into the international community. Second, 
throughout this period, China’s policy towards these regions was always a function, not an independent 
element, of Beijing’s relations with the superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union). This was the case 
when China’s policy entered the radical stage in the 1960s, to counter Soviet advances in Africa; and 
when the rapprochement with the US facilitated relations with LA in the 1970s. In the 1980s the 
                                                           
257 News wires, “Ecuador Seals US$1bn China Loan”, Upstream Online, 31 August 2010, available online at: 
www.upstreamonline.com. (accessed 7 January 2011) 
258 Jonathan Manthorpe, “China’s Trans-Colombian Railway won’t Harm Panama Canal”, The Vancouver Sun, 21 
February 2011, available online at: 
http://www.vancouversun.com/business/China+trans+Colombian+rail+harm+Panama+traffic/4319274/story.html 
(accessed 21 February 2011).  
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economic dependence on developed countries dictated the adjournment of the Third World project, while 
in the 1990s the strained relations with the West once again returned the Third World to China’s agenda.  
However, recent developments point to an important shift in this pattern. At the beginning of the 21st 
century Beijing’s motivation to seek a closer association with the Third World seems not to be so 
dependent on its relations with the remaining power, the US, or on the current international system’s 
structure. This time, domestic economic reasons seem to be the major stimulus, namely, the urge to 
diversify and find new sources to provide resource security upon which depend the maintenance of 
China’s economic growth and ultimately the legitimacy of its regime.  
Indubitably, having consolidated its position as a major importer of most mineral commodities throughout 
the 2000s, resource security naturally emerged as an increasingly important factor in CFP towards Africa 
and LA due to these continents’ large endowments of resources. This fact is confirmed by the structure of 
bilateral trade flows, as Chinese imports are largely dominated by resources. This is particularly the case 
in Southern Africa and South America, where a handful of countries account for the bulk of trade with 
China. Among these Angola stands out, accounting for nearly half of China’s trade with Southern Africa 
in 2008 (US$25bn, 23% of total trade with Africa) and two-thirds of China’s imports from the region 
(mostly oil). And on the other hand Brazil, which is responsible for 44% of South America’s bilateral 
trade with China (US$48bn, 34% of its trade with LA) and nearly half of its imports from the region 
(mostly minerals).  
If a similar rapid growth pace is observable in China’s bilateral trade with both regions, the same, 
however, is not true as regards Chinese investment and cooperation flows. As demonstrated above, while 
Chinese economic statecraft based on infrastructures-for-resources deals have made impressive inroads in 
Africa, the success of this approach was very limited in South America, until the onset of the global 
economic crisis. This reality is even more striking if one takes into account that there has been 
considerable interest from both parties in this regard, judging by the increasing number of high level 
exchanges and bilateral framework agreements involving extractive industries. In addition, at first sight, 
South America possesses the necessary prerequisites, namely a rich resources endowment and an urgent 
need to upgrade and expand its depleted infrastructure system. 
This paradox underpins this thesis, which aims to uncover the reasons for these diverging patterns, and 
why the situation improved with the onset of the global economic crisis. This is done through an in-depth 
analysis of China’s relations with its largest trade partners in each region: Angola and Brazil. With this 
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purpose in mind, the following chapter will explore the differences regarding the institutional structure of 
the oil sector in both case studies. 
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CHAPTER 3: COMPARING THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
OF THE ANGOLA AND BRAZIL OIL SECTORS 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the institutional structure that frames the oil 
sectors in Angola and in Brazil. In both cases the analysis will focus first on how the present structures 
came into existence, and how these were shaped by their contemporary history. Secondly, the institutional 
dynamics of their current respective oil industries are examined, this aimed at unpacking the synergies at 
work in both countries. The main aim of this is to uncover the major institutional differences affecting the 
oil industry in both countries, emphasizing the sharp contrast between Angola’s highly centralized pattern 
and the fragmented nature of the structure in Brazil. To complement this section, a detailed account of 
Angola and Brazil’s oil industry is presented in Appendix I and II.  
3.1. Institutional structure of the oil sector in Angola 
During the last decades of colonial rule, Angola enjoyed a diversified economy. Before 1975, aside from a 
flourishing mining industry (diamonds and iron ore) and a nascent oil industry, Angola had a thriving 
agriculture sector and emerging industrial park served by a large and modern transportation network and 
power grid. Following independence, however, the economy collapsed. The country lost most of its 
skilled labour overnight following the massive and hasty withdrawal of the Portuguese population in the 
wake of independence and the economy’s decline accelerated as civil war broke out and lasted for almost 
30 years.259 Over this period the economy became increasingly dependent on the oil sector, and this 
industry gradually fell under the absolute control of the Presidency. 
                                                           
259 Independence was granted to Angola in November 1975 following a military coup in Portugal (1974) that 
brought to an end over four decades of dictatorship. In the midst of a muddled political environment in Lisbon, 
authority in Luanda was transferred, in haste, to a transitional government integrating the three main independence 
movements: MPLA (Movimento para a Libertacao de Angola), FNLA (Frente Nacional para a Libertacao de 
Angola) and UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola). This fragile arrangement collapsed 
almost immediately, giving way to a civil conflict that drew in major international actors in the framework of the 
Cold War. The Marxist-Leninist MPLA held Luanda with military support from Cuba and Soviet armies, while the 
UNITA-FNLA alliance held the central region (Huambo) with the military support of South Africa, China and the 
US. After FNLA major defeats in the North, Western powers eventually focused all their support in UNITA, led by 
Jonas Savimbi. 
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3.1.1. Oil: empowering the Presidency throughout the civil war
260
 
The Angolan oil industry was under ruling party (MPLA)261 control from the onset of the conflict. With 
Angolan hydrocarbon reserves mostly located offshore, the oil industry was never affected by the civil 
war. The conflict’s progress, however, was greatly impacted by the fluctuation in oil prices, as oil 
revenues were critical in funding MPLA’s war effort. The national oil company, Sociedade Nacional de 
Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol, whose role is further detailed below), assumed a key role within this 
context by acting as a guarantor for short term loans to fund MPLA’s military expenditure.  
The evident synergies gradually knit the oil industry and the MPLA close together. Throughout the war 
period President Dos Santos262 consolidated his grip first over MPLA, and subsequently Sonangol. In this 
setting the Presidency and Sonangol emerged as Angola’s paramount institutions. 
Following the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of foreign powers (Soviet, Cuban and South 
African troops) the civil conflict became increasingly ‘angolanized’263, led by personal ambitions and 
mutual distrust and progressively more reliant on its own domestic resources. The civil war gradually 
became a resource-based conflict between urban MPLA that controlled the oil, and UNITA 264  that 
controlled the diamond mining areas in the northeast and southeast of the country. Up until 2002 Angolan 
resources were almost exclusively directed to fund the conflict, neglecting the state and all economic 
sectors, and most importantly the population that was pushed to the limits of extreme poverty.  
Having lost its main funding sources (US and South Africa) with the end of the Cold War, diamond 
revenues became vital for UNITA in the 1990s. When Savimbi refused to accept defeat in national 
elections held in 1992, and resumed the conflict, diamonds became the only funding source to purchase 
armament, pay its officials and buy the sympathy of neighbouring governments. UNITA’s control over the 
diamond mining areas was, however, disrupted by government mercenary led operations and the signing 
                                                           
260 This section draws heavily on: Ana Cristina Alves, “Angola’s Resources: from conflict to development”, in: 
Ruchita Beri and Uttam K. Sinha (eds.), Africa and Energy Security (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009) pp. 
155-175. History, political and economic background based in: EIU, Angola Country Profile 2008, London: EIU, 
2008; EIU, Angola Country Report, London: EIU, September 2009; CIA, The World Fact Book: Angola, available 
online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html (accessed 15 December 2010) 
261 MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola. 
262 Angola’s first President, Agostinho Neto, died in September 1979, only four years after independence. He was 
immediately replaced by oil engineer José Eduardo dos Santos, an eminent pro Soviet MPLA princeling, who was 
then the Foreign Affairs Minister (1975-79). At the age of 37, dos Santos assumed along with the Presidency the 
functions of President of MPLA and Commander in Chief of the armed forces, remaining in office up to the present. 
263 Phillipe le Billon, “Angola’s political economy of war: the role of oil and diamonds, 1975-2000”, in: African 
Affairs, 100, 2001, p. 58. 
264 UNITA - União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola. 
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of the Lusaka Peace Protocol in 1997, which forced UNITA to hand over important diamond fields. When 
the war resumed in 1998, UNITA had much smaller resources.  
MPLA, in contrast, saw its oil revenues increase substantially in the late 1990s, fuelled by the surge in oil 
price and new found reserves. As a result, MPLA’s military capacity improved dramatically, breaking the 
war impasse in favour of Luanda. UNITA was further weakened by the increasing military pressure of 
governmental troops and growing isolation, resulting from western institutions’ sanctions.265 UNITA’s 
difficulties of resupply, internal fragmentation (a rebel faction that favoured the peace process emerged 
within its leading ranks) and the loosening of the command chain, all contributed to the encirclement and 
decapitation of its forces in February of 2002.  
After the peace treaty signed on April 4, 2002, UNITA gave up its diamond mines and demobilised, and 
from then on the MPLA government steadily established control over the diamond sector, bringing thus 
all resources under the Presidency.  
After dealing with UNITA, MPLA was finally able to focus on the separatist movement in the Cabinda 
enclave, 266 in which offshore a significant part of Angolan oil production originates. Indeed, soon after 
the end of the civil war, MPLA managed to disband the separatist movement in Cabinda, who unlike 
UNITA had very limited resources. This was done through increased military presence, playing out the 
internal divisions and co-option of the leaders (namely Bento Bembe who is presently the Angolan 
Minister for Human Rights).  
The interlock between the conflict and resources throughout this phase was so profound, that it is hard to 
establish if it was a resource-based civil war or a war for resources. The fact remains that oil revenue 
greatly influenced the course of the war and peace was only possible when one of the contenders (MPLA) 
secured the monopoly over all the resources. With no means of funding, the defeated opponents (UNITA 
                                                           
265 In June 1998, the UN Security Council froze UNITA’s bank accounts and declared a worldwide ban on the sale 
of unofficial Angolan diamonds (‘blood diamonds’). Although it did not stop UNITA diamond transactions, it did 
substantially increase transaction costs. 
266 Based on historical reasons, Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) declared Cabinda’s 
independence in August 1, 1975, and formed a provisional government headed by N’zita Tiago and Ranque Franque 
as President. Angolan troops occupied Cabinda right after independence (November 11, 1975), and incorporated the 
territory in Angola. Since then FLEC has been fighting Luanda’s rule over the territory, and over the years has split 
into several groups (major ones: FLEC-Renovada and FLEC-FAC forças armadas de Cabinda). In September 2004 
the two main rebel movements (FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R) merged and created a dialogue platform, Fórum Cabindês 
para o Diálogo (FCD), that integrates civil society and church representatives, and which is presided over by 
António Bento Bembe (FLEC-R). On July 17, 2006, Bento Bembe signed a ceasefire with Luanda and a 
Memorandum for Peace and Reconciliation of Cabinda which includes a special statute for the province. However, 
this is still contested by N’zita Tiago and other Cabindans, and some low intensity fighting persists.  
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and FLEC) had no option but to lay down arms and integrate the political system commanded by the 
Presidency.  
3.1.2. The consolidation of the patrimonial state in the post-conflict setting 
By the end of the conflict, the Angolan economy was fully dependent on the oil industry, and by virtue of 
the war economy that ruled the country for almost three decades, oil was by then very much the exclusive 
patrimony of the presidency. 
Having no war effort to sustain now, the Presidency focus in the peaceful setting was thus placed on 
applying the state’s expanding oil revenue (four fold increase between 2002 and 2006, from US$7.5bn to 
US$30bn),267 to ensure the necessary support to remain in power.  
By exerting absolute control over the formal system of checks and balances, namely judicial power, 
parliament and civil society, 268  the Presidency has effectively managed to evade accountability and 
maintain the status quo. Its control over the executive and the parliament gives it a substantial leeway to 
manage state interests as its own. Most legislation is composed of executive decrees in which the 
parliament has no say. Moreover, the president holds a strong political control over the judiciary by, 
amongst other things, retaining the right to appoint key judges to the Supreme Court, without the need for 
sanctioning by the national assembly. The Presidency has also been successfully using state resources to 
weaken the opposition through a combined strategy of co-option, intimidation and infiltration. All 
opposition parties have been subject to the same erosion269 and none of them, including UNITA, pose any 
real challenge to the ruling party at present. This picture is further complemented by a particularly weak 
civil society, largely uneducated and often manipulated to drum up public support for the president. Dos 
Santos has actively sought to improve his image across the country, namely through the social projects 
developed by Eduardo dos Santos Foundation created in 1996. The centralised political institutional 
synergies that originated in the socialist period, thus not only survived but even strengthened throughout 
the transition to a multiparty system.  
By taking advantage of its tight control over the means of production and accumulation, and framed by a 
weak regulations and law enforcement environment, the Presidency was also able to reinforce its grasp 
                                                           
267 BNA, Boletim Estatistico Junho 2008 (Luanda: BNA- Departamento de Estudos e Estatística, 2008) p. 45. 
268 For a detailed account on how the Presidency steadily established control over these, see: Christine Messiant, 
“The mutation of hegemonic domination: multiparty politics without democracy”, in: Patrick Chabal and Nuno 
Vidal (eds.), Angola: The Weight of History (London: Hurst, 2007) pp. 109-120; Nuno Vidal, “The Angolan Regime 
and the move to multiparty politics”, in: P. Chabal and N. Vidal, op. cit., pp. 143-157. 
269 Christine Messiant, op. cit., p. 108. 
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over the economy. This was done through the gradual establishment of a rentier class in the context of the 
progressive liberalisation of Angola’s economy. Massive resources were progressively transferred to 
individuals or private companies,270 namely through privileged access to capital, licences, contracts and in 
particular concessions under the close supervision of the Presidency. The red tape involving all business 
activities in Angola further holds back competition by allowing business opportunities to be kept within 
the Presidency’s inner circle. According to IFC’s Doing Business Report 2010,271 Angola ranks 169th out 
of 183 countries listed on its Ease of Doing Business Index. The strategy fostered a loyal indigenous 
business class that presently spans across party peers, independents and former opponents, which strongly 
support the status quo and the Presidency. 
The new political-business class was encouraged by the Presidency to enter the oil industry in the post-
conflict context. Through Sonangol the presidency gave local companies (e.g. Somoil, Prodoil) privileged 
access to licensing, particularly to onshore and shallow waters of less interest to oil majors, and openly 
started to give preference to exploration consortia that included Angolan companies. In addition, it 
promoted the creation of local services companies and legally forced foreign oil operators to contract 
these.272  
Although the patrimonial nature of the Angolan state is in effect a pattern commonly found in African 
authoritarian states (e.g. Paul Biya in Cameroon; Gabon under Omar Bongo), what makes it so 
outstanding, as Tony Hodges notes, is that “the scale of resources under the control of the presidency has 
no parallel elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa except Nigeria”.273 The power of the ruling elite in Nigeria, 
however, is curtailed by political alternation cycles, which have not yet materialised in Angola. 
Unlike Obasanjo in 2007, Dos Santos rule was confirmed by the general elections in September 2008 (the 
first held in the post-civil war setting). The landslide victory of MPLA, grasping 81% of the votes and 
191 parliamentarian seats out of 220, is in sharp contrast with the slim 10% margin of the votes for 
UNITA with 16 seats),274 was endorsed by a strong turnout of almost 80% and by foreign poll observers. 
                                                           
270 For a more detailed account on the emergence of this rentier class, see: Tony Hodges, “The Economic 
Foundations of the Patrimonial State”, in: P. Chabal and N. Vidal, op. cit., pp. 186-194. 
271 IFC, Doing Business 2010 Report, 2009, available online at www.doingbusiness.org (accessed 21 February 2010) 
272 Similar developments occurred in the early 1990s in the diamond sector, with the introduction of legislative 
changes to allow the participation of national interests, which, however, ended up acting as sleeping partners who 
owned the exploration licences while the capital and technology were fully brought in by foreign investors. 
273 Tony Hodges, op. cit. (2007), p. 186. 
274 In the previous legislature (resulting from the 1992 elections) MPLA controlled 129 seats out of 220, while 
UNITA secured 70.  
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As a consequence, dos Santos has emerged more powerful than ever before. In the peaceful setting his 
power is uncontested as it is now legitimised by a strong popular mandate.  
Furthermore, a new Constitution was approved in January 2010 that further expands the President’s 
power in the current peaceful context.275 The new document abolished the post of Prime Minister created 
in 2002 - reinstating the President as the executive head. It also removed presidential elections, giving the 
party with most seats in parliament the right to nominate the head of state, whom can serve two 
consecutive four year mandates. This new constitutional setting opens the door for dos Santos to remain 
in power until 2020,276  given that MPLA is not expected to face any solid competitors in the next 
legislative elections to be held in 2012. The cabinet reshuffles in February and October 2010 followed the 
traditional pattern whereby ministers are chosen from amongst the President’s key allies. Despite the 
progressive empowerment of a MPLA technocrat clique within the government since the end of the war, 
dos Santos remains ultimately in control of the decision making process. 
Taking into account these recent developments and the rising oil production prospects, no significant 
change to the institutional context that frames Angola’s oil industry is expected in the foreseeable future. 
In fact, the magnitude of financial resources concentrated in the structure commanded by the President’s 
office, has made it possible for Angola to effectively resist even external pressure for increased 
transparency and good governance, by some western states, NGOs and multilateral institutions. This was 
the case with the IMF, which was unable to complete any of the previous staff-monitored programmes 
(SMP, 1995 and 2000-2001) geared up to increase transparency in governance of public accounts, having 
both times clashed with vested interests and faced the public opposition of the presidency.277 Angola’s 
leverage derived from its condition as a large oil producer and in the context of high oil prices. This has 
also played out in its bilateral relationships, namely with France. As a consequence of its activism in the 
‘Angolagate’278 affair, Sonangol refused to renew Total’s expiring oil concessions in 2006.  
                                                           
275 Constituicao da Republica de Angola, 2010, available online at: 
http://imgs.sapo.pt/jornaldeangola/content/pdf/Constituicao_da_Republica_de_Angola_projecto_final.pdf (accessed 
20 August 2010) 
276 Eduardo dos Santos will be 78 years old by then, completing over four decades in power. 
277 Tony Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State (Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2004, 2nd ed.) pp. 118-122.  
278 Judicial process over financing of Russian arms purchases to Angola (1993-98 while a UN arms embargo was in 
place, and with the arms being critical for MPLA’s victory over UNITA), with oil-backed loans. These involved 
intermediation of French citizens (the Franco-Brazilian financier Pierre Falcone, Jean-Christophe Miterrand, son of 
the French president, and the then Minister of Interior, Charles Pascua), an Israeli-Russian arms dealer (Arcadi 
Gaydamak) and Angola’s nomenclature top echelons. In order to give him diplomatic immunity and to avoid his 
testimony in court, Angola nominated Falcone to the post of UNESCO ambassador. This move was firmly contested 
by Paris who refused to acknowledge his credentials, in the face of which Luanda suspended recognition of the 
108 
 
The oil price crash in 2009, on the other hand, prompted Luanda to sign a third SMP with IMF in 
November 2009 for a US$1.4 bn loan (to promote macro-economic stability and economic 
diversification), which is presently under implementation. This further confirms the over-dependency of 
the Presidency on the oil industry, by evidencing how vulnerable it is to fluctuations in the oil price. 
3.1.3. Unpacking the centralized nature of the regulatory framework  
Oil prospection started in Angola in 1910 in the Kwanza and Congo Basins, with Canha & Formigal, a 
Portuguese company. Although well-digging started early on (1915), it took four decades to find the first 
commercially viable well, located in the Kwanza River basin. In 1953 ANGOL (Sociedade de 
Lubrificantes e Combustíveis) was established as a subsidiary of the Portuguese oil company SACOR, to 
manage the nascent oil industry in Angola. Later that year exploration rights for the Cabinda enclave 
offshore were granted to an American company, the Gulf Oil Company.279 The first oil well in Cabinda 
was discovered in 1962 and production started soon thereafter. Following new investments in the late 
1960s, production tripled from 50,000 bpd in 1969 to 173,000 bpd in 1974, on the eve of independence - 
having surpassed coffee as Angola’s main export commodity in 1973.  
In 1976 the nationalisation of ANGOL gave birth to the national oil company Sonangol (Sociedade 
Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola) in 1976, and the National Direction of Petroleum (DNP - DL 
66/77; placed under the Ministry of Industry) in 1977. The Decree Law Nr. 52/76, established Sonangol 
as a state owned company responsible for managing the exploration of hydrocarbons in Angola. After 
brief negotiations, Sonangol took over the operations and infrastructure left behind by Mobil, Texaco, 
Fina and Shell, who fled the country after independence. 
The first Petroleum Law (Law Nr. 13/78) was published two years later, establishing the legal scope of 
upstream activities. Although this Law was replaced by a new one (Law Nr. 10/04)280 in November 2004, 
to integrate new concepts and practices originated by the evolution of the industry over the years, the 
same basic principles remained. These are:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
French Ambassador in Angola and refused to renew Total’s oil concession for block 3/80. Soon after, the French 
government recognised Falcone’s immunity. Nevertheless, the trial proceeded and the recent conclusion (October 
2009) led to a verdict of six years in prison for Pierre Falcon and Arcady Gaydamak, three years for Pascua and two 
for Miterrand.  
279 This was later formally turned into a subsidiary, Cabinda Gulf Oil. Gulf Oil Corporation merged in 1984 with 
Chevron and Chevron with Texaco (ChevronTexaco) in 2001. Cabinda Gulf Oil kept the name, while becoming a 
subsidiary of the major oil giant. 
280 Ministerio dos Petroleos, Lei Geral das Actividades Petroliferas (Lei 10/04), 12 November 2004, available 
online at: http://www.minpet.gov.ao/LegislacaoD.aspx?Codigo=273 (accessed 7 January 2011). 
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 a) All oil mineral rights belong to the state (art. 1 and 2); 
 b) Sonangol is the exclusive concessionaire of exploration and production rights on behalf of the 
state281 - a role assumed by Sonangol E.P. (Sonangol Empresa Publica, the official designation of the 
group);  
 c) Sonangol is also entitled to participate in exploration and production activities (E&P) (art.13), 
having for this purpose established Sonangol P.P.282 (Sonangol Pesquisa & Producao, in Portuguese); 
 d) All oil companies entering the industry have to do so in association with Sonangol (art. 13) by 
creating a commercial enterprise (JV), a consortium or through a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) 283 
(art. 14).  
Through this legal framework Sonangol was placed at the core of the Angolan oil industry from the very 
beginning, combining quasi-regulator competences (e.g. organising oil auctions and signing PSA) with 
E&P activity. Other important legal aspects that favour Sonangol’s position in the sector include the 
preferential right (art. 16, nr. 5), which gives the NOC the right of first refusal when one of its associates 
is to sell its position (or part of it) in a block. In recent years, Sonangol has exerted extensively this right 
in view of profit, having in most cases sold the parcel later for a higher price. In addition, all data 
acquired by companies during the exploration phase are legally considered property of the state, with the 
right of use by Sonangol.  
Throughout the years Sonangol’s power was further reinforced by the growing importance of the oil 
sector and the gradual institutionalisation of a number of practices. In addition to holding the exclusivity 
of concession rights and being involved in E&P activities, Sonangol created an extensive network of 
subsidiaries to supply services and goods to the industry (Sonair for air transport; Sonaship for crude 
                                                           
281 The Ministry of Petroleum is in charge of prospection rights concession. 
282 Sonangol E&P was created in 1992 and took over its first operatorship stake in 2003 (block 3). Presently 
Sonangol E&P has participation in 33 out of the 35 operating oil blocks. It is operator in seven offshore blocks (3; 
2/85; 3/05; 3/05A; 4/05; 2/05; 34) and one onshore (Norte).  
283 Production Sharing Agreements are a special civil contractual form between a state and an investor that 
determines the area, conditions and timeframe regarding subsoil use. The state retains the ownership of the soil and 
of the produced product. The contractor, who bears all the expenses at its own risk (prospecting, exploration and 
extraction of mineral resources), has the right to use the revenue from produced oil to recover expenditures it 
incurred (cost oil). In Angola, PSAs usually state that up to 50% of the revenue can be appropriated by the 
contractor to offset investment cost recovery in the initial stages. After development costs have been fully recovered 
(average time in Angola 7-8 years, against 12-15 in most oil producing countries), the remaining income (profit oil) 
is split between the government and the contractor, normally at a rate of about 80% for the government, 20% for the 
company. Each PSA is negotiated individually with Sonangol. (Interview, Sonangalp, 19 March 2009, Luanda, 
Angola.) 
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transportation; MSTelcom for telecommunications; ESSA for human resources development; and AAA 
for integrated insurance). These have benefited widely from the effort of ‘angolanisation’ of the industry 
(art. 27), whereby foreign operators are obliged to procure local services and goods (when these offer the 
same quality and are up to 10% more expensive than the imported ones). In addition, Sonangol also 
retains a dominant position downstream. Over the years the Angolan NOC also expanded to other lines of 
business, namely banking (Banco Africano de Investimentos and Banco de Comercio e Industria), real 
estate, healthcare (Clinica Girassol), construction (Bricomil) and retail (Sodispal and WACO). At the 
same time, Sonangol has expanded its business overseas, having established trading and operations 
offices in London, Houston, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Although other institutional players are legally obliged to perform as regulators to the sector, namely the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum (MINPET), their roles have been dwarfed by 
Sonangol’s growing influence over the industry. MINPET was created in 1978 (Decree 15/78), having 
absorbed the DNP into its structure. It went through several major restructurings in 1984, 1991 and 1996. 
According to article 1 of its internal statute,284 MINPET’s main responsibilities are executing the national 
oil policy and to coordinate, monitor and control the activities in the sector. Among its competences, stand 
out proposing new regulatory legislation, defining blocks’ areas, issuing prospecting licences, and 
promoting studies and inventories of national oil resources (art. 2). Although the legal framework portrays 
MINPET as the central administration body in charge of the oil sector, its influence over developments in 
the industry pales when compared to Sonangol.  
These developments are mostly explained by the synergies that emerged in the sector in the context of the 
civil war, largely attributable to the lack of competent cadres and subsequent bureaucratic paralysis that 
affected not only MINPET, but most Angolan governmental institutions throughout the conflict. The fact 
that the establishment of Sonangol preceded the creation of the Ministry, determined that the NOC not 
only was granted the existent infrastructure, but also that it absorbed all qualified human resources 
available in the sector, that were left behind by the companies leaving Angola.  
In fact, the Angolan NOC was insulated from the rest of the state apparatus since its inception in 1976. 
Managed as a private company, and with close links to the international oil economy, Sonangol has 
followed a distinctive administrative path that kept it aside from the pattern of incompetence and 
negligence that characterised most Angolan institutions. Over the years the company developed valuable 
                                                           
284 Ministerio dos Petroleos, Estatuto Organico do Ministerio dos Petroleos, (DL 10/96), 18 October 1996, available 
online at: http://www.minpet.gov.ao/LegislacaoTodos.aspx (accessed 7 January 2011). 
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human capital and expertise, which is unique in the context of Angolan economy. As such Sonangol 
gradually assumed a number of responsibilities on behalf of other state institutions, namely the treasury 
and the National Bank.285 In this setting and given the centrality of oil to the economic survival of MPLA, 
Sonangol gradually emerged as a key internal economic actor.  
In addition to lacking human resources, MINPET also lacked access to capital. Being only able to issue 
prospection licences, MINPET had no access to major revenues in the sector, since E&P oil profit was to 
be directly paid to Sonangol, and taxes and royalties channelled to the Ministry of Finance. With much 
better human capacity and direct access to abundant financial resources, it is thus not surprising that the 
Presidency privileged Sonangol, allowing it to extend its influence over the sector - much beyond its legal 
responsibilities.  
Diagram 3.1. Representation of the institutional structure of the oil sector in Angola  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author, based on the current regulatory framework. 
 
The authority chain in Sonangal is very straightforward, featuring a Board of Administrators integrated by 
a chair and four deputy-chairs, below which stand all the operational departments of the company. This 
board is responsible for both policy making and implementation. There is no fiscal council, executive 
board or general assembly. The interlock between Sonangol and the Presidency is further evidenced by 
the appointment of its close allies to the top positions in the company. The current CEO, Manuel 
Domingos Vicente (Director general of the company since 1991), was appointed to chair the board of 
directors in 1999 by Ministers Council Decree (a body presided over by dos Santos). Lacking effective 
oversight from other state institutions, namely the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, the oil 
                                                           
285 For a detailed account on these activities and the dual economy originated by these procedures, see: The World 
Bank, Angola: Oil, Broad-Based Growth, and Equity (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2007) pp. 49-50. 
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industry became increasingly opaque, allowing the Presidency to easily dispose of huge resources without 
being held accountable for it. Throughout the civil war, oil revenue, especially signature bonuses, served 
not only to pay for armaments’ purchases, but also nurtured the presidential patronage network. Human 
Rights Watch estimates that in the last five years of the civil war (1997-2002), approximately US$4.2bn 
went missing from the public treasury.286  
The growing integration of Angola into the global economy in the peaceful context has, however, made 
the government more vulnerable to mounting criticism from NGOs and multilateral institutions (World 
Bank -WB and International Monetary Fund -IMF). This reality, combined with existing plans for the 
public listing of Sonangol in international stock exchanges, has prompted the leadership to gradually 
improve its management practices in the oil sector. Among this practices, stand out the introduction of 
regular audits to Sonangol (Ernst and Young conducted the first one in 2003), the posting on the Ministry 
of Finances website of detailed and updated monthly information regarding oil production, exports and 
revenue (by block), and the disclosing of signature bonuses287 in the last two oil licensing rounds (1999 
and 2005/06). These actions were actually part of a list of recommendations by the World Bank in an oil 
sector diagnostic study elaborated in 2004. A lot, however, remain to be addressed, namely regarding 
expenditures performed by Sonangol on behalf of the government, the publication of the audits, a stronger 
engagement with civil society in public finances management, and the separation of concessionairy and 
operator roles of Sonangol.288  
Indeed, the concessionary and operator roles simultaneously assumed by Sonangol are a major obstacle 
with regards to improving transparency in the sector. There is an obvious conflict of interests here, being 
that Sonangol assumes a quasi-regulator role and at the same time engages directly in E&P and services 
supply. This centralized structure allows the Presidency to use Sonangol not only as its business arm, but 
also as a political instrument. Despite the World Bank and IMF pressure to transfer the role of 
concessionaire and regulator to MINPET, Luanda has been able to resist on the grounds that the MINPET 
and MINFIN still lack the institutional and technical capacity to assume this function. 289 As such, and 
even though the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank have in recent years significantly improved 
                                                           
286 Human Rights Watch, Transparency and Accountability in Angola, an update  (New York: HRW, April 2010) p. 
1 
287 Signature Bonus refers to a common practice in some oil producing countries, by which bidders make a one-off 
payment in advance, to secure the right to develop and explore an area. The size of the bonus is based upon 
presumed recovery potential and value on the market’s interest in the right.  
288 For a detailed account on progress and challenges remaining in the Angolan oil industry, see: The World Bank, 
Angola: Oil, Broad-Based Growth, and Equity (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2007) pp. 50-53. 
289 The World Bank, op. cit. (2007), pp. 50-53. 
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their capacity in this regard, they still lack control over the totality of Sonangol’s financial flows. In this 
context, Sonangol’s primacy in the sector is set to remain unchallenged in the foreseeable future. In spite 
of all this, Sonangol retains responsibility for the success of the oil industry in Angola. Sonangol 
successfully created, as R. Soares de Oliveira points out, “a parallel economic system that insulates oil 
companies from the unreliability of local conditions, with its own acceptable legal framework and 
logistical efficiency. In such enclave contexts, companies can operate freely and do not face the rent-
seeking, contractual uncertainty or threat of expropriation that are widespread outside the oil sector.” 290 
Lacking capital, expertise and technology to develop the oil industry in Angola, Sonangol’s strategy to 
develop the industry was from the start to form partnerships with foreign companies. This was done by 
maintaining the concession agreements regarding onshore and shallow water blocks that were already in 
production at that stage (mostly located in Cabinda and Soyo), and the introduction of Production Sharing 
Agreements for new contracts. For this reason, and although Sonangol production has been on the rise, 
IOCs account for the bulk of Angolan oil production. 
In sharp contrast with most oil producing countries in Africa, and in the midst of domestic chaos, 
Sonangol managed to lay down an efficient and stable regulatory environment that conquered the trust of 
major operators in the sector. This was made possible, first, by the fact that oil was mostly located 
offshore und thus remained unaffected by the civil conflict; second, as the same regime remained in 
power throughout all this time; and third, given that contract stability characterised the sector. Indeed, 
Sonangol has always honoured its commitments and has no major disputes in its record. Reflecting this 
favourable context, Angola ranks fifth in Business Monitor International’s upstream business environment 
rating in Africa, ahead of Algeria and one point behind Nigeria.291 
In addition to its critical role domestically, Sonangol has also become a key foreign economic statecraft 
instrument for the Presidency in recent years. Sonangol has been driving the country’s investments 
overseas, acting much as a sovereign wealth fund. In addition to expanding its upstream (Gabon, Nigeria, 
Iraq, Gulf of Mexico and Brazil), and downstream (Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, São Tomé, 
Nigeria, US, Portugal and Argentina) activities overseas, Sonangol has been very actively investing in 
other lines of business (e.g. banking, energy, construction and real estate), in Portugal, Brazil and other 
Portuguese speaking countries. This strategy clearly serves a political purpose of strengthening Luanda’s 
                                                           
290 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, “Business success, Angola style: post colonial politics and the rise of Sonangol” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 45:4, 2007, p. 610. 
291 Business Monitor International, “Angola Oil and Gas Report Q1 2011” (Executive summary), January 2011, 
available online at: http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?r=1501380 (accessed 17 January 2011). 
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influence, namely in the region and in the Lusophone area. In addition, Sonangol has been used as an 
instrument to diversify Luanda’s foreign partnerships, specifically through the gradual attraction of other 
players to invest in the Angolan oil industry, namely Asian companies. The NOC has also served the 
purpose of minimising external pressure from bilateral partners and multilateral organisations, such as the 
WB and IMF, by serving as guarantor for bilateral and commercial loans which account, respectively, for 
one and two-thirds of the country’s public debt.292 
Angola is presently a well established hydrocarbons producer, with a very good track on exploration 
success, having registered a rapid expansion of reserves and production over the past decade. Even 
though the growth pace of new reserves and production may be affected by increasing operating costs as 
the drilling goes deeper, Angola has bright prospects in terms of new oil potential (see Appendix I). 
Having successfully resisted mounting external and domestic pressure throughout the post-conflict setting, 
Sonangol has managed to retain its primacy in the sector management. In the same way, the Presidency 
has effectively reinforced its hegemony in the peaceful setting, being now legitimised by a powerful 
mandate. Therefore the synergies between Sonangol and the Presidency have not only survived, but have 
also prospered in the new setting. If confirmed commercially viable, the Angolan pre-salt reservoirs may 
sustain this status quo beyond 2025, when conventional reserves are expected to dry up and drag down 
the regime. In this context, the links to the Presidency-Sonangol nexus are to remain a determining factor 
in the Angolan oil industry in the foreseeable future, particularly so for new entrants. 
3.2. The institutional structure of the oil sector in Brazil 
Unlike Angola, the Brazilian economy has had an intimate relationship with the resources sector since 
early colonial times. In fact, the hunt for precious metals and stones (mostly gold, silver, copper, 
diamonds and emeralds) can be held, to a certain extent, responsible for the expansion of the country’s 
frontiers, almost to a continental level, under Portuguese colonial rule (1500-1822). If on the one hand, 
the Portuguese had exhausted most of Brazilian gold and silver alluvial deposits by the time of 
independence (1822), they left behind what is presently the fifth largest country in the world by area 
(8.514.876 km2) and the largest in South America - accounting for nearly half of the landmass of that 
subcontinent.  
                                                           
292 Banco Nacional de Angola-Departamento de Estudos e Estatistica, Boletim Estatistico 2002-Junho/2010 (BNA: 
Luanda, Junho 2010) p. 45. 
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Unlike Angola, however, and mostly because of its much longer independence history and peaceful 
framework, Brazil managed to develop a vibrant diversified economy following independence, having 
currently a thriving services sector, along with extremely dynamic industrial and agribusiness sectors.  
3.2.1. Private initiative and decentralisation (1822-1930)
 293
  
When independence was declared on 7 September 1822, the new monarchy retained the pre-existent 
resource logics separating ownership of land and eventual riches underneath. The state retained exclusive 
ownership over all subsoil resources, issuing concessions rights separately for exploration and 
development. Reflecting a new economic context highly dependent on agriculture, the new constitution 
(1891) following the proclamation of the Republic (United States of Brazil) in 1889, established, 
however, that the land proprietors also had ownership over the subsoil resources. Under this new legal 
framework the federal government lost its authority over mining activities. Nevertheless, after the turn of 
the century, the federal government steadily started to be more assertive in regard to the resources sector. 
In 1907 the first state organ in charge of mining activities was created: the Geological and Mining Service 
of Brazil (Serviço Geológico e Mineralógico do Brasil, SGMB) under the Ministry of Agriculture. Two 
laws promulgated in 1915 (Lei Calógeras) and 1921 (Lei Simões Lopes) attempted to reintroduce the 
separation of surface and subsoil ownership and to regulate mining activities, working in practice as a 
germinating mining code. Fearful of exploitation by external powers (e.g. US in Venezuela), a 
constitutional amendment was introduced in 1926, limiting the participation of foreign companies in 
mining activities.  
During period over 10 wells were drilled looking for oil in S. Paulo, Bahia and S. Catarina, by private 
entrepreneurs. Lacking the necessary capital, the legal incentives, adequate equipment and expertise, 
these, however, failed to produce any significant results. Nonetheless, institutionally, pioneering steps 
were taken such as the creation of SGMB that produced important studies, the capacity building that took 
place under the mining school in Minas Gerais, the germination of a mining code with the above 
mentioned adopted laws, and the increasing debate over the state’s developmental role with regards to 
resources. 
                                                           
293 The following overview is based on: Adriana Fiorotti Campos, “A reestruturação da Industria do Petróleo 
Sulamericana nos anos 90”, Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, December 2005, 367 pp., 
unpublished; Luiz António Bongiovanni, “Estado, Burocracia e Mineração no Brasil 1930-1945”, Masters Thesis, 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas, November 1994, 113 pp., unpublished; “Espaço Conhecer” Petrobras website: 
http://www2.petrobras.com.br/espacoconhecer/APetrobras/linhatempo_ano90.asp ; and relevant Brazilian legislative 
acts, available online at: http://www.presidencia.gov.br/legislacao/ (accessed 7 February 2010). 
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3.2.2. Centralising under the developmental state (1930-1989) 
The emerging clash between the old rural oligarchy behind the First Republic and the new urban-
industrial class, combined with the dramatic effects of the world economic crisis of the late 1920s, 
precipitated a regime change through a military coup in 1930. Benefiting from weakening regional 
constituencies in face of a crumbling coffee lobby, the new highly militarized republic led by Getúlio 
Vargas (1930-1945), managed to swiftly achieve a high level of power concentration in the federal 
executive. Favoured by expanding nationalist currents, Vargas pursued a strong developmental role for the 
federal executive in the economy. Through the elaboration and implementation of concerted national 
policies encompassing all economic sectors, Vargas promoted the industrialisation of the country, 
launching the basis of an economic institutional structure that would have an enduring impact over the 
following decades. 
a) Launching the basis of the developmental state and resources sector 
administrative emancipation (1930-1945) 
Owing to its strategic importance for national development and defence, resources sectors assumed a 
central role in Vargas’s plan to undertake fast modernisation of the country. The new constitution 
promulgated in July 1934 re-enacted the distinction between ownership of the land and of the subsoil, 
stating that: 1) it was the exclusive right of the Union to legislate about the resources deposits, 2) the 
federal executive owns the exclusive rights to authorise exploration and development of resources, 3) 
only Brazilian citizens or enterprises domiciled in Brazil can access those concessions, and 4) all known 
deposits ought to be registered at the National Department of Mineral Production (DPNM in the 
Portuguese acronym, created in 1933) and be nationalised.  
This was shortly followed by the promulgation of the first Mining Code (1934). According to this new 
law, all resources deposits became national patrimony and were to be developed by the state. Through this 
legal instrument, the federal executive not only achieved total control over resources, but it also managed 
to foster the emergence of national companies by privileging and protecting the local business class from 
international competition.  
The whole modernisation project, however, got jammed as the legislative arena quickly became a 
battlefield of the various economic interests at stake. Backed by the military, the fascist segments of the 
administration and the entrepreneurial class, Vargas installed a dictatorship in 1937 (‘Estado Novo’, 1937-
1945). In December 1937 a new constitution was promulgated, concentrating all the power in the 
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President, so allowing Vargas to resume the fast industrialisation path in the terms he had planned in the 
early 1930s.  
The new constitution reinforced the nationalist content, reflecting an intimate nexus between resources, 
the development of base industries and national defence. Reflecting the increasing evidence of oil 
deposits in the country, legal dispositions defining the regime of national oil and natural gas reserves, 
were integrated into the mining code in 1938.  
Vargas decided to give more autonomy to the resources sectors by creating outside the Ministry of 
Agriculture, two state agencies responsible one for oil and the other for mining. In 1938 the National 
Council for Oil (Conselho Nacional do Petróleo, CNP) was created, under the direct authority of the 
Presidency, to elaborate oil policy and supervise the oil administration. The same decree declared that the 
import, export, transportation, distribution and commercialisation of oil and its derivatives, as well as 
refining activities, were of public utility, and therefore placed under the control of CNP. This state agency 
controlled the prices, authorised exploration and development and supervised the activities of the oil 
enterprises operating in the domestic market. In 1939 oil was found in Lobato (Bahia) and the first oil 
area (Recôncavo) was defined. 
When Vargas was forced to step down in October 1945, the basis of the modern capitalist state had been 
launched, and because of its strategic importance to economic progress, oil and mining had been placed at 
the core of the developmental agenda.  
b) Defining resources institutional structure along the rise and fall of the 
developmental state (1946-1989) 
The finding of the first commercially viable oil well in 1941 (Bahia) under the CNP, enlarged the 
prospects for future exploration. In the following years, national oil exploration gradually became critical 
in the context of fast rising domestic demand and the limited financial capacity to expand oil imports.  
The new president, Eurico Dutra (1946-51), attempted to reintroduce a more liberal regulating system. 
Although featuring the same nationalist character of the previous one, the new constitution promulgated 
in 1946, allowed for the participation of foreign capital in resources exploration, justified by limited 
domestic financial capacity and technical expertise to rapidly develop the oil industry. In line with this, a 
special commission was nominated to draw up a new oil law. This initiative, however, raised strong 
opposition, leading to a nationalist campaign («o petróleo é nosso» – the oil is ours) opposing foreign 
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capital participation in the national oil industry. In the Congress, the law also faced the dissatisfaction of 
the liberal faction, who thought it too restrictive to foreign participation.  
Following Vargas’s reelection (1951-54), the creation of a national oil company was proposed, Petróleo 
Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), to overcome the impasse. After a long and fierce debate, the new oil law was 
finally approved by the congress and promulgated by the president in late 1953. The new law (Law 
2004/3 October 1953) defined the main institutional features of the Brazilian oil sector, which remained 
more or less intact for the next four decades. This law established the Union Monopoly over all oil 
development phases, excluding distribution; created Petrobras as a mixed capital enterprise, but fully 
owned by national public and private capital, and controlled by the federal state with the goal of executing 
the state oil monopoly; and defined CNP (directly subordinated to the Presidency) as the agency 
responsible for general policy orientation, oversight of that monopoly, and to supervise the national oil 
supply. Foreign private capital was only authorized to participate in distribution of oil derivatives. CNP’s 
patrimony was transferred to Petrobras. The national oil company thus started its activities with two 
refineries (Bahia and S. Paulo), 22 oil tankers and a maritime terminal in Bahia. 
Under Juscelino Kubitschek’s rule (J.K., 1956-1961), the relationship between CNP and Petrobras was 
further clarified (Decree 40.845/28 January 1957), detailing the supervision responsibilities of CNP over 
Petrobras activities. But the major advancement made under J.K. was the creation of the Ministry of 
Mining and Energy (Ministério de Minas e Energia, MME), which finally came into existence in 1960 
(Law 3.782/22 July 1960), at last emancipating mining and energy issues from the Agriculture Ministry. 
The new Ministry was installed in February 1961. The scattered mining and energy agencies (DNPM and 
CNP in the oil sector) and state enterprises active in the sector (Petrobras and Companhia Vale do Rio 
Doce-CVRD), were all placed under the jurisdiction of the new Ministry. The emerging leftist wave under 
the J. Goulart Presidency (1964) led to the nationalization of the two private refineries and of distribution 
activities, completing the monopoly of the Union over all oil development phases.  
The growing political instability and the fear that the raising communist influence might jeopardize the 
development of the country, led to a new military coup in March 1964, installing a military dictatorship 
that would last for twenty years (1964-1985). Although political freedom was much restricted in the 
context of progressive power concentration in the executive,294 the economy grew significantly in the 
following years, to a great extent benefiting from a less politicized approach of the authoritarian 
                                                           
294 Political parties were abolished in 1965, presidential indirect elections were constitutionally enforced in 1967, 
and congress was closed in 1968. 
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developmental state. As such, this period introduced some liberal nuances to the institutional structure. 
One of the first measures taken was to annul Goulart’s nationalization of the refineries and distribution, 
and to authorize private investment, national and foreign, in the petrochemical industry - so as to foster 
competition domestically.  
In 1967 CNP’s competences of guidance and supervision of the Union295 oil monopoly, and of monitoring 
Petrobras and its subsidiaries’ activities, were further clarified (Decree 60184/8 Feb. 1967). In that same 
year, a new Mining Code was issued. Although it determined that only Brazilian citizens and companies 
based in Brazil were to have access to exploration and development concessions, the new law did not 
determine that the composition of the Brazilian firms’ capital ought to be fully national.  
The growing interest of IOCs in the Brazilian oil industry following the first oil shock in 1973, combined 
with the deteriorating economic situation internally, led to the first active attempt to attract foreign 
investment to the national oil sector. In 1975 the first upstream liberalisation attempt was pursued through 
the introduction of Risk Agreements Contracts. These stipulated that the state, through Petrobras, was to 
exert a high monitoring degree over exploration and production, along with having the exclusive 
ownership rights over the reserves to be found. Three licensing rounds took place (1976-77-78), but the 
results fell well below expectations. The controversy surrounding this episode revived the debate over 
state monopoly once again.  
The second oil shock in 1979, further emphasized the vulnerability of the Brazilian oil-dependent 
economy. Petrobras started investing heavily in upstream activities domestically and abroad (Norway, US, 
Mexican gulf and UK), in an attempt to expand its reserves and production. Like other Brazilian state-
owned companies facing the lack of financial sources domestically during this period, Petrobras was 
forced to secure capital abroad. The investment Petrobras made during this period allowed for the 
acquisition of offshore equipment and technical expertise, that would place this NOC on track to become 
a leader in deep-water drilling technology. Building on several onshore and offshore findings throughout 
the 1980s, Brazil’s oil production grew three-fold by the end of that decade (616,000 bpd).  
The deep economic crisis Brazil faced in the 1980s, however, weakened the military dictatorship and led, 
ultimately, to the collapse of the developmental state. In 1988 a new constitution re-established 
democracy, and inaugurating the ‘New Republic’. The first direct presidential elections since 1964 took 
place in 1989. This new constitution, however, reinforced the nationalist approach to resources 
                                                           
295 In 1967 the official name of Brazil was changed to the Federative Republic of Brazil, although to this day the 
term ‘Union’ is used to refer to the Federation. 
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exploration, by re-establishing the state monopoly over resources exploration, prohibiting further oil 
concessions under risk agreements, and again excluding foreign capital participation. 
3.2.3. Liberalising resources sectors in the 1990s  
This restrictive approach, however, would not last long. The new international framework following the 
end of the Cold War and the advent of a fast globalization era, prompted a liberal wave across the globe 
sanctioned by the IMF, which favored a lesser state role in economic affairs. The debate between statists 
and liberals again surfaced in Brazilian politics.  
After some twists and turns, the liberal position finally became the mainstream under the presidency of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC, 1995-2002). In this context, and facing divestment prospects with the 
drop in the price of raw materials in the early 1990s, a constitutional amendment was adopted (No. 06/15 
Aug. 1995, concerning Article 176th §1) in August 1995, allowing for the participation of foreign capital 
in mineral resources exploration.  
Another constitutional amendment (No. 09/ 9 Nov. 1995, concerning art. 177th §1) later that year, would 
introduce ground-breaking changes to the oil sector. This amendment brought to an end Petrobras’s 
exclusivity rights to execute the Union monopoly over oil and natural gas reserves. By these means, 
activities in upstream and downstream were opened to participation by other public and private 
enterprises, national or foreign, and aimed at improving market conditions by fostering competition. 
Further to this, in August 1997 a new law was promulgated (Law 4978/6 Ago. 1997) defining the national 
energy policy. This law, that came to be known as ‘Lei do Petróleo’ (Oil Law), further clarified the 
structure and rules of the domestic oil industry. According to this law, the Union retains the exclusive 
right to exercise the national monopoly over E&P of all hydrocarbon deposits, refining activities, import 
and export, and transportation (maritime and pipelines). The new law also opened the way for the 
privatisation of some of Petrobras subsidiaries and to the privatisation of part of its capital (including 
foreign capital). Petrobras was listed in several stock exchanges, namely in S. Paulo, New York and Paris. 
To appease the growing opposition to the alienation of Petrobras, the Presidency publicly assumed the 
commitment to not fully privatize the company, and that the federal government would maintain its 
golden share. As such, Petrobras retained its statute as a state owned oil company. 
The new Oil Law also created an advising council - National Council for Energy Policy (Conselho 
Nacional de Política Energética, CNPE). CNPE (Chapter II, Law 4978/97) is a policy advising organ 
headed by the Minister of Energy and Mines, and administratively placed under the President. Its goal is 
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to propose national policies envisaging, amongst other things, to foster the rational use of domestic 
energy resources, ensure energy supply to remote areas, and to line up directions for the import and export 
of oil and natural gas to ensure national supply. Other significant institutional changes introduced by the 
new Oil Law were the establishment of a regulating agency for the sector - the National Oil Agency 
(Agência Nacional do Petróleo, ANP) - and the introduction of annual auctions for hydrocarbons 
concessions.  
From this point on, upstream activities were subject to concession contracts (Chapter V, Law 4978/97) to 
be signed by the winning companies/consortiums with the concessionaire ANP. A one off signature bonus 
(which minimum amount is set in the licensing announcement) is to be paid when the contract is signed. 
Concession contracts are divided into two phases: exploration and production. Exploration is to be 
developed by the contractor under its own risk, and all deposits found belong to the Union. If a 
commercial discovery is made, the contractor is entitled to the production extracted, provided the 
incumbent taxes and contractual charges are paid. Royalties are payable monthly and vary between 5 and 
10 % of total production, according to the exploration risk. 
As the regulator, ANP296 competences (Chapter IV, Law 4978/97) include the study and determination of 
the oil blocks to be licensed, the promotion of licensing rounds, regulating, contracting and monitoring 
the E&P concessions. Having lost its legal monopoly in the oil industry, Petrobras was obliged to transfer 
its valuable geological surveys portfolio to ANP (in exchange for a fee). 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the executive dealing with a very thorny dialectic trying, on the one hand, 
to rectify the institutional limitations of the politico-economic structure it inherited and, on the other hand, 
coping with a growing number of increasingly more powerful constituencies pushing in different 
directions. Nevertheless, under FHC, Brazil was gradually stabilized through steady administrative 
reforms that transformed the executive’s developmental structure into a liberalized one.  
3.2.4. Unpacking the fragmented nature of the institutional structure 
Unlike Angola, Brazil’s oil sector has a long history of institutionalization, which despite the central role 
of the state, involved from the start a plurality of state, sub-state and non state agents. This historical 
legacy and the need to sustain a nationalist approach while interacting with an increasing number of 
                                                           
296 ANP was in a way the rightful successor of CNP, that was abolished in 1990 to create the National Direction of 
Fuels (Direcção Nacional de Combustíveis, DNC), which was absorbed by ANP when it was installed in 1998. 
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constituencies in the context of liberalisation, led to the complex institutional structure that characterizes 
the sector at present. 
a) The overall complexities of the institutional structure 
Looking at the state level and comparing with the case of Angola, the executive checks and balances are 
much stronger.297 Despite well known inefficiencies (widespread corruption, for example), the legislative, 
judiciary and federal states (empowered by the 1988 Constitution) can be quite effective in using their 
democratic prerogatives to block executive initiatives that counter their interests.  
The judiciary system in Brazil is a very complex structure involving several layers of courts at federal and 
state levels, and multiple appeal possibilities. Some of the cases involving resources sectors include, for 
instance, the freezing of the 2006 oil auction by judicial sentence, and which has not yet been solved, or 
the still ongoing judicial process to reverse CVRD privatisation. 
The legislative power is bicameral (Chamber of 513 deputies and 81 Senate Chamber) and loyalties are 
divided between party and states’ allegiance. In fact, the regional lobby cuts across ideological boundaries 
and makes it difficult to enforce party discipline’ not only in the congress’ but also in the government 
itself.298 In this setting, most legislative debates are addressed by their regional impact, which has a 
particular appeal when resources-related legislative acts are under discussion, because of the underlying 
royalties question. As such, inquiry commissions involving resources issues are frequently set up in 
congress, and extended debating periods are normal for new legislation, namely the case with the new 
pre-salt code (discussed below).  
The federal states’ autonomy further fragments the picture. State governors have been elected by direct 
suffrage since 1982, and the 1988 constitution further strengthened their autonomy. Each state has its own 
legislature and administration. State governors tend to hold a strong influence over the MPs and senators 
under their jurisdiction, regardless of party affiliation. To this fragmentation of the federal executive, adds 
the pressure coming from sound independent civil society constituencies, namely labour syndicates, 
socio-environmental movements, and a well established independent business class.  
All the above have contributed in different ways to a complex institutional structure in the oil sector. This 
state of affairs is acknowledged by all players and agents as a serious institutional constraint, affecting 
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negatively the development of resources sectors at present.299 The main reason for this state of affairs is 
unclear/overlapping jurisdictions of different levels of authority and of regulatory frameworks.  
The environmental licensing is a recurrent illustration of this reality. Every mineral resources project (oil, 
natural gas or mining) needs an environmental license in order to start operations. The law (Law 
6.938/81) defines that the Brazilian Institute for Environment and Natural Renewable Resources (Instituto 
Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis, IBAMA) shares the licensing 
competence with federal states and municipalities. It establishes that IBAMA is in charge of issuing 
licenses for projects that have a potential environmental impact in more than one state or in offshore 
areas. The issue is that not always is it easy to determine the potential extension of the environmental 
impact and hence the competent jurisdiction to issue the environment license. This has frequently led to 
the blockage of major projects, and not always for purely environmental reasons.300  Oil companies 
winning operatorship bids in Brazil have therefore to navigate and endure a complex environmental 
licensing system. 
To this add the relative regulatory instability of the sector. This is mostly due to bureaucratic inefficiency, 
lack of synergy among state agents at the various levels, and also the latent nationalistic pressure over 
resources regulations. Although the benefits of privatisation and competition gradually became evident, 
not only through the significant improvement in these companies’ performances, but also in the more 
sustainable socio-economic progress generated,301 most labour syndicates still advocate the ‘re-statisation’ 
of some of the privatised enterprises and the re-enactment of the state monopoly over upstream activities 
in the oil sector.302 Even if there is only a slim chance of the privatisation process being completely 
reverted, there is still room for these pro-state monopoly forces to influence critical future decision 
making regarding the oil sectors. 
Adding more weight to this structure, Brazil also has strict regulations regarding local content. Indeed, 
from the beginning of the liberalisation of the oil sector, local content - along with signature bonuses and 
exploration plans - became one of the main criteria to evaluate the bids. Over the years this local content 
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clause has become more demanding and complex, including different specifications for onshore and 
offshore, the various water depths, and developmental stages. A certification system for dealing with this 
was introduced in 2007.303 
These institutional constraints, however, are to some extent overshadowed by the country’s hard resources 
potential as shown by Fraser Institute’s Annual Survey of Mining Companies,304 which measures mineral 
potential against the policy framework. In the 2010/2011 ranking, Brazil ranked 49th out of 79 countries, 
scoring 43.2 out of 100 in the policy potential index (regulatory institutional framework). But when add 
to that equation the mineral potential of the country, with Brazil ranked 18/79. Nevertheless, new 
investors still need to assimilate the institutional complexities of the Brazilian market, and need to learn 
how to navigate through the fragmentation, overlaps and instability of the sector, when investing in the 
country.  
b) The oil institutional structure: Petrobras’s role 
Through its monopoly over the sector, Petrobras played a central role in Brazil’s oil industry throughout 
45 years. The progress the sector registered during this period was thus much intertwined with the 
company’s undertakings and achievements. The end of monopoly and the company’s public listing 
brought more autonomy for the company, that could now concentrate fully in its E&P activities. Having 
retained ownership over all E&P areas it was operating at the time, as well as all refining, equipment and 
transport infrastructure (oil and gas pipelines), Petrobras departed from a very advantageous position.  
Increased competition has prompted the diversification of Petrobras operations beyond hydrocarbons, to 
encompass biofuels, hydropower and other energy sources such as solar and hydrogen. In 2010 Petrobras 
hydrocarbon reserves were estimated by ANP at 15.9 billion boe (barrels of oil equivalent - includes oil 
and natural gas), its production having reached 2.6 million boe that year. 305  Throughout the years 
Petrobras has created an extensive network of subsidiaries, among which stand out Transpetro, 
responsible for transport and storage of hydrocarbons and biofuels through 11,000km of ducts, terminals 
and a large fleet of tankers; Gaspetro, which manages over 7,000 km of gas ducts across the country; 
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Petroquisa (petrochemicals), Petrobras Biocombustiveis (biofuels) and Petrobras Distribuidora 
(downstream). 
In addition to its growth in the domestic market, Petrobras has also expanded overseas, and is currently 
running operations in 27 countries across five continents. In addition to representative and trading offices 
in the UK, Singapore, China and Japan, the NOC has significant investment in South America (9 
countries: E&P, refining, transportation and distribution of hydrocarbons), Africa (5 countries: E&P), 
Oceania (exploration in Australia and New Zealand), Iran (Exploration) and the US (E&P and refining).306 
Reflecting its exponential growth over the past decade, Petrobras was ranked third in the PFC Energy 
2010 ranking of the world’s largest 50 listed energy firms by market capitalization - up from 27th in 1999. 
Its market value was estimated at US$229bn as of 31 December 2010.307 With the bright prospects of the 
Brazilian oil industry, the company is expected to grow further in coming years as investment expands. 
The company’s strategic planning calls for an investment of US$224bn over the 2010-2014 period, 95% 
of which is to be invested domestically. 
Unlike Sonangol, Petrobras is a publicly traded corporation. Although Brasilia has kept a controlling 
stake in the company through the ownership of 54% of its voting shares (31% of overall corporate 
ownership), the company remains accountable to its other shareholders. 
According to the Statute of the company,308 the administration board and its President (5 to 9 members, 
decision making body) are elected for a one year mandate (renewable) by the assembly of voting stock 
holders. Presently, the President and six counsellors represent the interests of the controlling stakeholder 
(Federal Union), one the interests of the minority common stock holders and the last one the interests of 
preferential stock holders. The Administration board elects from its members the Chair of the board of 
directors (executive body, three years mandate) and appoints the remaining six directors from Brazilian 
nationals resident in the country.  
Political appointments to the administration board of Petrobras became common during Lula’s rule. The 
previous board included two ministers and the chairperson was the chief of the civil cabinet of the 
President (Dilma Russef, now President of Brazil). This trend initiated by President Lula da Silva has to 
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some extent favoured state interventionism in the strategic corporate policy of the company. 309 This is 
evidenced by the setting up of operations in Cuba and Iran. Moreover, in the present board, the elected 
Chair (Guido Mantega) is the current Finance Minister, and other members include the Executive 
Secretary of the MME and the President of BNDES (Brazil’s Development Bank).  
The fact that Petrobas is a company of mixed capital makes it accountable to two different constituencies, 
which most of the time pursue different goals. In this context, the institutional fragmentation is also 
evident inside Petrobras. While the private stake is moved by pure revenue interests and is market 
oriented, the state golden share is answerable to public constituencies. It is therefore also oriented by 
political considerations and national constraints such as internal supply needs, the executive energy 
strategy, government revenue priorities and civil society demands.310  
The leftist nature of the current regime and the latent nationalism of Brazilian civil society with regards to 
the oil sector, further add to this picture. The same attempt to exert political influence also became evident 
in the sector’s regulating body, ANP, during Lula’s rule. The fact that its directing board is to be appointed 
by the president (Law 9478, Art. 11), gives the Executive some leeway in this regard. This fact is 
evidenced by Lula’s nomination in 2006 of an old leftist ally (Haroldo Lima) to the post of Director 
General, who, unlike his predecessors, had no background in the oil industry. Nevertheless, the necessary 
sanctioning by the Senate limits to some extent the executive’s appetite. The Presidency has already faced 
blockage by the Senate in the nomination process of some ANP directors.  
ANP was legally established in 1997 as an autarchy (patrimonial, financial and administrative autonomy) 
within the MME, with the purpose of implementing the national oil and natural gas policy on behalf of 
the Union. As the regulating body, its competences include regulating, contracting and supervising all 
activities in the hydrocarbons sector (upstream and downstream). In line with this, ANP is responsible for 
devising the exploration areas, organizing the annual oil auctions (the main instrument for concessions), 
contracting the winners, and supervising the contracts execution. As pointed by Georges Landau,311 
ANP’s influence over the sector was much curtailed by practical limitations, such as insufficient funding 
due to budget cuts during Lula’s first term, unclear work division between MME and ANP, the fact that its 
decisions can be blocked by judicial sentence (leading to long court battles), and finally because of the 
overlapping political jurisdiction (Presidency and Senate) over the nomination of the Board of Directors.  
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The relationship between ANP and Petrobras is, nonetheless, fairly straightforward and amicable. As the 
local NOC, Petrobras enjoys some privileges, namely the right of preference in the case of an oil bid 
draw, and the right to the areas of exploration that are left out of the auctions due to their small size. 
Under the 1997 Oil Law, Petrobras was given by ANP the concession rights (without tender) to all its 
producing blocks at the time of the end of the monopoly, and also the blocks under exploration in which it 
had proven financial capacity to develop. Furthermore, many of ANP cadres are former Petrobras 
officials. Such is the case of one of the current directors (Magda Chambriard). Despite some natural 
friction, there is a ready flow of information between the various national agents in the sector, being the 
National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE) integrated by members of MME, Petrobras and ANP. 
Despite the new institutional and regulatory framework aiming at promoting the liberalisation of the 
hydrocarbons industry, and the fact that it has been in place for almost 15 years, Petrobras retains, to this 
day, a virtual monopoly over the sector. This is true in upstream operations where it holds the largest 
hydrocarbon acreage in the country, and accounts for the bulk of its oil output; and also downstream, 
where it owns most of the country’s gas and oil ducts, and refineries in Brazil. This fact is largely 
explained by the company’s vast oil acreage portfolio, and by its unmatched geological expertise and 
technological skills accumulated over the four decades it enjoyed exclusivity in the sector. 312  
 c) Institutional changes introduced by the new ‘Pre-salt Law’ 
The potential magnitude of pre-salt reserves (50-100 billion barrels) and its implications for the country’s 
development, triggered once again the nationalist debate around oil exploration. Immediately after the 
discovery of the Tupi field (now renamed Lula) in late 2007 in Santos basin, CNPE suspended the auction 
of the 41 offshore blocks (26 of which are around Tupi) on offer in the 9th licensing bid under ANP. The 
following year the auction did not include offshore blocks in the pre-salt area.313  
Although most stakeholders agreed that there was need to define a new regulating framework for the pre-
salt area, they could not agree on the terms, and thereafter there was a long period of discussions during 
which no auctions were held (2009 and 2010). The new law was originally submitted to the Congress in 
August 2009, where it marinated for over a year. The process was further delayed by the Presidential 
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elections scheduled for October 2010. Disagreement focused, namely, on revenue distribution among the 
various states, the exploration regime (concession or PSA) and the role of Petrobras.  
The 28% parcel of the pre-salt area that was successfully auctioned prior to 2007, located in the Santos 
basin and which includes the Tupi and Iara fields, remains, however, under the old concessions law. The 
remaining 72% of the pre-salt area is to be developed under the new regulatory mark in which the state is 
to play a greater role, reflecting the populist nature of the current Brazilian administration. In late August 
2009, Lula submitted four bills to the congress proposing four pillars for the new legal context governing 
the pre-salt area: the creation of a new public company for the pre-salt, the introduction of a production 
sharing agreement regime, reinforcement of state capital in Petrobras, and the creation of a social fund.314 
In his speech to the Congress presenting the four bills in 31 August 2009,315 Lula argued that the need for 
a new regulatory framework rests in the fact that the royalties-based concessions introduced in 1997 
contemplated a totally different reality: exploration risks were higher, the economy was weaker and 
national ambitions were more modest (self-sufficiency). The much higher stakes in what concerns profits 
and the smaller exploration risk of the pre-salt layer required, in his view, a different legal arrangement.  
The new law (Law 12.351/2010),316 was approved by the Congress in the last quarter of 2010, and 
sanctioned by the President on December 22, although he vetoed two articles.317 The first veto regarded 
the royalties even distribution among all states of the Union – in compliance with an agreement Lula had 
previously made with the governors of the two states where most of pre-salt production will take place 
(Rio de Janeiro e Espirito Santo). The second veto regarded the allocation of half of the social fund318 to 
education programmes. According to Presidential changes, royalties are now to privilege the producing 
states and the social fund is to be more evenly distributed among education, the environment, sports, 
science and technology, and fighting poverty programmes. The new law was then sent back to the 
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Congress, and at the time of writing was still pending approval. The first oil auction for the pre-salt is to 
take place in the second half of 2011, soon after the expected approval by Congress of the new law.319  
The new law introduces three major institutional changes that directly affect players in the pre-salt. The 
first one is the introduction of a production sharing regime (Chapter III, PSA, Law 12.351), whereby the 
executive retains ownership of a large parcel of the production after exploration, and development costs 
are amortized. Unlike the concessions regime where the largest bid wins, in the new PSA regime the 
winning bid will be the one that offers the largest production parcel to the Union (Art. 18). This will give 
the executive more control, not only over the destination of the oil, but of the pace and volume of 
extraction, and thus theoretically allowing for a more efficient management of the impact of this revenue 
on the rest of the economy.320  
The second change introduced by the new law pertains to the role of Petrobras. According to the new law, 
the NOC will be the exclusive operator in the pre salt (Art. 4). It is, nonetheless, allowed to form JV with 
other companies retaining a minimum stake of 30% in every project (Art. 10c). Under the CNPE 
proposal, Petrobras may be directly contracted (PSA) for exploration and production activities (E&P) in 
the pre-salt by the Union, and without need for auction (Art. 12).  
The third change regards the establishment of a public company (Pre-sal Petroleo S.A., commonly 
referred to as ‘Petrosal’), fully owned by the executive and to be placed under the MME. This company 
will administer all PSA contracts on behalf of the Union (Art. 8, §1), and will be responsible for 
marketing the Union’s share of profit oil, and may subcontract Petrobras for this purpose (Art. 45). 
Although not performing any E&P activities, the company will integrate all consortiums in representation 
of the Union’s interests in the PSA (Art. 21; this includes the ones contracted directly with Petrobras). The 
consortiums will be administered by a operational committee integrated by all parties, with Petrosal being 
responsible for the appointment of half of them and the president (Art. 23), who will have veto power 
over any decision making (Art. 25). 
According to the new law, CNPE and ANP maintain their main competences in the pre-salt area as policy 
formulating and regulatory bodies, respectively. The law also stipulates that as in the previous system, 
there shall be a minimum local content in terms of services and goods (Art. 15, VIII), which is to be 
defined by the MME (and sanctioned by CNPE) and specified in the tender notice to be elaborated by 
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ANP. This is expected to become even more demanding in the new framework, in line with Brasilia’s 
plans to use the pre-salt as an industrial policy instrument to promote the emergence of strong technology 
and an equipment and services industry to support Petrobas’s efforts in developing the new reservoirs, and 
to boost its shipbuilding and petrochemical industries.321  
Diagram 3.2. Representation of the institutional structure of the oil sector in Brazil  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by the candidate according to the new regulatory framework and based on 
information posted in the MME website: http://www.mme.gov.br/mme (Acronyms - 
CNPE: National Council for Energy Policy; ANP: National Petroleum Agency). 
 
Although the partial re-enacting of Petrobras’s monopoly is appealing to most civil society circles,322 
criticisms over the efficacy of the various features of the new regulatory framework abound, and 
perceptions are quite fragmented across the oil sector and even amongst national and foreign investors.323 
Ultimately, what is at stake here is the old debate regarding the role of the state in resources 
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management.324 Through its controlling share in Petrobras and the sole ownership of Petrosal, the Union 
is ensured a much larger control over the pre-salt, which is where the future of the Brazilian hydrocarbons 
industry lies. As such, and at this particular point, the nationalist faction seems again to have taken over 
developments.  
In line with this, the Union has also reinforced its control over Petrobras through an oil-for-shares swap 
agreement. Through this accord, the government gave Petrobras the rights to 5 billion boe reserves in the 
pre-salt, in exchange for US$42.5bn worth of common shares in the company.325 The swap, approved by 
the Congress, took place in the context of the company’s bond issuing in the New York and São Paulo 
Stock Exchanges, in November 2001. The capital increase operation was aimed at sourcing funding for its 
strategic development plan 2010-2014. Totaling nearly US$70bn, this was Petrobras’s biggest ever bond 
issuing, and a world record. By these means the executive raises its controlling share from 56% to 64%.326 
The introduction of the new law for the pre-salt signalled the willingness of Lula’s leftist administration 
to reinforce the Union’s control over the hydrocarbons sector. Although the Dilma Administration is 
expected to have a more pragmatic approach in managing the sector,327 the changes introduced make the 
oil industry institutional structure more complex and difficult to navigate. The co-existence of two 
different legal regimes has the potential of raising various technical challenges. This is particularly so in 
overlapping jurisdiction areas, where conflicting interests of federal states involved, may take long time to 
clear and as such delay implementation. In addition, and according to a significant part of the 
interviewees in the oil sector in Brazil,328 Petrosal might end up playing a marginal role and only adding 
up the weight of bureaucracy due to its political nature. Further empowered by the new regulatory 
framework (the only operator and with participation in all blocks), Petrobras is therefore expected to 
remain the foundation in Brazil’s oil industry, due to its much larger financial resources and technological 
and geological expertise.  
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3.3. Chapter conclusions 
If on the one hand the Angola and Brazil oil industries present the same bright perspective in terms of 
future potential (see Appendix I and II), on the other hand their oil industries present very different 
institutional frameworks. The reasons for such disparity lies in the historical record of both countries. 
While Angola has a much shorter independence history, mostly under martial law and the same ruler, 
Brazilian history spans almost over 200 years, with many different rulers and regimes, all of which left an 
imprint in the current institutional structure of the oil industry.  
In spite of the formal appearance of a multiparty democracy, power in Angola remains, in reality, highly 
concentrated in the Presidency. Indeed, the presidential office holds absolute control over the executive 
(the President is the head of government and he nominates the ministers), legislature (MPLA holds 
absolute majority in the national assembly and therefore it is a mere sanctioning instrument of the 
President), judiciary (judges are nominated by the President, from constitutional to provincial courts), and 
local powers (provincial governors are political appointees). In addition to the state institutional structure, 
the President also controls the major source of state revenue (oil through Sonangol) and the means of 
production (through his vast patronage network among the business class). To complement this highly 
centralised structure, civil society is practically non-existent. In this setting, there is no real accountability 
at any level, that can dispute the decisions emanated from the Presidency. This has enabled the Presidency 
to control the political and economic life of the country, while formally projecting an image of a 
multiparty system and a market economy. In such a highly centralised environment, fostering a close and 
stable relationship with the President’s office, emerge thus as one of the most important factors in doing 
business in Angola, especially so when it comes to the oil sector.  
In sharp contrast, Brazil’s long independence history, filled with ups and downs, has gradually produced 
not only a pluralist and democratic regime, but also very strong constituencies. At a very early stage the 
Brazilian state showed little interest in evaluating the riches beneath its land and did not give much 
incentive to do so. Therefore resources prospection was mostly led out of curiosity and led by strong 
perseverance of a handful of barons. The first signs of a real potential for oil emerged in the context of 
growing nationalism around 1900, and from then on the Brazilian state gradually took over resources. 
Under the authoritarian developmental state, oil exploration became a monopoly of the state and the 
national oil company became the exclusive concessionaire. The democratising context in the 1990s, 
however, led to liberalisation of the sector, with the state assuming a regulatory role. Despite having lost 
its exclusivity rights, Petrobras maintained a dominant position in E&P. Along this path many other 
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institutions were created, abolished and reinvented, largely contributing to the complex dynamics of the 
sector at present.  
Brazil now boasts a solid and independent business class and a very pro-active and demanding civil 
society, which has played an important role in the gradual democratization and liberalisation of the 
country. Despite the evident weaknesses of the executive institutional capacity (e.g. overlapping 
jurisdictions, rampant corruption at all levels of the Union bureaucracy, including at parliamentary and 
judiciary level), the executive remains ultimately accountable to those strong constituencies. 
Petrobras’s dominance over upstream activities in Brazil, however, is much higher than that of Sonangol 
in Angola. This is mostly explained by the fact that Petrobras enjoyed a legal monopoly over the sector 
throughout nearly four-fifths of its history, which legacy has granted the NOC a virtual monopoly over 
E&P activities even in a liberalized context. Sonangol, on the other hand, lacking the resources and 
expertise, had to bring in other players from the start, which now account for a significant part of 
production. Nonetheless, due to the highly centralized nature of the surrounding institutional structure, the 
executive in Angola has a much stronger grip over Sonangol (fully state owned), and therefore has a much 
larger latitude to influence developments in the oil industry. In Brazil, on the other hand, the executive’s 
influence over Petrobras and the sector is curtailed by the semi-private nature of its NOC, and the checks 
and balances that have been put in place in the process of liberalisation of the sector. 
Recent developments in the regulatory framework in Brazil, however, suggest that the state is to play a 
much larger role in the sector in the near future, which is regarded by many as a partial reversal of the 
liberalisation of the sector initiated only a decade ago. This is being engineered through the reinforcement 
of the federal executive in Petrobras’s voting capital, and by granting the NOC a dominant position in the 
development of the massive pre-salt reservoirs. Although these changes may strengthen the executive’s 
grip over the sector in the near future, they may not necessarily ensure the best outcomes for the industry. 
In a political leftist environment, this may imply the prioritizing of macro-economic and social objectives 
over commercial considerations. Even if a Venezuela-like scenario seems unlikely in Brazil, these recent 
shifts may impact negatively on Petrobras’s operational autonomy, which has placed the NOC among the 
top energy companies in the world.  
Structural changes are also looming on the horizon in Angola, namely the listing of Sonangol and the 
creation of an autonomous regulating body, which have the potential to limit the Presidency’s control over 
Sonangol and the oil industry. This, however, for the reasons discussed above, is unlikely to take place 
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anytime soon. Therefore, the institutional structure that has characterized the oil industry in Angola for 
the past three decades is expected to remain unchanged in the foreseeable future.  
Having mapped out the specificities of the institutional structure of the oil industry in Angola in Brazil, 
the following two chapters will analyse in detail the how China’s oil diplomacy interacted with these two 
diverse contexts over the past decade and assess how successful it was in achieving Beijing’s energy 
security goals in each country. 
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CHAPTER 4: CHINA’S OIL DIPLOMACY IN ANGOLA 
 
 
This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the first case study, Angola. Its aim is to examine China’s 
relations with that country, focusing on the performance of infrastructure-for-oil loans, with regard to 
Beijing’s energy security goals. For this purpose, this chapter presents: (a) a brief analysis of China-
Angola relations and historical background throughout three distinctive periods (gradual rapprochement 
in the late 1970s, a dormant phase in the 1980s and 1990s, and a flourishing phase in the 2000s); (b) a 
detailed study of different features of bilateral relations in this last phase, aimed at demonstrating how 
critical and pervasive the oil factor is in contemporary bilateral relations; (c) an analysis of China’s 
infrastructure-for-oil loans in Angola, so as to illustrate how the relationship is structured around that 
formula; and (d) an assessment of how these loans performed in pursuing China’s oil security goals in 
Angola.  
The overall aim of this chapter is to emphasise how this instrument of China’s economic statecraft 
(infrastructure-for-oil deals) has been relatively successful in achieving Beijing’s oil diplomacy goals - 
access to oil equity and long term supply contracts - in Angola.  
4.1. Contextualising China-Angola relations  
 4.1.1. Historical background  
Owing to Angola’s long colonial history and the fact that it was among the last African countries to gain 
independence, the historical record of China in that country is relatively recent. It dates back to China’s 
controversial involvement in Angola’s liberation war in the 1960s and 1970s. Over that period Beijing 
had supported all three liberation movements, sometimes simultaneously.  
 a) China’s controversial involvement in Angola’s liberation war (1960s and 1970s) 
Although at first China supported the largest liberation movement, MPLA,329 Beijing soon decided that it 
was too urban-based and pro-Soviet. As a result, Beijing switched its support to FNLA330  in 1963. 
Chinese relations with the FNLA were strained, however, by the fact that Chinese delegates were not 
                                                           
329 Movimento para a Libertação de Angola (headed then by Agostinho Neto), the party in power since 
independence in 1975. 
330 Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola. 
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allowed into the DRC, where the movement was based. In 1964, Beijing switched again and started 
supporting UNITA,331 formed by a rebel group that had split from FNLA. Its leader, Jonas Savimbi, 
underwent military training in China in 1964 and 1965, before the formal establishment of UNITA in 
1966. Unlike MPLA and FNLA, UNITA sought support in indigenous sources, and started to build 
internal bases, proclaiming Maoism as its doctrine. However, in the early 1970s, China abandoned 
UNITA, to approach again, first, the MPLA, and then the FNLA. After formal independence in 1975 and 
the onset of civil war, Beijing covertly supported both the FNLA and UNITA, in an effort to preclude 
victory from the Soviet-backed MPLA.332 This fact put a dent in China’s relations with the ruling MPLA 
in the years following independence. For the above reasons, unlike most other African countries, China 
had no record of aid and cooperation in Angola . 
 b) Gradual rapprochement and the dormant phase (1980s and 1990s) 
The gradual improvement of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1980s, and the change of guard in 
both countries (Deng Xiaoping in China 1978, and dos Santos in Angola in 1979), paved the way 
for a gradual rapprochement between Beijing and the MPLA. Diplomatic ties were formally 
established on January 12, 1983. In the following year, an inconsequential trade and cooperation 
agreement was signed, and in 1988 a mixed economic and trade commission was set up, which 
remained mostly inactive until the turn of the century. Owing to Angola’s volatile domestic 
situation, bilateral trade flows remained practically non-existent throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
With nothing much happening, bilateral relations can thus be characterised as dormant over this 
period. 
 c) Thriving bilateral relations (2002-2010) 
It was only in the 2000s that conditions in both China and Angola were ripe to bring bilateral relations to 
a new level. The launch of China’s ‘going out policy’ coincided with the end of the civil war in Angola in 
2002, setting the stage for the expansion of China-Angola economic relations in the following years. 
Signalling the growing weight of economic cooperation in bilateral relations, the dormant economic and 
trade commission was reactivated333 (meetings were held in 1999, 2001, 2007, 2009 and 2010). This is 
also indicative of the urge for a closer coordination at the policy making level, so as to ensure better 
                                                           
331 União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (headed by Jonas Savimbi). 
332 For a detailed account of China’s involvement in Angola in the 1960s and 1990s, see: Steven F. Jackson, 
“China’s Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93”, in: The China Quarterly, 
142, 1995, pp. 388-422. 
333 Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luanda, Angola, 11 March 2009. 
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management of the fast expanding economic flows between the two countries. In the 2010 meeting of this 
commission, five cooperation agreements were signed, mostly for infrastructure construction, equipment 
provision and capacity building in education, health and defence.334 
4.1.2. Bilateral relations in the 2000s 
4.1.2.1. Building closer political ties 
Due to Angola’s internal turmoil and the marginal importance of the relationship for both countries until 
the early 2000s, official visits and exchanges were very scarce, as is shown in the table 4.1 (below). 
Nevertheless, there were some important Chinese state visitors to Angola, including Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen and Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, and two official visits by President Dos Santos to China were 
undertaken ten years apart. 
Reflecting the changing context, the exchange has clearly intensified since the end of the civil war. 
Amongst other Chinese high ranking officials and numerous delegations from Chinese banking 
institutions (EXIM Bank, CDB) and entrepreneurs, Angola welcomed Premier Wen Jiabao, and the 
Minister of Commerce Chen Deming. As for Angola, after a ten year break, President Dos Santos visited 
China twice in 2008 - in August for the Olympics inauguration and again in December to ensure the 
continued flow of Chinese funds. Premier Wen Jiabao guaranteed that China would not reduce its 
financial assistance,335 and President Hu Jintao even raised four proposals336 to deepen cooperation and 
further extend bilateral exchanges. Dos Santos’s visit was followed shortly thereafter by China’s Minister 
of Commerce Chen Deming’s visit to Luanda in January 2009. During his stay, he restated that China 
would not only honour previous financial commitments, but would also further strengthen its cooperation 
with Angola in a variety of sectors, including oil, construction and agriculture.337 
                                                           
334 Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luanda, Angola, 2 February 2011. 
335 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Wen Jiabao meets with Angolan President Dos Santos”, 20 December 
2008, available online at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t527821.htm (accessed 8 November 2009). 
336 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Hu Jintao holds talks with Angola President Jose Eduardo dos Santos”, 
18 December, 2008, available online at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t526951.htm (accessed 8 November 
2009). 
337 According to Chen Deming, and responding to the Angolan government’s appeal, China is soon to send a team of 
agro-technicians and to jointly develop in the near future, four agricultural projects located in Huíla and Uíge. 
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Table. 4.1. Selected China-Angola high ranking official bilateral exchanges (1988-2010) 
Chinese Government dignitaries official visits 
to Angola 
Angolan Government dignitaries official 
visits to China 
year Name and rank year Name and rank 
August 1989 Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen 
October 1988 President  
Eduardo dos Santos 
August 1995 Vice-Premier 
Zhu Rongji 
October 1998 President  
Eduardo dos Santos 
January 2001 Foreign Affairs Minister 
Tang Jiaxuan 
2006 Prime Minister  
F. Piedade dos Santos  
February 2005 Vice Premier 
Zeng Peiyan 
August 2008 President  
Eduardo dos Santos 
June 2006 Premier 
Wen Jiabao 
December 2008 President  
Eduardo dos Santos 
January 2009 Minister of commerce 
Chen Deming 
June 2010 Minister of Environment 
M. Fatima Jardim 
March 2009 Vice-Minister of 
Commerce Jiang Zengwei 
July 2010 Minister of Defence 
Candido Van Dunen 
November 2010 Vice-President  
Xi Jinping  
September 2010 Vice President 
F. Piedade dos Santos  
 
Source: Elaborated by the candidate, with data collected from: http://www.chinavitae.com ; 
http://www.macauhub.com.mo and http://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo  
The year 2010 was particularly rich in high level bilateral exchanges, namely Angola’s Vice President 
Fernando Piedade dos Santos’s visit to Shanghai World Expo in September accompanied by several other 
ministers (Geology, Mining and Industry; Education, Science and Technology; Commerce; Urban 
Development and Construction; Agriculture and Rural Development). That same year in November, the 
Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visited Luanda, where a joint declaration was signed to upgrade 
bilateral relations to ‘strategic partnership’, aiming at reinforcing coordination and strengthening 
cooperation in all sectors. While in Angola, Xi proposed four points to foster bilateral strategic 
partnership: enhancing political trust, pushing forward substantial cooperation, expanding people-to-
people and cultural exchanges, and reinforcing coordination in international fora.338 During his visit, 
another seven inter-governmental agreements were signed in the areas of economic technology, energy, 
mining, agriculture and finance. 
It is worth noting that this bilateral strategic partnership was an enterprise initiated by the Angolan 
government in early 2010, and that it was publicly announced by President Eduardo dos Santos in his 
                                                           
338 Xinhua, “China, Angola set up strategic partnership”, CCTV news channel online, 19 November 2010, available 
online at: http://english.cntv.cn/20101120/103692.shtml (accessed 5 December 2010). 
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speech addressing the ‘state of the nation’ in October 2010, and signalling the rising importance of China 
in Luanda’s policy making elite. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unlike relations with all 
other countries, Angola-China affairs are carried out at the highest level, involving the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Planning, and are closely monitored by the 
President’s office.339 
According to this strategic partnership agreement a bilateral commission is to be established, which will 
be headed by the Angolan and Chinese Vice-Presidents. It is aimed at devising multi-year action plans to 
be implemented and coordinated through a joint operational mechanism, yet to be defined.340 Following 
Xi Jinping’s visit, a team integrating cadres from the Angolan Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and 
Planning, plus the President’s Office, was set up to identify priority cooperation areas.341 Cooperation 
reinforcement, namely in infrastructures, energy and mining is to be promoted, mostly through the 
reinforcement of Chinese public credit lines and the fostering of public-private and private 
partnerships.342 
The intensifying of political exchanges described above has been to a great deal propelled by the 
blossoming economic ties between the two countries throughout the past decade. Indeed over this period 
of time the economic features of the relationship have shown an unprecedented dynamism that uplifted 
bilateral relations to new heights. This results mostly from China’s growing engagement in Angola 
through development assistance, trade, infrastructure development and the oil industry. 
4.1.2.2. Using aid as positive economic statecraft 
Unlike its African neighbours that have been benefiting from Chinese assistance since the 1960s, 
Beijing’s aid to Angola is very recent. It was only in the early 2000s that China began to work with 
Angola in health, education and agriculture. Meaningfully, these cooperation efforts mostly occurred 
following the first oil-backed loan package signed with EXIM Bank in 2004 (discussed below).  
The largest hospital in the country, Hospital Geral da Província de Luanda, was rehabilitated with a grant 
from the Chinese government. Within the framework of Beijing’s concessional loans, Chinese companies 
                                                           
339 Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luanda, Angola, 2 February 2011. 
340 Jornal de Angola, “Declaracao conjunta de Angola e Republica Popular da China”, Jornal de Angola, 21 
November 2010, online version, vailable at: 
http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/20/0/declaracao_conjunta_de_angola_e_da_republica_popular_da_china (accessed 25 
November 2010). 
341 Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luanda, Angola, 2 February 2011 
342 Details according to first draft of the joint-declaration, in which the candidate played a small role. 
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have been constructing and rehabilitating a large part of the existing health centres and hospitals around 
the country. Additionally, there are also a number of Angolan doctors pursuing post-graduation studies in 
China, with Chinese grants.343 Furthermore, a protocol was signed in 2005 with the Chinese Ministry of 
Health (International Cooperation Department) to send Chinese medical teams (18 doctors / two years 
missions) and to donate much needed medicines.344  
With respect to education, The Chinese government has expanded the number of scholarships for 
Angolans from 20 to 60 a year in 2010,345 clearly envisaging a substantial increase in the number of 
Angolan students enrolled in Chinese universities. In addition, several Angolan administrative cadres 
enrol every year in short-term human resources development courses in China and in Macau, as part of 
the activities promoted by the Permanent Secretariat of the Macau Forum (423 between 2003-2008) and 
the Ministry of Commerce in Beijing.346  Finally, and also within the framework of the credit lines, 
Chinese firms have been building or rehabilitating several polytechnic institutes and universities in the 
main urban centres of Angola, namely Universidade Agostinho Neto in Luanda - which is the main public 
university.  
Agriculture is also an area that has benefited from China’s credit lines. China has been financing 
equipment acquisition and irrigation projects in Angola’s major producing provinces of Huíla, Huambo 
and Moxico. In December 2008, during Dos Santos’s last visit to Beijing, a memorandum was signed to 
send Chinese technical teams to help develop cereal crops. 
Despite not having military attaches in their respective embassies, military assistance is the oldest form of 
cooperation between Angola and China. Cooperation consists mainly in acquisition of Chinese equipment 
and training, conducted mostly in Angola by Chinese officials, and including the airforce.347 Additionally, 
China has also been assisting in the removal of land mines all over the country.348 
                                                           
343 Interview, Angolan Embassy in Beijing, November 15, 2007 
344 Semanario Angolense, “China teria concedido mais 2 bilhões de dólares a Angola”, Semanário Angolense, nº 
168, Junho 2006, available online at: www.semanarioangolense.net/full_headlines.php?id=4753&edit=168 
(accessed 14 February 2008). 
345 Jornal de Angola, “China garante mais bolsas para estudantes angolanos”, Jornal de Angola, 22 November 2010, 
online version, available at: 
http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/20/0/china_garante_mais_bolsas__para_estudantes_angolanos (accessed 25 November 
2010). 
346 Information according to “Activities Report 2006-2009”, Forum Macau Secretariat, internal document. 
347 Interview, Angolan Embassy in Beijing, November 15, 2007. 
348 Information according to e-mail exchanged with official at the International Cooperation Department of the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, March 31, 2008. 
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Despite a late start, Chinese cooperation has become increasingly visible around Angola in recent years, 
and is therefore fulfilling its goal of portraying a positive image of China in Angola. Notwithstanding, the 
rapid rise in bilateral trade flows in recent years remains by far the most notable feature of the 
increasingly strong relations between Luanda and Beijing.  
4.1.2.3. Bilateral trade – uncovering the oil drive 
Trade figures appear to be the most striking trait of contemporary bilateral relations between Angola and 
China. Bilateral trade has grown over twelve-fold in less than a decade, reaching US$25bn in 2008, up 
from US$2bn in 2000. Fig. 4.1 (below) shows that most bilateral trade is accounted by Chinese imports, 
99.5% of which is oil. Although diamonds imports have steadily increased in recent years (from US$6mn 
in 2005 to US$52mn in 2009) it still represents only a meagre 0.3% of Chinese imports from Angola. In 
2009, Chinese oil imports alone accounted for 88% (US$15bn) of the total value of bilateral exchanges.349  
 
 Source: TRALAC, “Africa’s Trading Relationship with China 2010”  
The sharp drop in bilateral trade registered in 2009 (US$17bn), reflects mostly the fall in oil prices and is 
not a real contraction in trade flows between the two countries. In fact, preliminary figures for 2010, put 
bilateral trade back at US$25bn350, indicating the resumption of the upward trend. 
                                                           
349 Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this paragraph are according to data in: Departamento de Estudos e 
Estatística, Boletim Estatistico2002- Junho 2010 (Luanda: Banco Nacional de Angola, June 2010) p. 43. 
350 O Pais Online, “China Reve tarifas alfandegarias para produtos de Angola”, O Pais Online, 17 Jan 2011, 
available online at: http://www.opais.co.mz/index.php/economia/38-economia/11789-china-reve-tarifas-
alfandegarias-para-produtos-de-angola.html (accessed 7 February 2011). 
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Although representing only a tiny share of bilateral trade, Angola’s imports from China have been rising 
at a relatively rapid pace, particularly in recent years. Imports from China have more than doubled from 
2007 to 2008 (US$1.2bn to US$2.9bn), contributing to China’s rise from fourth (with a share of 9.5%) to 
second major source of imports in just one year.351 Angola’s imports from China are to a great extent a 
collateral effect of China’s oil drive, since the bulk of imports is composed of construction materials and 
equipment that have been used in Angola’s reconstruction, as part of the Chinese oil-backed loans granted 
since 2004. According to the National Trade Department (Direcção Nacional de Comércio) of the 
Angolan Ministry of Commerce, over two-thirds of Angolan imports from China are construction 
materials, machinery, and vehicles - the remaining being accessories, electrical appliances and 
furniture.352  
In a relatively short period, China-Angola trade relations achieved a dramatic level of inter-dependency. 
Not only did Angola become China’s major trading partner in Africa in 2006, displacing South Africa, but 
also preliminary data353 for 2010 suggest that China became Angola’s major trading partner that year. 
After overtaking the US as a major exports destination in 2007, China overtook Portugal in 2010 as 
Angola’s major source of imports. Both these countries had occupied those positions throughout most of 
the country’s modern history (see fig. 4.2 and 4.3 below).  
     
Source: EIU, Angola Country Report, September 2009. 
                                                           
351 EIU, Angola Country Profile 2008 (London: EIU, October 2008); EIU Angola Country Report (London: EIU, 
September 2009). 
352 Interview, Angolan Ministry of Commerce, Luanda, March 19, 2008. 
353 Angolahub, “China foi o Principal Parceiro comercial de Angola no primeiro trimestre”, Angolahub, 25 June 
2010, available online at: 
http://www.angolahub.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=155%3Achina-was-angolas-main-
trading-partner-in-first-quarter&catid=35%3Aangola&Itemid=64&lang=pt (accessed 20 August 2010) 
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In 2007 (see fig. 4.4, below) China became Angola’s main oil export destination, absorbing 26% of its 
total export value, against 24% going to the US. China’s share has expanded to 29.7% in 2008, while the 
US’s share decreased to 23.3%. In 2009 the gap increased even further, with China having accounted for 
38.4% of Angolan exports, and the US for 19%.354 
 
 Source: BNA, Balança de Pagamentos 2007 & BNA, Boletim Estatístico 2000-Junho/10. 
The widening gap in 2009 is mostly due to a sharp contraction in the volume of oil exports to the US 
throughout that year, whereas exports to China registered a much smaller drop, mostly justified by the fall 
in oil prices. In fact, in terms of volume, oil exports to China actually registered a substantial increase in 
that year. The gap between exports to the US and China expanded even further in 2010, with China 
importing from Angola an average of 879,000 bpd in the first six months of that year, against an average 
of 409,000 bpd by the US.355 
In 2009 Angola was the source of 57% of the volume of Chinese oil imports from Africa and 15.5% of its 
global oil imports, placing Luanda as China’s second largest supplier after Saudi Arabia (19.8%).356 The 
gap is closing up further. After having temporarily overtaken Saudi Arabia as China’s largest oil supplier 
in the first quarter of 2006, and again in the same period of 2008,357 Angola was China’s largest oil 
supplier in the first eight months of 2010, accounting in August that year for 19% of Chinese global oil 
                                                           
354 According to data in: BNA-Departamento de Estudos e Estatística, Balança de Pagamentos 2007 (Luanda: BNA, 
2008) p. 26; and BNA, Boletim Estatistico 2002-Junho/10 (Luanda: BNA, 2010) p. 43. 
355 Interview, Angolan oil sector expert, Luanda, Angola, February 2011. 
356 EIA, “Country Analysis brief: China”, November 2010, available online at: 
http://www.eia.gov/cabs/China/pdf.pdf  (accessed 5 December 2010). 
357 Oil Voice, “Angola becomes largest oil supplier to China; Saudi Arabia in second place”, 22 April 2008, in: 
www.oilvoice.com (accessed 5 December 2010). 
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imports.358 Although at the end of that year Saudi Arabia (896 bpd) remained China’s largest supplier, the 
gap between the two is now much smaller (Angola: 791 bpd). This recent development clearly underlines 
the increasing relevance of Angola in China’s energy security strategy. 
As demonstrated above, the phenomenal rise in bilateral trade is a direct consequence of the rapid 
expansion of China’s oil imports from Angola, which became particularly evident after 2004 (the year that 
China extended its first credit line) - with a clear intensification of flows over the few years. This fact 
unmistakably places the ‘oil factor’ as the driving force behind the thriving China-Angola trade flows.  
4.1.2.4. Funding Angola’s reconstruction 
China’s role in Angola’s national reconstruction has also intensified throughout the decade, with its 
participation in the sector becoming widely visible across the country. According to the National Agency 
for Private Investment (ANIP in the Portuguese acronym) data,359 80% of Chinese investment approved 
between 2000 and 2010 was targeted at the construction sector (72% of which equipment), being the 
majority of projects located in Luanda province.360  Despite significant discrepancies in Chinese and 
Angolan official statistics361 figures regarding Chinese private investment in Angola, figs 4.5 and 4.6 
(below), show that Chinese OFDI flows to Angola, although fluctuant, have been more consistent in the 
second half of the decade.  
 
                                                           
358 Ni Dandan, “Angola producing more oil than quota”, Global Times, 28 September 2010, available online at: 
http://china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/2010-09/577855.html (accessed 5 December 2010). 
359 This data excludes investments in the oil sector. 
360 ANIP, ‘Dados Estatisticos do Investimento Privado 2000-2010’, internal document, courtesy of ANIP, February 
2011. 
361 The differences are mostly because ANIP’s figures reflect the total amount of approved investment, the 
disbursement of which may be spread over a few years, while Chinese statistics present actual investment disbursed 
that year. Nonetheless, both sets of figures are known to be inaccurate.  
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Source: ANIP, “Estatisticas de Investimento Privado 2010”; MOFCOM, 2009 Statistical Bulletin of 
China's outward FDI . 
The fact that investment flows have been more consistent in the second half of the decade suggests that 
Chinese companies ventures in Angola’s construction sector were triggered by Beijing’s credit lines for 
infrastructure, the first one having been extended in 2004. Encouraged by political stability and fast 
economic growth, some companies established headquarters in Luanda and started venturing outside the 
Chinese credit lines, further expanding China’s presence in the country’s construction sector. Among 
these are: China Road and Bridge Corporation, China State Construction Engineering Corporation, China 
Guangxi International Construction Lda and China Jiangsu. According to ANIP data, Chinese approved 
investment in Angola over the past decade (2000-2010) totals US$348mn (3% of total FDI) and ranks 
fourth after Portugal (US$1.7bn), the Netherlands (US$502mn) and the US (US$356mn).  
Nevertheless, and despite the rising private investment trend, the bulk of Chinese engagement in the 
sector is still happening in the context of Chinese credit lines. Much like in the rest of Africa, Beijing 
seems to be particularly keen on delivering high prestige infrastructure projects such as the rehabilitation 
of the Ministry of Finance, the High Court, various convention halls, as well as edifices for the population 
at large - like hospitals, schools and stadiums. 362  Additionally, its engagement in housing, the 
transportation network, water supply and the electrical grid’s improvement and extension, have had a 
wide impact in improving local living standards. The fact that Chinese construction projects have also 
been completed within (or even before) the allotted time, and within (or below) budget, has certainly 
                                                           
362 Chinese companies built the bulk of the sports pavilions to host the Afrobasket Cup in August 2007, and the four 
main stadiums to host the African Football Cup (CAN) in 2010.  
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enhanced China’s political capital, maximising goodwill among the Angolan government and the general 
population vis à vis China.  
Unlike the oil sector (where the largest Chinese investments in Angola have taken place) Chinese 
involvement in the construction sector put China directly under the public spotlight. This is mostly 
because of the objective presence it entails across the country in terms of Chinese labour, equipment and 
the products delivered - making it more prone to criticism. Indeed, a few emerging issues are currently 
threatening to stain China’s reputation in Angola. These include the alleged poor quality of Chinese work 
(the General Hospital of Luanda collapsed in 2010, only four years after its inauguration), the lack of 
maintenance procedures, problems with technological equipment (failure or inability of locals to operate 
it), very low work standards (safety and salaries), the large numbers of Chinese workers brought to work 
in Angola, and qualms about their skills. 363 If criticism grows in this sector, following what has happened 
in other African countries where China’s physical presence is greatly felt like in the DRC and Zambia 
(mining) or Cameroon and Gabon (retail), China’s image in Angola may well suffer. This would certainly 
have a negative impact on its quest for oil equity in Angola, since in such a highly centralised decision 
making structure, political perceptions and voluntarism at the highest level can overshadow the brightest 
business prospects. Nevertheless, at this stage China’s partnership in Angola, is in general well regarded, 
not only by the political elite, but also by the population, who has seen an improvement in living 
standards, namely due to new infrastructure and the availability of cheap Chinese consumer goods.  
4.1.3. Infrastructure-for-oil loans: the making of the ‘Angola Mode’ 
China’s first funding experience in Angola dates back to the year the civil war ended. In 2002 China 
Construction Bank and the EXIM Bank funded small infrastructure projects in Angola - the first phase of 
Luanda’s railway rehabilitation and electrical grid projects in four cities - valued at over US$150mn.364 
This initial experience in Angola made Beijing conscious of the massive infrastructure challenge Luanda 
was facing in the post-conflict setting.  
Soon after the peace accord was signed in April 2002, Angola’s diplomacy focused its efforts in 
promoting a donors’ conference in order to get funding for much needed reconstruction. Its efforts, 
however, were undermined by Luanda’s poor relations with the IMF. In 2003 Angola tried to obtain the 
                                                           
363 Various interviews, Luanda, February-March, 2008, and March 2009. 
364 Indira Campos and Alex Vines, “Angola and China, a pragmatic partnership”, working paper presented at the 
CSIS conference on Prospects for improving US-China-Africa cooperation, 5 December 2007, p. 6, available online 
at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080306_angolachina.pdf (accessed 5 December 2010). 
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required funds by approaching several countries bilaterally, including South Korea and Japan. These 
countries, however, also demanded from Angola an improvement in relations with the IMF.365  
It was in this context that the first large Chinese credit line materialised. Aware of the slim prospects 
Angola was facing in getting funding in international markets, the Chinese government proposed in mid 
2003, a non conditional and large concessional loan for infrastructure development in exchange for oil. 
Negotiations started soon after. 
Angola was the first African country to receive this type of infrastructure-for-oil loan from China on such 
a large scale. In fact, the success of this formula in Angola, helped establish a pattern of resource 
collateralised loans dubbed ‘Angola Mode’, which became one of the most distinctive characteristics of 
Beijing’s engagement with Africa from 2000 to 2010. This kind of financial assistance differs from 
traditional donors and commercial loans in many regards. Firstly, it has no conditions attached (such as 
improvements in transparency and democracy); secondly, it offers more favourable terms than regular 
commercial loans (namely interest rate and repayment conditions); thirdly, it is normally secured by 
natural resources; and lastly, it comes tied to the procurement of goods, labour and contractors from 
China. This model reflects thus the eminently pragmatic nature of China’s assistance, and is designed to 
benefit both the lender and the borrower, fitting into the ‘win-win’ cooperation and ‘mutual benefit’ 
models that Beijing defends.  
Other countries with a strong economic presence in Angola have been resorting to similar financial 
instruments, also using oil as a loan guarantee (namely Brazil, Spain and Israel). 366 Nonetheless, the 
infrastructure-for-oil formula matrix introduced by China remains unparalleled, not only by its volume 
and low interest rate (highly subsidised by the Chinese state), but also by the large margin of Chinese 
content. From Angola’s point of view, the non-conditional nature of China’s cooperation aid is 
undoubtedly appealing, given its well known record of resisting IMF’s pressure to improve its 
transparency and accountability record. Owing to its political stability and significant oil reserves, Angola 
has been one of the major beneficiaries in Africa of China’s financial largesse over this period. From 
Beijing’s perspective, Angola remains among the most successful and less troublesome economic 
partnerships in the region. 
 a) The first phase of Chinese public credit lines 
                                                           
365 Angolense, “Uma breve cronologia do empréstimo”, Angolense, 29 July 2006, p. 22; plus various interviews with 
government officials between January and March 2008, and March 2009. 
366 Interview, Ministry of Finance - Department of Debt Management, Luanda, Angola, 3 February 2011. 
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According to the Secretary of Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Angola warmly welcomes 
Chinese cooperation, since it is ‘more advantageous then that one offered by the other countries as it does 
not impose political conditions and financially there are many advantages, namely regarding the volume 
of credit, financial conditions (interest rate and repayment term), projects’ execution time, high 
productivity and easy integration of Chinese labour in both urban and rural areas, among others.’367 
According to the office responsible for running the Chinese loans at the Angolan Ministry of Finance 
(MINFIN),368 Luanda Executive has signed three loan agreements with EXIM Bank, worth a total of 
US$4.5bn. The first one, of US$2bn, was signed in March 2004, for infrastructure construction and 
rehabilitation. A second one, of US$500mn, was signed in July 2007, to finance complementary works 
required to finish the projects started under the first credit line. A third agreement was signed in 
September 2007, for another US$2bn. The credit lines were given to finance the projects listed in the 
government’s public infrastructures programme (PIP, in the Portuguese acronym, listed in the national 
budget).  
The combined loan of US$4.5bn was originally to be repaid over 17 years, following a grace period of 
five years, with an interest rate Libor + 1.5% (later reduced to 1.25%). It is managed as a current account 
of the Angolan government at EXIM Bank in Beijing. Sonangol is the guarantor of the loan, and 
repayment is to be done with the proceeds of oil sells from Sonangol to UNIPEC (China international 
United Petroleum & Chemicals Co. Ltd, Sinopec group), which are to be deposited in the Angolan 
Ministry of Finances (MINFIN) account at EXIM Bank. 369 In accordance with the agreement signed, and 
although there were a fixed number of barrels to sell daily,370 the volume of oil to be sold to UNIPEC 
each month for repayment of the loan, varies according to market oil prices. If the amount deposited 
exceeds the debt service of that month, it shall be discounted in the following month. Up to the present, 
Angola has fully complied with its repayment schedule, and according to one source in Luanda, the 
volume of oil being sent to China at the end of 2010 for loans repayment was around 60,000 bpd.371 
                                                           
367 Closing speech delivered by the Secretary of Cooperation - Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the 
conference ‘China in Africa: challenges and opportunities for Angola’, 31 January 2011, Luanda, Angola. 
368 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Luanda, Angola, March 5, 2008. 
369 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Luanda, Angola, March 19, 2009. 
370 Originally, repayment was to be the equivalent of contract sales of 10,000 bpd in the first two years and 15,000 
bpd thereafter, according to Afrodad, “China development aid to Angola”, available online at: 
http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/publications/Angola%20Factsheet.pdf  
371 Interview, oil sector expert, Luanda, Angola, 1 February 2011. 
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Under the agreement, 70% of works have to be contracted with Chinese companies and the same 
proportion of construction material, equipment and labour has to be contracted in China.372 This feature 
has not raised any serious obstacles in Angola, since there are no relevant laws protecting local industry or 
labour. Moreover, the local business class and local industry lack the capacity to supply such large scale 
reconstruction projects, and labour is to a large extent unqualified. In addition, labour unions are non-
existent, and business associations are weak and disorganised. In this context, the Chinese content is 
reportedly much larger in reality, as local contractors (30%) end up sub-contracting Chinese services, 
labour and goods, as they tend to be cheaper and more expeditious. 
Loan disbursements are made on a project-by-project basis. The tendering, management and payment of 
projects are jointly managed by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Angolan Ministry of Finance 
(who coordinates the Ministries undertaking the projects in Angola). MINFIN submits the projects for 
tendering, EXIM Bank selects the Chinese candidates running for each project, and a joint commission 
makes the final selection.373 Around 10% of the capital is released at the start of the project, and the 
remaining upon project completion (after completion is confirmed by MINFIN). The payment is made 
directly into Chinese companies’ accounts at EXIM Bank in China. 374 
According to the former Angolan Finance Minister, the first US$2bn was mainly spent in projects related 
to energy and water supply, as well as education, these sectors having benefited from 18% and 20%, 
respectively, of the first consignment. 375 The bulk of the complimentary works batch (US$500mn) was 
directed to health (31%) and education (18%).376 The remaining US$2bn (3rd phase) is being channelled 
to integrated infrastructure (Malange, Zaire & Cabinda), roads and transportation (rolling stock for 
railways and urban public transportation). 377 According to the Ministry of Finance, in early 2011 the first 
two credit lines had been completely disbursed and were under repayment. Regarding the third batch, all 
projects have been assigned, some have already been completed and are under repayment.378 
The management of the EXIM Bank credit line has been relatively transparent, especially since the 
emergence of allegations of mismanagement regarding the CIF fund in 2004 and 2007 (see below). The 
                                                           
372 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Luanda, Angola, March 5, 2008. 
373 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Luanda, Angola, March 5, 2008. 
374 Chinese money is thus only ‘virtually’ present in Angola, seriously reducing the possibility of embezzlement.  
375 A full list of the projects is available on the Finance Ministry’s website: 
http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspProjGov.htm (accessed 5 December 2010). 
376 Angola Press Agency, “Energy takes much of China loan”, 11 April 2008, available online at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200804110421.html (accessed 6 November 2008). 
377 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Luanda, Angola, 12 March 2009. 
378 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Department of Debt Management, Luanda, Angola, 3 February 2011. 
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latter allegations were particularly damning, because they involved a former close ally of the President 
charged with insubordination.379 This led the Ministry of Finance to issue a press release on the topic, and 
to post on its website detailed information concerning the Chinese dossier, including number of projects, 
value and progress status.380  
 b) The private arm: China International Fund  
Another large Chinese credit line to Angola started to take shape in late 2004 and early 2005, channelled 
through a private Chinese fund based in Hong Kong: the China International Fund (CIF). 381  CIF 
apparently came into existence through personal connections linking Hong Kong-based tycoons (some 
allegedly former SOEs’ senior cadres and others with links to Chinese intelligence), Sonangol cadres and 
a Lusophone financier. 382  This credit line was set up to fund projects under the Angolan National 
Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN). Although this credit line features 
private Chinese capital and therefore is not pursuing Beijing’s energy security goals, it is important to 
elaborate a bit further on it, as significant synergies emerged between the two. 
According to some reports, the establishment of the GRN in 2004 followed a visit by the Angolan 
Finance Minister to Beijing.383 It is said that at that time the Chinese secret services had concern over 
alleged illegal rent-seeking by Angolan officials involving the EXIM Bank credit line.384 Soon after, the 
GRN was created, with the main purpose of administering the bulk of public works part of the 
government’s national reconstruction programme. The GRN was placed under direct control of the 
presidential office, and one of dos Santos’s closest allies put in charge of it, namely General Helder Vieira 
                                                           
379 José Kaliengue, “Minfin Nega desvio de biliões da China”, Semanário Angolense, 236, 2007, available online at: 
www.semanarioangolense.net/full_headlines.php?id=8636&edit=236 (accessed 6 November 2008). 
380 This practice seems, however, to have been abandoned by the new cabinet following the legislative elections in 
September 2008, as the last update was made in July 2008. 
381 CIF was originally created as the construction arm of Beiya International Development, now Dayuan group - the 
parent company of China Angola Oil Stock Holding, which imports oil from Angola. This Hong Kong fund is 
discussed in more detail below. 
382 Interview, Think Tank, Shanghai, China, 13August 2009; L. Levkowitz, M. Ross and J.R. Warner, The 88 
Queensway Group (Washington: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 July 2009). This report 
attempts to uncover the complex web of Chinese, Angolan, and Lusophone individuals and companies with which 
CIF is associated, and to reveal the extent of its links to the Chinese government, which is increasingly trying to 
distance itself from the group in the context of CIF’s latest venture in a massive mining deal with the Guinea-K 
junta, and that became public in October 2009.  
383 Manuel Ennes Ferreira, “China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?”, C. Alden, D. Large and R.S. Oliveira (eds.), 
China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent’s Embrace (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
July 2008) p. 313. 
384 Semanario Angolense, “Chineses refreiam os aguçadissimos apetites de dignatários angolanos’, Semanário 
Angolense, 103, 2005, available online at: www.semanarioangolense.net/full_headlines.php?id=911&edit=103 
(accessed 6 November 2008). 
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Dias, also known as ‘Kopelipa’, and head of Casa Militar (an army central institutional structure under the 
President’s direct control).  
The CIF loan to Angola stands out for the opacity of its financial records and project management. 
Nevertheless, and although falling out of MINFIN jurisdiction, the Ministry of Finance informed in a 
press release, published in October 2007, that the first batch of this fund totalled US$2.9bn and was 
contracted in the same terms of the EXIM Bank loan, and thus directed to infrastructure, tied to Chinese 
contractors and to be repaid in oil. According to the World Bank, CIF’s pledged credit totals US$9.8bn.385  
Without the Chinese governmental apparatus overtly behind it, but certainly riding the wave started by 
EXIM Bank, the CIF credit line also managed to establish through a handful of well related individuals, a 
direct connection to the Presidency in Angola. Not only the management of the infrastructure fund in 
Angola was placed under the Presidency through GRN, as the Hong Kong group behind this initiative 
came to be closely associated with Sonangol, the powerhouse of the Presidency.  
CIF was funding some of the largest infrastructure projects in Angola, namely the three railway lines, the 
new airport, the Special Economic Zones, and mega housing projects in line with President dos Santos’s 
pledge to built one million homes by 2012. Most of CIF construction projects, however, came to a halt in 
late 2007, allegedly due to unrealistic planning.386 CIF apparently failed to consider a few logistical 
constraints, like the insufficient capacity of Angolan harbours to cope with a sharp increase in port traffic, 
which resulted in a shortage of construction materials such as cement. Most importantly though, there 
seem to have been significant disbursement problems at CIF,387 having repeatedly failed to honour its 
financial commitments and complete all flagship infrastructure projects under its responsibility, raising 
concern among the Angolan political elite.388CIF’s problems forced the Angolan Ministry of Finance to 
issue short term debt titles (US$3.5bn)389 in 2007 and 2008, to pay Chinese companies undertaking the 
contracts, and to facilitate the resumption of works.  
                                                           
385 World Bank delegation in Luanda, Angola Interim Strategy 2007-2009 (Luanda: WB, 2007) p. 49. 
386 João Marcos, “Chineses enxergaram mal a dimensão do caminho-de-ferro de Benguela”, Angolense, 4 August 
2007, p. 15. 
387 Various interviews, Luanda, Angola, January-March 2008 and March 2009; Semanario Angolense, “China 
reconhece que está a patinar”, Semanário Angolense, 224, 2007, available online at: 
www.semanarioangolense.net/full_headlines.php?id=7898&edit=224 (accessed 6 November 2008). 
388 Various interviews, Luanda, Angola, January-March 2009, and rumours circulating in the press on the eminent 
dismissal by the President himself, of Gabinete the Reconstrução Nacional’s (GRN) head (Gen. Kopelipa) - who 
was in charge of the reconstruction projects funded by CIF. 
389 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Luanda, Angola, March 5, 2008. 
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Further to these developments, in mid 2008 the Angolan government was made aware that CIF was 
receiving oil payments for contracts that were not yet being executed.390 Having finally realised that the 
GRN-CIF platform did not have the financial or management capacity to undertake the massive 
construction programme they had been assigned, the government started to deplete GRN of its 
responsibilities in late 2010. President dos Santos replaced General Kopelipa with General Flores and 
announced that all housing projects under GRN391 were transferred to Sonangol Imobiliaria (Real Estate 
arm of the national oil company), which would also manage the Special Economic Zone Luanda-
Bengo.392 Furthermore, the President also announced that the management of other infrastructure projects 
under GRN393 would also be assigned to other national institutions. 394 This episode clearly illustrates the 
extent of the President’s control over national institutions, and again the key role Sonangol plays in the 
domestic context.395 
Despite Beijing’s efforts to distance itself from CIF,396 the private fund gradual decline and the debacle 
around its failure to deliver from late 2007 onwards had, to a certain extent, a negative impact on China’s 
image and interests in Angola. This situation was reinforced by the fact that most of the companies hired 
to undertake projects funded by CIF, were the same Chinese SOEs working for projects under the EXIM 
Bank credit lines.  
 c) Reinforcing the public arm: new Chinese credit lines in the making 
                                                           
390 Interview, Angolan oil sector expert, Luanda, Angola, 1 February, 2011. 
391 Consisting of 215,000 housing units in Luanda and in 17 other provinces. 
392 Germano Gomes, “Imobiliaria da Sonangol gere novas centralidades”, Sonangol Noticias, October 2010, pp. 11-
13; various interviews in Luanda, Angola, February 2011. 
393 This includes the three railway lines that run eastwards from the three main ports on the coast (Luanda, Lobito 
and Namibe). The Luanda-Malange line was inaugurated in January 2011 and the other two are scheduled to be fully 
operational in 2012. The Benguela railway links Angola to the cooper belt area in the DRC and in Zambia, where 
China has strong mining interests. The Benguela railway track is by far the shortest and fastest way to transport 
these commodities out of the continent. The Moçamedes railway, which links the Namibe port to the mineral rich 
Huíla (iron ore) and Cuando Cubango (copper, iron ore and diamonds) provinces, is planned to connect with 
Namibia’s railway network, and with the Benguela railway in the north. Rolling stock of the Moçamedes railway 
and staff training were left out of the Chinese contract, and handed over to an Indian company as part of New 
Delhi’s credit line to Angola (US$40 mn). Other projects being ran by CIF include road rehabilitation; the industrial 
zone of Luanda (in Viana); the new Luanda airport, and studies for the hydro-electric power project in the Kwanza 
River, the New Luanda City project, and the new administration complex in Luanda. The new airport, located 
between Viana and Bom Jesus (40 km outside Luanda), is projected to have the largest operational capacity 
(passengers and cargo) of Sub-Saharan Africa, and is a clear attempt to become the region’s air traffic hub, in tune 
with Angola’s ambition to become a regional power. 
394 Germano Gomes, op. cit., pp. 11-13; plus various interviews in Luanda, February 2011. 
395 Despite the CIF/GRN debacle, Sonangol has recently joined CIF in ventures in the oil sector in Guinea and 
Madagascar.  
396 Interview, Forum Macau Secretariat, Macau, China, 18 August 2009; Interview, Chinese Embassy in Angola, 
Luanda, Angola, 28 March 2009.  
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As in 2004, the reinforcement of China’s position as a funds provider in Angola in recent years, benefited 
from Angola finding itself yet again in dire straits, this time owing to the onset of the global economic 
crisis. The elections in 2008 set in motion a cycle that put MPLA under pressure to deliver much needed 
infrastructure before the next poll due in 2012. The oil price plunge, however, substantially cut back 
Angolan oil revenue estimated to have contracted by 39% in 2009.397 In addition, the onset of the global 
economic downturn had an adverse effect on Angola’s strategy of diversifying its funding sources, since 
credit became increasingly scarce in international financial markets. Despite the gradual rebound in oil 
prices throughout 2009/2010, the endurance of the global financial crisis in western economies continued 
to limit Luanda’s funding prospects. President Dos Santos’s tours to Europe, the Middle East and Russia 
in 2009/2010, produced little results in this regard, considering the sheer size of its funding needs. As 
such, the financial contraction context, and Luanda’s urge to sustain the pace of the large infrastructure 
programme, placed China once again in a favourable position to reinforce its position as a development 
cooperation partner. 
It was in this particular framework that agreements for three new official Chinese credit lines were signed 
in late 2009: EXIM Bank (US$6 bn), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC, US$2.5 bn) and 
China Development Bank (CDB, US$1.5 bn).398 
Negotiations between China Development Bank (CDB) and the Angolan government started in early 
2008. 399 During a visit of CDB’s president to Luanda to set the final details, it was disclosed that this 
credit line was to be directed to infrastructure (social housing in Cazenga and Camama, and transport and 
telecommunications) and agricultural development (mainly cereal crops and agro-industry).400 Although 
the CDB had been expressing its willingness to participate in Angola’s reconstruction effort, it is 
meaningful that it was only in this specific crisis context that this credit line finally materialised. This loan 
is expected to be increased in coming years 401 and is the only one already being disbursed amongst the 
new ones.402 Unlike the other two, this credit line is not backed by oil.403  
                                                           
397 Based on data in: EIU, Angola Country Report (London: EIU, September 2009) p. 8. 
398 Ricardo Gazel, “Macro Brief: Angola”, World Bank office in Angola, February 2010, p. 1; various interviews in 
Luanda, Angola, in March 2009; interview, ExIm Bank, Beijing, China, 3 June 2010. 
399 Angola Press Agency, “Head of State analyses cooperation with Chinese financial institution”, 17 April 2008, 
available online at: http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200804171177.html (accessed 5 November 2009). 
400 Jornal de Angola, “Chefe de Estado chinês discute financiamento de banco chinês ao sector da agricultura”, 
Jornal de Angola, 13 March 2009, p. 2.  
401 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Luanda, Angola, 12 March 2009 
402 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Debt Management Department, Luanda, Angola 3 February 2011. 
403 Various interviews in Luanda, March 2009; “China/Angola: no oil guarantees”, in: Africa-Asia Confidential, 1: 7, 
May 2008, p. 6. 
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Negotiations for a new US$6bn credit line for infrastructure development from EXIM Bank took place 
throughout 2009. 404 Like the previous ones, this loan is secured by Sonangol, and is to be repaid in oil405 
(100,000 bpd 2010-2018)406 following the same procedure of the previous ones. In November 2009, a 
third loan of US$2.5bn was announced with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and is 
also directed at infrastructure development and to be repaid in oil (10,000 bpd in 2010; 40,000 bpd in 
2011-2013; 30,000 bpd in 2014-2016), using the same modus operandi. 407  Although not much 
information is available on EXIM Bank and ICBC loans, as of January 2011 these were yet to be 
disbursed according to the Ministry of Finance. 408  
The combined figure of the new loans rises to US$10bn, and when added to the previous US$4.5bn of 
EXIM Bank, makes up a total of US$14.5bn in public funding from China, which will be the largest in 
Africa when disbursed. Moreover, the combined volume of other bilateral (Brazil, Portugal, Spain, 
Germany and US) and multilateral (IMF, 2010 US$1.4bn) credit lines contracted by Angola over the past 
decade, hardly match the magnitude and soft conditions of Chinese loans. The fact that Angolan President 
dos Santos visited Beijing twice in the second half of 2008 409 and that a significant number of Ministers 
in the Angolan cabinet visited China in 2010, clearly signals Beijing’s rising importance in Luanda, 
providing concrete evidence of the success of Beijing’s positive economic statecraft. 
4.2. Assessing the performance of infrastructure-for-oil loans in Angola  
Although Chinese participation in the oil sector has been driven by direct investment of one of China’s 
National Oil Companies (Sinopec), its penetration of the industry was largely propelled by the extension 
of Beijing’s infrastructure-for-oil credit lines to Luanda, as discussed below. 
4.2.1. The initial period of grace  
                                                           
404 Interview, ExIm Bank, Beijing, China, 26 August 2009. 
405 Various interviews in Luanda, Angola, March 2009; Interview, ExIm Bank, Beijing, China, 26 August 2009. 
406 Figures according to an early version of the contract to be signed with Sonangol: Sonangol: “Parceria Estrategica 
Angola China: a contratacao de petroleo bruto”, 4 March 2010 (internal document). These figures merely indicate 
the exact number of barrels to be sent daily to China, depending on the oil price. 
407 Figures according to an early version of the contract to be signed with Sonangol: “Parceria Estrategica Angola 
China: a contratacao de petroleo bruto”, 4 March 2010 (internal document).  
408 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Debt Management Department, Luanda, Angola 3 February 2011. 
409 Especially evident if considered that: dos Santos did not visit China for over a decade; that the President’s official 
visit to China has been on the agenda for several years but was constantly postponed until this point; and that he did 
not take part in the historical FOCAC Beijing meeting in 2006, but showed up for the opening of the Olympic 
Games in August 2008. 
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Sinopec Group acquired its first stake in an Angolan oil block shortly after the signing of the first EXIM 
Bank credit line in March 2004. The stake in question is 50% of oil block 18, in which BP is the operator 
owning the remaining 50%. The surrounding framework and procedures involved in the acquisition 
process, illustrate well the critical role played by the timely loan and the connections at the highest level 
that came with it.  
The stake was being relinquished by Shell in mid 2003, allegedly due to rising cost in exploration and 
unsuccessful drilling. In April 2004 Shell reached an agreement to sell its stake to the Indian state owned 
Oil & Gas National Company (ONGC).410 From mid 2003 the Angolan government had been negotiating 
with China EXIM Bank the first batch of the much needed loan, in which Sonangol played a key role as 
guarantor and responsible for repayment in kind. By mid 2004 it became clear that Sonangol was going to 
exert its pre-emptive rights in block 18 and jointly explore it with Sinopec.411 Sinopec’s bid to buy Shell’s 
share at US$725mn was allegedly much higher than ONGC’s. For this purpose, a JV was established 
between Sonangol and Sinopec Group subsidiary Sinopec Overseas Oil & Gas (SOOG) in September 
2004: Sonangol Sinopec international (SSI). In December 2004 Sonangol formally exerted its pre-
emptive rights to buy the 50% stake on oil block 18 from Shell (executive decree no 148/2004, December 
14) and the stake was formally transferred to SSI in February 2005 (Diário da República, no 22, Series I, 
21 February 2005).  
It is worth noting that, through this JV, Sinopec became closely associated with an obscure network based 
on personal connections. This intricate web connects the top echelons of the Angolan elite to the same 
group of Chinese private interests based in Hong Kong, that in 2005 started channelling infrastructure 
funds to Angola through CIF. A brief look at the dynamics of this network offers a key insight into the 
complexities of China’s engagement in Angola’s oil industry.  
Sonangol had become formally associated with the Honk Kong fund in June 2004412 (Sonangol Asia, see 
diagram below). China Sonangol International Holding Ltd (CSHI,413 commonly referred to as China 
                                                           
410 Africa Asia Confidential, “Luanda Diversifies its portfolio”, 23 September 2009, available online at: 
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/58957 (accessed 5 November 2009). 
411 Semanario Angolense, “A India não está a dormer”, Semanário Angolense, 89, 2004, available online at: 
www.semanarioangolense.net/full_headlines.php?id=241&edit=89) (accessed 5 November 2008). 
412 Through the establishment of a JV, Sonangol Asia Ltd, 40% owned by Sonangol and 60% by China Beya 
ESCOM international (40% ESCOM, and 60% Dayuan International Development - the core company of the 
group). Info according to L. Levkowitz, M. Ross and J.R. Warner, op. cit. 
413 Although most of the capital of this JV is Chinese, this study chose not to focus on China Sonangol, because it 
features private Chinese interests articulated with Angolan state interests (Sonangol). Furthermore, its management 
suggests that despite having a minority stake, it has been mostly used as a Sonangol instrument, and thus more prone 
to pursue Angolan interests than Chinese. 
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Sonangol) was established in August 2004 with the purpose of expanding the Hong Kong group energy 
projects in Angola, and to allow Sonangol to access funding. It is 70% owned by Dayuan International 
Development Ltd (core company of the Hong Kong-based group) and 30% by Sonangol. Only a month 
later, Sinopec Group (through SOOG) became formally associated with this private fund through its 
majority stake in Sonangol Sinopec International (55%). Dayuan International Development holds a 
31.5% share and China Sonangol the remaining 13.5%. 414 In spite of the much larger participation of 
Dayuan, SSI was since its inception been addressed by Luanda as a JV between Sonangol and Sinopec. 
Indeed, even though with only a marginal formal participation in the JV through its 30% share in CSIH, 
Sonangol played the key role as the recognised counterpart of the venture, illustrating its ascendency in 
the structure.  
This web of personal connections linking all the way up to Sonangol’s managing elite and the Presidency, 
is thus critical in understanding, not only how Sinopec entered the Angolan oil sector so swiftly, but also 
the underlying dynamics of the system. This intricate web (see Diagram 4.1. below) explains, for 
instance, the unconventional transfers of acreage between SSI and China Sonangol (discussed below). 
Diagram 4.1. How Sonangol Sinopec International fits into the Hong Kong group 
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414 Alex Vines et al., Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola, Chatham House 
Report (London: Chatham House, August 2009). 
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Sources: Author, adapted from diagrams in L. Levkowitz et al., The 88 Queensway Group(2009), and 
Alex Vines et al., Thirst for African Oil (2009). 
Shortly after the transfer of 50% of block 18 to SSI, the Chinese Vice-Premier paid a three day visit to 
Luanda (25-27 February 2005), during which time he held private meetings first with President dos 
Santos, and then with Minister of Oil Desidério Costa and the CEO of Sonangol, Manuel Vicente. He also 
coordinated with the Angolan Prime Minister, Piedade dos Santos, the signing of nine cooperation 
agreements (five inter-governmental and four entrepreneurial). It is meaningful that in the wake of the 
extension of the first credit line and Sinopec’s first oil equity access, four of the five inter-governmental 
agreements and three out of the four entrepreneurial ones were energy related. The first category 
contemplated an agreement envisaging closer cooperation in energy, mining and infrastructure, a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to create a bilateral commission on this topic, and two 
cooperation agreements between the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, China’s 
policy making core) and the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Geology and Mining. As for the 
entrepreneurial deals, Sonangol signed a long term supply contract with Sinopec (term of seven years - 
40,000 bpd due in the first three years), and the two companies also signed a memorandum to jointly 
study exploration in oil block 3/80,415 and to jointly develop the Sonaref refinery project.416 
Through its links to the Hong Kong clique, later that year Sinopec secured additional long term supply 
through a loan syndication masterminded by the French investment Bank Calyon, whereby China 
Sonangol (CSIH) was placed as the borrower, Sinopec as the guarantor, and UNIPEC (Sinopec’s Trading 
Company) as the off taker. The syndication of the loan which was over-subscribed enabled Sonangol to 
raise USD 3 billion. 417  This same successful financial expedient was used in May 2006, to raise USD 1.4 
billion on behalf of Sinopec Sonangol International, in order to develop its share in block 18. By virtue of 
the above mentioned oil-backed loans Sinopec became ultimately the receiver of most of the oil produced 
by SSI in block 18. 418 
The close relationship that Sinopec had by then established with Sonangol, largely explains the expansion 
of China’s equity in the licensing bid round that took place between November 2005 and May 2006. 
                                                           
415 Block 3/80 was operated by Total, and Sonangol was not going to renew the contract that was to expire in 2005, 
due to the ‘Angolagate’ affair, which, as noted before, involved individuals with very close links to the Presidency. 
416 Angop, “Angola e China assinam nove acordos de cooperação”, 25 February 2005, available online at: 
http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2005/1/8/Angola-China-assinam-nove-acordos-
cooperacao,952208c2-adec-4a88-960c-1ebf143e6ea8.html (accessed 5 November 2008). 
417 Africa Intelligence, “The Cash Just Keeps Coming”, 403, 26 October 2005.  
418 A. Vines et al., op. cit., August 2009, p. 43. 
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Although Sinopec was not awarded the stakes in the shallow water block 3/80419 as the signature of the 
joint study programme signed in February 2005 originally suggested, SSI was awarded three stakes in 
some of the most disputed new ultra deep-water blocks: 20% in block 15/06 (operated by AGIP/ENI), 
27.5% in block 17/06 (led by Total) and 40% in block 18/06 (operated by Petrobras). 
Through its net share (27.5%) in block 18, Sinopec oil output in Angola can be approximately estimated 
at 44,000 bpd as of 2009 (see table 4.2. below).420 With estimated reserves of over 500 mn barrels and a 
potential output of 240,000 bpd, block 18 came on stream in 2007. In 2010 it accounted for 10.5% of 
Angolan oil exports (fifth largest in Angola).421 This asset has the potential to increase Sinopec’s daily 
overseas oil production by 8.8% (72,520 bpd), and its proven reserves by 3.6% (102 million barrels).422  
Table 4.2. Sonangol Sinopec International oil acreage in Angola 
Oil 
Asset 
Consortium Estimated 
Reserves* 
(Barrels) 
Known 
Investment 
Progress Stage, 
Depth and Crude 
Grade 
Total 
Production 
2009 
Sinopec 
Estimated 
Net Share 
2009*** 
 
50% 
Block 18 
2004 
 
 
 Op. BP 50% 
 
 
1 bn 
 
 
US$1.4bn  
 
 
Production 
(largest find Plutonio, 
start Oct. 2007); 
Deep-water 
(1,200-1,500 m); 
Light crude (33.2 API) 
 
160,000 bpd 
 
27.5% 
 
(44,000 
bpd) 
 
20%  
Block 
15/06 
2006 
 
 
Op. ENI 35%; 
Sonagol E.P. 
15%; Total 
15%; Falcon 
Oil 5%; Gemas 
5% 
 
 
1.5 bn 
 
 
[Total Signature 
Bonus (SB): 
US$902 mn 
Total Social Bonus 
(Soc. B): 
US$50mn]  
 
SSI share**  
SB: US$207 mn 
Soc.B: US$12 mn 
 
Exploration 
(largest find: 
Cabaça South Oct. 
2010); 
Deep-water (400-
1,500 m); 
Light crude  
(34 API) 
 
- 
 
11% 
                                                           
419 Later renamed 3/05 and 3/05-A, and which were awarded to China Sonangol instead In 2007 these stakes were 
for a brief period handed over to SSI, according to A. Vines et al., op. cit., August 2009, p. 44. 
420 Technical problems with Greater Plutonio FPSO, brought down the production in 2010, estimated at around 
90,000 bpd. The problem is expected to be solved by mid 2011. 
421 According to data in the Angolan Ministry of Finance website, “Exportacoes e receitas de petroleo (2010): 
receitas consolidadas”, available online at: http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspPetrolDiamond.htm (accessed 7 March 
2011). 
422 Bloomberg, “Sinopec buys Angola oil stake; sees refining challenges”, 28 March 2010, available online at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-28/sinopec-buys-angolan-field-stake-warns-of-refining-
challenges.html (Accessed 5 December 2010) 
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27.5%  
Block 
17/06 
2006 
 
 
 Op. Total 
26%; Sonangol 
E.P. 24%; 
Falcon Oil 5%; 
ACR 5%; 
Partex 2.5%; 
Somoil 10% 
 
1bn  
 
(Total S.B: 
US$1.1bn)  
 
SSI share:  
SB: US$398 mn  
Soc.B: US$32 mn 
 
Exploration  
phase  
(largest find:  
Begonia, Apr. 2010); 
Deep-water  
(600-1,900 m); 
Light crude (36 API) 
 
- 
 
15.3% 
 
40%  
Block 
18/06 
2006 
 
 
Op. Petrobras 
30%; Sonangol 
E.P. 20%; 
Falcon Oil 5%; 
Gemas 5% 
 
 
700 mn 
 
(Total SB 
US$1.1bn)  
 
SSI share:  
SB: US$540 mn 
Soc.B: US$50 mn 
 
Exploration phase 
(Largest find: 
Magnesium-01, 
Nov. 2009); 
Deep-water 
(750-1750 m); 
Medium crude 
(API around 20s) 
 
- 
 
22% 
Total - - US$2.64 bn 
(approx.) 
- - Reserves: 
972 million 
barrels 
Production: 
44,000 bpd 
*Refers to potential reserves estimates by Sonangol and other operators.  
** All participants have to pay the equivalent to their respective share in the block, plus Sonangol’s share 
divided by all. 
*** This figure is merely indicative, as the effective final number of oil barrels varies according to the profit oil 
margin that is due to the government, and which depends on oil price. 
 
Sources: Ministério dos Petróleos de Angola; Africa Energy Intelligence; EIA; Sonangol; ENI; Total; 
Petrobras; various news reports (Upstream online, Offshore, Oil & Gas, Bloomberg). 
When the blocks acquired in 2006 (Blocks 15/06, 17/06 and 18/06) whose combined potential reserves 
are estimated at 3.2 billion barrels423 come on stream (2013-2015), Sinopec’s production may well expand 
to over 100,000 bpd.424 
4.2.2. The souring of relations  
The honeymoon between the Angolan and Chinese NOCs was, however, of short duration. Sonangol-
Sinopec relations suffered an initial backslide during the 2006 tender following a misunderstanding over 
the signature bonus. 425 On the brink of bid submission, SSI realised, through contacts in petroleum circles 
in Luanda, that the bonuses would be much higher than expected, and alerted Sinopec to this fact.  When 
the bids were known, Sinopec realised that its offers had exceeded the highest by about USD150 million. 
Unhappy about this fact, the Chinese NOC pressurised Sonangol for its bonuses to be lowered to the 
                                                           
423 Agência Lusa - Shanghai office, “Petrolífera chinesa obtém áreas de exploração em Angola”, 13 June 2006, 
http://www.agencialusa.com.br/gpdf.php?iden=1877 (Accessed 8 November 2008) 
424 AFX News Limited , “China's Sinopec wins bid for stakes in Angola oil blocks”, 13 June 2006, available online 
at: http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2006/06/12/afx2810979.html (Accessed 8 November 2008) 
425 Interview, Angolan oil sector expert, Luanda, Angola, 1 February 2011. 
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highest value offered by other companies.  Discontent with the mounting pressure from the Chinese side, 
Sonangol temporarily moved these assets (Blocks 15/06, 17/06 and 18/06) to China Sonangol and started 
inviting other companies to take over those stakes. Faced with the prospect of the eminent loss of that 
equity, Sinopec immediately took the bonuses and the assets were moved back to SSI.426 According to 
Wood Mackenzie, the bids paid for during this round were at the time the highest ever offered for oil 
acreage anywhere in the world.427 The bidding level had supposedly been pushed up by Sinopec, which 
allegedly offered US$2.2bn in signature bonuses for the acquisition of blocks 17/06 and 18/06. Shortly 
after the bidding round, Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao visited Angola (2006, June 20-21). 
The following year another episode damaged further the relationship. In accordance with the pre-
requisites for the blocks 15/06 17/06 and 18/06, Sonangol and Sinopec signed in March 2006 a 
partnership agreement to develop a Refinery (Sonaref).428 The negotiations over the details of the project 
started shortly afterwards. The refinery had long been on the agenda of the government, since Luanda 
imports 70% of its refined fuel.429 Angola has only one small refinery, located in Luanda, which is 
operating at half of its capacity (39,000 bpd),430 and is thus largely insufficient to supply the booming 
economy.  
The US$3.5bn refinery to be built in Lobito (near the southern city of Benguela), and with a capacity to 
process 200,000 bpd (in which Sonangol held 70% and Sinopec 30%), was projected to start operations in 
2010. The technical development of the project had been awarded in 2000 to Korea’s Samsung, but the 
lack of funding kept the project from starting. Under the agreement, Sinopec was to fund the totality of 
the project, 431 the second largest downstream project after Angola’s new LNG plant (US$5 bn). 
Despite the favourable framework lain down by the previous ventures and the favouritism Sinopec clearly 
enjoyed amongst the Angolan executive,432 negotiations stalled in January 2007, and the whole project 
collapsed in March 2007. Reports on the media at the time point to a sharp disagreement over which 
                                                           
426 Interview, Angolan oil sector expert, Luanda, Angola, 1 February 2011. 
427 Stanley Reed, “A Bidding Frenzy for Angola's Oil”, 7 June 2006, available online at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2006/gb20060607_581473.htm (Accessed 8 November 2008) 
428 Agência Lusa, “Refinaria do Lobito pode estar operacional em 2010”, 5 December 2005, available online at: 
http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=7938<b (Accessed 8 November 2008) 
429 Sonangol Universo, “Sonangol 35 year milestone of success beckons”, in: Sonangol Universo, December 2010, 
p. 39. 
430 Rogerio Oliveira, ”Petroleo: 100 anos de exploracao”, Sonangol, October 2010, p. 27. 
431 Angop, “Sonangol rubrica acordo para desenvolvimento da refinaria do Lobito”, 16 March 2006, 
http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=9228<b (Accessed 8 November 2008). 
432 According to reports, Angola’s elite preferred to seal the business with Sinopec instead of ONGC, that had also 
run for this project. Projects Today, “ONGC bids for refinery project in Angola”, 1 November 2005, available online 
at: http://www.projectstoday.com/News/NewsDetails.aspx?smid=16&nid=14266 (Accessed 8 November 2008). 
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supply market to target. In a press conference held on February 23, the head of Sonangol publically 
admitted “we have reached a point where we cannot make concessions - we cannot build a refinery to 
produce for the Chinese market.” 433 Various field interviews conducted both in China and in Angola434 
corroborated this. More specifically, the point of disagreement was on the technology to be used which, 
because of different specifications in Asia and the West, would limit from the start, the supply markets. 
While Beijing wanted to supply the Chinese market, Luanda envisaged supply its own domestic market 
and western markets (US and Europe). The reason for this disagreement was purely commercial. From 
the Angolan perspective, the profit margin would be much slimmer in exporting to Asia, due to longer 
distances (transport costs) and the fact that fuel is highly subsidised in most markets there, including 
China. In contrast, exporting to western markets will ensure bigger profit margins, due to proximity and 
higher fuel prices in these markets.  
Some of the interviewees (in China and in Angola in 2008 and 2009) gave some further insight into the 
Chinese perspective, advancing that although the technology to apply was publicly presented as the major 
issue, Sinopec was from the start not really interested in the refinery project, having become involved 
only to please the Angolan government, who had linked the refinery project to the concession blocks 
(2006). The reason why they were not so interested is unclear though. It could have been because the 
profit prospects were very low, since petrol prices are controlled and highly subsidised in Angola. The 
alleged limited interest of Sinopec would have decreased during the negotiations owing to the narrowing 
prospect of profit given that Sonangol planned to construct a highly sophisticated refinery with 
technology that Sinopec does not have at its disposal.  This fact would substantially inflate the project 
cost as it would make it unviable from the outset to contract subsidiaries of Sinopec in favour of Western 
companies. Within this context, the project would be less advantageous to Sinopec as it planned to 
capitalise not only on marketing of the products, but on loan interest and project construction. 
 Lastly, the location of the Lobito refinery seems to also raise serious techno-logistical challenges, which 
would add to the cost. In this context, Sinopec may have found in the technological question a way out of 
a deal it was not really interested in - without ‘losing face’. Furthermore, the fact that no other investor 
stepped forward to help finance this particular project, whilst in the midst of high oil prices and Angolan 
                                                           
433 Sousa Neto, “Sonangol incompatibiliza-se com Chineses e Franceses”, 3 March 2007, available online at: 
http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=13633<b (Accessed 8 November 2008). 
434 Various Interviews, private and public sector, Luanda, Angola, January to March, 2008, March 2009, and in 
China and Macau in October-December 2007. 
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efforts,435 further attests to this interpretation. What most analysts interpreted as a show-case of strength 
of the Angolan government436 in the face of a growing presence of China in key economic sectors 
(construction and oil), might thus in the end have been just a pragmatic withdrawal of the Chinese. 
In the end, backed by increasing oil revenue, the Angolan government decided to go ahead alone with the 
project. In late 2008 the technical execution of the project was awarded to an American company, Kellogg 
Brown & Root (KBR),437 with the cost of the project increased to US$8bn and with production (200,000 
bpd) projected to start in 2015.438  
By late 2007, as a sign of souring relations, Sinopec Overseas Oil & Gas renounced its rights to the new 
blocks it had acquired in 2006 through SSI, and the existing stakes were handed over to China 
Sonangol439 - the minor shareholder of SSI. After a period, the three stakes where respectively placed 
under SSI Fifteen, SSI Seventeen and SSI Eighteen.  
Sinopec did, however, underestimate the impact this episode would have in the pursuit of its oil security 
interests in such a centralised political environment, especially in a high oil price context.  
4.2.3. Efforts rebuffed and an attempt at rebalancing 
Despite this unexpected hindrance, Sinopec Group continued in its quest to expand its oil equity in 
Angola. Only a few months after calling off the Sonaref partnership, Sinopec entered the oil bid opened 
later that year (2007). Evidencing the straining of relations with Sonangol, Sinopec placed a separate bid 
to SSI. Owing to the latest developments, in Sinopec’s perspective the JV had become counter-productive, 
limiting therefore its prospects in the industry.  
The list of pre-qualified companies included Sinopec International Group (as an operator) and SSI (as a 
non-operator).440 The oil round was, however, frozen in mid 2008, initially due to coming legislative 
                                                           
435 According to the US Embassy in Angola, Chevron was briefly interested on this project, but after studying the 
dossier pulled out due to its unviable nature. Interview, US Embassy in Angola, Luanda, Angola,17 March 2009.  
436 Lucy Corkin, “Angola flexes newfound muscle”, in Business day, 23 March 2007, available online at: 
http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/Angola%20flexes%20newfound%20muscle%20-%20Business%20Day%20-
%2023032007.pdf  (Accessed 8 November 2008). 
437 Angop, “Sonagol e KBR assinam acordo para a criação da refinaria do Lobito”, 6 November 2008, available 
online at: http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=21566<b (Accessed 8 November 2008). 
438 Germano Gomes, “Feira Internacional de Luanda consolidou prestigio”, Sonangol, October 2010, p. 16. 
439 Interview, Private Law Firm, Luanda, Angola, March 31, 2008. 
440 To see the list of pre-qualified companies, see Sonangol’s website: http://www.sonangol.co.ao (accessed 8 
February  2011) 
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elections (September 2008), and after that due to the global economic downturn. Despite the upturn trend 
in oil prices in 2010, its reopening remains uncertain. 
In late 2008, Sinopec made another attempt to secure acreage in the Angolan oil industry, divorced from 
Sonangol. For this purpose, Sinopec joined hands with CNOOC to bid for a 20% stake in ultra-deep water 
oil block 32441 (operated by Total), that was being relinquished by the American oil company Marathon in 
the midst of the financial crisis. The joint offer by Sinopec and CNOOC (US$1.3bn), out-bid rival bids 
from ONGC, Petrobras and even another Chinese NOC: CNPC. The final deal was reached between 
Sinopec/CNOOC and Marathon in July 2009, and was expected to be closed at year end.442 Nevertheless, 
and corroborating what a source close to the Presidency and Sonangol had suggested earlier that year,443 
in September 2009 Sonangol made public its intention to exert its right of first refusal,444 blocking the 
access of the Chinese NOCs to this asset.  
According to the source mentioned above, this move was purely based on market considerations by 
Sonangol, as the stake was being sold at a much lower price than its real value (valued at US$1.4-1.6bn 
by Goldman-Sachs, and Marathon had originally tagged the stake at US$2bn). Whether the change of 
attitude on the part of Sonangol was still a consequence of Sinopec’s withdrawal from the Sonaref project 
in 2007, or was just a move to protect the market and avoid the decline of oil stakes prices,445 remains 
unclear.446 Nevertheless, the important message is that there was an evident change in the relationship 
between Sinopec and Sonangol after that episode. If in 2004 Sonangol used its pre-emption rights to 
benefit Sinopec, the same expedient was now being used to prevent Chinese companies from accessing 
acreage, which is all the more striking taking into consideration the economic crisis context. Sonangol 
bought the 20% stake from Marathon in February 2010 for US$1.3bn, aiming at selling the equity for a 
                                                           
441 A promising investment with estimated recoverable reserves of 1.5 billion barrels of light crude. 
442 Marathon Press release, “Marathon Announces $1.3 Billion Sale of 20 Percent Interest in Angola Block 32”, 17 
July 2009, available online at: http://www.marathon.com/News/Press_Releases/Press_Release/?id=1308708 
(accessed 8 February  2011) 
443 Interview, Private International Law Firm, Luanda, Angola, 17 March 2009. 
444 Benoit Faucon, Dow Jones Newswires, “Sonangol wants to Block Marathon’s share to China”, 11 September 
2009, available online at: http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090911-713371.html (accessed 5 December 2010) 
445 Indeed, if Chinese oil companies were paying above the odds and pushing the market up before the crisis, they 
were now bringing it down by, in the context of the crisis, bargaining in a market where its competitors’ financial 
capacity had contracted significantly.  
446 Based on the interviews conducted in Luanda (March 2009) and reports by the media, there seems to be a 
dividing line between government officials or individuals close to the executive and external observers (civil 
society), concerning the nature of the changing relationship between Sonangol and Sinopec. The first group denies 
any political change and reinforces market-oriented considerations, and the second one conveys a souring 
relationship perspective - drawing from the Sonaref episode.  
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better price when the market was more favourable.447 This asset currently (December 2011) appears in 
Sonangol’s concessions map under China Sonangol. 
The successful acquisition of 20% in block 32 would have made a significant addition to Sinopec’s oil 
assets in Angola, by adding access to another 1.5 billion barrels estimated reserves448 and 130,000 bpd,449 
when the project comes online in 2014/15. That stake in block 32 would have added an estimated 26,000 
bpd to Sinopec’s oil production in Angola.  
Despite all the efforts, Sinopec’s attempts to venture into the Angolan oil sector divorced from Sonangol 
in the period 2007-2009, produced thus no equity. This contrasts sharply with the previous period (2004-
2006), when the Sinopec-Sonangol connection was thriving, having granted Sinopec access to important 
acreage. 
In face of this, and having been kept out of the closed tender for the Angolan pre-salt (2010-2011) and 
with slim prospects of open tenders in the near future, Sinopec came to the conclusion that its best chance 
to expand its acreage in the Angolan oil industry lies in the partnership with Sonangol.  In March 2010 
Sinopec International (listed arm of Sinopec Group - China Petrochemical Corporation) acquired from its 
parent company the 55% controlling stake in SSI, which was under Sinopec Overseas Oil and Gas. The 
deal totalled US$2.46bn, US$0.76bn of which was debts owed by SSI to SOOG.450 This move clearly 
indicates Sinopec’s willingness to revamp the JV with Sonangol, by replacing the Cayman Island 
registered SOOG with the much higher profile Hong Kong-listed arm of the Sinopec Group. 
This reorganisation exercise by Sinopec took place at the same time that negotiations between Luanda 
and Beijing were starting for the extension of the new infrastructure-for-oil loans (end 2009/early 2010). 
Even though it remains unclear to what extent these two developments were coordinated, they point 
nonetheless to China’s return to the same formula that had worked so well in 2004, as a means to improve 
its prospects in the Angolan oil industry. 
                                                           
447 Upstream, “Marathon wraps up block 32 sale”, 9 February 2010, available online at: 
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article205997.ece (accessed 5 December 2010). 
448 Africa-Asia Confidential, “Luanda diversifies its portfolio”, 23 September 2009, available online at: 
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/58957 (accessed 5 December 2010). 
449 EIA, “Angola Country Analysis Brief”, March 2008, available online at: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Angola/Oil.html  (accessed 8 November 2008) 
450 Scandinavian Oil and Gas, “Sinopec to acquire a stake in block 18, Angola”, 2 April 2010, available online at: 
http://www.scandoil.com/moxie-bm2/news/sinopec-to-acquire-a-stake-in-block-18-angola.shtml (accessed 5 
December 2010) 
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In sharp contrast with Sinopec’s frustrated attempts, China-Sonangol451 was awarded significant equity in 
2010 and 2011 (see table 4.3. below) in the context of the estrangement of relations between Sonangol 
and Sinopec. Even though Sinopec had an earlier start (2004, 50% in block 18) with acreage in deep 
waters, its last acquisitions dated back to 2006. China Sonangol, on the other hand, whose acreage started 
in 2006 with two stakes in shallow waters, had gained access in 2010 to two relinquished stakes in ultra-
deep waters, one of them at the expense of Sinopec (the Marathon 20% stake in block 32). In addition to 
this, China Sonangol was listed as one of the winners in the first licensing round for the Angolan pre-salt 
area,452 having been awarded in January 2011 stakes in four (blocks 19, 20, 36 and 38) out of the eleven 
blocks on offer. 
Table 4.3. China Sonangol (CSIH) and SSI oil acreage in Angola  
China 
Sonangol 
Year Location SSI Year Location 
 
25% block 3/05A 
25% block 3/05  
 
 
2006 
(oil bid) 
 
Shallow 
waters 
 
50% block 18  
(from Shell) 
 
2004 
(blocks being 
relinquished) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deep 
water 
 
5% block 31  
(from TEPA) 
 
20% block 32 
(from Marathon) 
 
 
2010 
(blocks being 
relinquished) 
 
 
Ultra 
Deep 
Waters 
 
 
20% block 
15/06 
 
27.5 block 
17/06 
 
40% block 
18/06  
 
 
 
 
2006 
(oil bid) 
 
10% block 19 
10% block 20 
20% block 36 
15% block 38  
 
2011 
(oil bid) 
 
Pre-Salt 
 Source: Sonangol Concessions Map (December 2011); interview (Luanda, 3 February 2011)  
 for blocks acquired in 2011. 
 
Unlike China Sonangol, Sinopec was not part of the companies shortlisted by Sonangol to bid for the pre-
salt, nor was SSI. Meaningfully, the only company with no relevant experience awarded acreage in this 
licensing round, was China Sonangol. Most acreage of the two companies, however, is still in the 
development phase. Only block 3/05 (China Sonangol) and block 18 (SSI) are currently on stream, with a 
                                                           
451 30% Sonangol capital and 70% private Chinese capital from Hong Kong. 
452 Benoit Faucon and Isabel Ordonez, “Angola awards oil rights in new frontier area”, Dow Jones Newswires, 
available online at: http://www.advfn.com/news_UPDATE-Angola-Awards-Oil-Rights-In-New-Frontier-
Area_46147521.html (accessed 26 January 2011) 
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production of 48,000 bpd and 160,000 bpd, respectively, in 2009.453 According to the Angolan Ministry of 
Petroleum,454 SSI ranks seven out of the 21 companies exporting oil in Angola. 
Table 4.4. China Sonangol and SSI shares in Angolan oil exports 
   2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 
Sonangol 
  
Thousand 
barrels 
 1,970 2,955 985 1,969 
Thousand 
US$ 
 
              
128,022 210,643 115,537 143,519 
SSI 
  
Thousand 
barrels 
 0  3,924 25,581 25,851 
Thousand 
US$ 
 0  339,664 2,430,181 1,607,896 
Angola Total  
  
Thousand 
barrels 
 495,919 605,482 675,024 646,938 
Thousand 
US$ 30,393,320 42,357,156 62,401,503 39,219,541 
 Source: Angolan Ministry of Petroleum , Oil Sector Report 2009, July 2010. 
As demonstrated in the table 4.4 (above), despite the setback in recent years regarding the acquisition of 
new acreage, Sinopec is in fact drawing much more profit from its operations in Angola, than China 
Sonangol is. Sinopec owes this to its very first oil acreage in Angola in block 18, acquired as collateral to 
the first EXIM Bank infrastructure-for-oil loan.  
The above analysis reveals an interesting Sonangol - SSI - China Sonangol dynamic.  Whenever 
misunderstandings arise between Sinopec and Sonangol, the blocks are temporarily transferred to China 
Sonangol (as demonstrated in the bonus and Sonaref episodes) and when resolved, the assets return to 
SSI. Unconfirmed reports citing the adjunct-director of SSI (a senior Sonangol official), 455 point to the 
possible transferral of China Sonangol’s acreage (with the exception of blocks 3/05 and 3/05A) to 
Sonangol Sinopec International in the near future as soon as relations with the Angolan NOC warm up 
again. In line with this, China’s infrastructure for-oil-loans may still be the most efficient economic 
statecraft instrument to pursue Chinese oil security interests in Angola.  
                                                           
453 Ministerio dos Petroleos, Departamento de Planeamento e Estatistica, Relatorio de actividades do Sector 
Petrolifero relativo ao ano 2009 (Luanda: Ministerio dos Petroleos, August 2010) p.15. 
454 Ministerio dos Petroleos, Ibid., p.15. 
455 Interview, Angolan oil sector expert, Luanda, Angola, 1 February 2011. 
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4.3. Chapter conclusions  
The intensifying relations between China and Angola are mostly explained by the emergence of growing 
economic complementarities in the post conflict phase. The launching of China’s ‘going out’ policy, 
inspired by its expanding financial might and growing thirst for markets and resources, coincided with the 
end of the civil war in Angola in 2002, its national reconstruction urge and rising crude oil output. This set 
the stage for the astounding expansion of China-Angola economic relations seen in recent years.  
These matching conditions are at the very foundation of the contemporary China-Angola relationship. 
Having, at an early stage, correctly identified infrastructure development as a critical need of post-conflict 
Angola, Beijing offered to fund the government’s reconstruction project in exchange for access to equity 
and a long term oil supply. Building on this infrastructure-for-oil formula, China’s engagement with 
Angola became naturally most evident in the sectors that have been driving Angola’s rapid economic 
growth in recent years: infrastructure construction and the oil industry.  
As a result, in less than a decade, China managed to carve out a prominent position in Angola’s economy, 
namely as its largest trading partner, a major provider of funds, and the largest operator in the country’s 
reconstruction project. Even though not so evident at first sight, a closer look reveals that the oil factor 
pervades all aspects of China’s economic engagement in Angola, as oil imports account for the bulk of 
bilateral trade, credit lines for infrastructure are backed by oil, and the largest share of Chinese investment 
in the country is directed towards the oil industry. This scenario demonstrates the centrality of oil factor in 
China-Angola relations, and the key the role infrastructure-for-oil formula plays in pursuing its energy 
security goals in Angola. 
As demonstrated above, the specificities of this formula and the perfect timing of the first credit line were 
critical in allowing China to engage in the oil industry in Angola. It generated the necessary goodwill 
among the highly centralised political elite in Luanda, to facilitate Sinopec’s debut in the oil sector in 
Angola in 2004/2005, which led to its linkage to a network structured around personal connections rooted 
in Hong Kong. This granted the company direct access to the top echelons of Sonangol and the 
Presidency, which proved vital in such a highly centralised and personalised institutional framework. This 
‘guanxi’ network, whose interests in Angola are driven by Sonangol, is a key factor in understanding 
Sinopec’s success in the country.  
In only two years (2004-2006), Sinopec amassed significant oil acreage, having secured access to reserves 
of nearly 1 billion barrels in some of the most promising Angolan deep-water blocks. All four stakes 
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Sinopec accessed were in deep-water blocks adjacent to the current major producing blocks (15 and 17), 
and were acquired through its 55% share in SSI. In addition, it has also secured a considerable amount of 
its oil supply through the repayment of credit lines and also by being the off taker of the loan for 
development of block 18.  
Nevertheless, the ‘bonuses’ episode in 2006 and the Sonaref debacle in 2007, undermined China’s 
relations with Sonangol, and as a result Sinopec struggled to make further acquisitions on its own in the 
sector afterwards. In the context of strained relations with Sonangol, Sinopec has pursued all available 
ways to access, on its own, more oil acreage in Angola’s oil sector - but to no avail. Against this 
background, Beijing is again trying to revamp the JV with Sinopec, and to boost the goodwill of Angola’s 
political elite through the extension of new infrastructure-for-oil credit lines.  
Despite the setbacks underlined above, China’s oil diplomacy in Angola can thus be said to have been 
relatively successful in achieving the two main goals of Beijing’s oil diplomacy in Angola. Not only has it 
secured access to important oil acreage but also long term oil supply. The following chapter will analyse 
how the same type of economic inducement was performed in the Brazilian context.  
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CHAPTER 5: CHINA’S OIL DIPLOMACY IN BRAZIL  
 
 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the second case study, Brazil. In line with the previous 
chapter, it examines China-Brazil relations from the perspective of Beijing’s economic statecraft 
performance in relation to its energy security goals. In order to facilitate the comparison, the chapter is 
structured in a very similar way to chapter four. Firstly, a brief historical background of China-Brazil 
relations over three different periods marked by the setting up of foundations (1970s and 1980s), a 
stagnant stage in the 1990s, and a flourishing phase in the 2000s are discussed. Secondly, a detailed study 
of the most relevant features of bilateral relations in the present phase is presented, aimed at stressing the 
much more advanced institutionalisation stage of the dialogue and the increasing relevance of the oil 
factor in relations in recent years. Thirdly, the chapter considers the infrastructure and resources sectors as 
the least developed dimension of the relationship, in spite of evidence of strong mutual interest. Finally, 
an evolving picture of China’s struggle to achieve its energy security goals in Brazil is presented, and how 
China finally managed to succeed in this by the end of the decade, in the context of the global financial 
crisis.  
The overall aim of this chapter is to emphasise the unsuccessful deployment of China’s economic 
inducements in Brazil throughout most of the decade, and how the onset of the global economic downturn 
in 2008 gradually changed this situation.  
5.1. Contextualising China-Brazil relations  
 5.1.1. Historical background
456
 
Brazil-China diplomatic relations can be traced back to the late 19th century, when Brazil sent a 
diplomatic mission to China in 1879, aimed at attracting Chinese emigration to work in Brazilian 
plantations. Beijing, however, forbade Chinese emigration to Brazil, due to ill treatment of its emigrants 
in other parts of America (US, Cuba and Peru). Notwithstanding this, in the context of the ‘unequal 
                                                           
456 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is according to: Danielly S. R. Becard, O Brasil e República 
Popular da China: política externa comparada e relações bilaterais 1974-2004 (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre 
Gusmão, 2008). This is currently the most comprehensive study on the history of Brazil-China relations. 
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treaties’,457 Brazil got China to sign a treaty of friendship, trade and navigation in 1881, which led to the 
opening of a Brazilian consulate in Shanghai in 1883. The establishment of the PRC in 1949 by Mao 
Zedong, led to the severing of diplomatic relations, the closure of the Shanghai consulate and the opening 
of an embassy in Taipei in 1952. 458  Although some isolated political and economic rapprochement 
attempts were made with the mainland, bilateral relations remained frozen for the following twenty two 
years. While China was at this time fighting for the leadership of the communist world, Brazil was a 
capitalist developmental state in the US orbit.  
The first attempt to improve relations with China took place under President Jânio Quadros. An 
entrepreneurial delegation was sent to China in August 1961, headed by Vice-President João Goulart, the 
first Latin American government official ever to visit China. This prelude was postponed for another 
decade by a coup in 1 April 1964, that overthrown President J. Goulart and installed a military 
dictatorship.  
a) Gradually setting up the foundations (1970s and 1980s) 
Although the military dictatorship had at first repudiated revolutionary China, developments in the early 
1970s determined a gradual relaxation of its policy towards Beijing, that would culminate in the 
establishment of diplomatic ties on 15 August 1974. This was to a great extent a product of US-China 
political rapprochement, and China’s accession to the UN in 1971. The new context paved the way for 
overcoming the ideological obstacles, and led finally to the pragmatic embrace of their shared interests. In 
the sequence of an exchange of business/trade delegations in 1974, diplomatic ties were formally 
established in August of that year. 
Trade figures showed a meaningful increase which led to the signing of the first bilateral trade agreement 
in January 1978. By the end of that decade, over 40% of Chinese imports from Brazil were mining and 
metallurgic products, and 95% of Brazilian imports from China was oil. The large share of oil in Chinese 
exports to Brazil became a pattern in the following decade and an important factor in relations. 459  
It was in this context that the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, headed a 
mission to China in March 1982, with the purpose of promoting Braspetro’s (international arm of 
                                                           
457 This category includes all treaties that China was forced to sign with foreign powers in the wake of the Opium 
Wars in the 19th century. These treaties forced Beijing to grant most favoured nation treatment and extra-
territoriality privileges to its western counterparts. 
458 Henrique Altemani de Oliveira, “Brazil-China: trinta anos de uma parceria estratégica”, in: Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional 47: 1, 2004, pp. 10-11. 
459 Figures in this paragraph according to Danielly S. R. Becard, op. cit., pp. 72-78. 
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Petrobras) participation in exploration of the Chinese offshore. 460  This signalled the start of a long 
standing interest of Petrobras in oil exploration in China’s offshore, that remains unmet until the present 
day, and which explains to some extent, the dynamics between the Brazilian NOC and the Chinese NOCs 
at the present. 
The sharing of the same international aims and similar national development projects, led to the 
diversification of Brazil-China relations in the 1980s. This decade saw the signing of 22 inter-
governmental agreements between the two countries,461 most of which were inked during high level 
bilateral exchanges. The agreements ranged from scientific and technological collaboration in many 
different areas (including metallurgy, transportation, industrial technology, pharmacy and traditional 
medicine,power generation, research and the production of satellites) - to political, economic, 
commercial, military, cultural and educational cooperation. These laid down, not only the basis of a 
comprehensive bilateral dialogue, but also the fundamental traits that still define bilateral relations at 
present.  
Following a considerable rise in bilateral trade flows in the first half of the 1980s (from US$316 mn in 
1980, to US$1.2bn in 1985)462  trade volume decreased significantly towards the end of the decade 
(US$756mn in 1989). Oil imports from China also declined substantially (98% of total imports in 1987 to 
51% in 1989) as a result of both China’s decreasing surplus production and Brazil’s rising oil output. The 
expansion of bilateral trade was halted mainly by the high cost of transportation, which impacted 
negatively the competitiveness of Brazilian goods, and the poor infrastructure on the Chinese side - 
namely the insufficient capacity of its railroads and ports to receive large ships, affecting in particular 
Brazilian mining exports to China. 463 
b) Stagnation and rebound (1990s)  
The economic and political reforms affecting both countries in the late 1980s led to a temporary inward 
looking phase and the subsequent stagnation of bilateral relations. Attempting to recover the credibility 
lost throughout the 1980s (indebtedness and macro-economic instability), Brazil gave preference to 
developed countries over alternative alliances in its external relations. In the same way, China also 
                                                           
460 See: João Figueira, “Petróleo no Brasil e na China e possibilidades de cooperação”, in: Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimarães (ed.), Multipolaridade Brasil-China (Brasília: IPRI/FUNAG, 2003) pp. 143-148. 
461 According to: Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Atos em vigor assinados com a República popular da 
China”, available online at: http://www2.mre.gov.br/dai/bichina.htm (accessed 8 February 2010) 
462 Of these, US$400 mn were Chinese oil exports to Brazil and US$640mn were China mining and metallurgical 
products imports from there. 
463 All figures and information in this paragraph is according to: Danielly Becard, op. cit. (2008), pp. 121-126. 
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prioritised its relations with developed countries, aiming at attracting much needed investment and 
technology, as well as fostering trade flows upon which its modernisation process was dependent. In this 
context, China and Brazil failed to address the bottlenecks affecting bilateral trade and cooperation. As a 
result, and although official exchanges at the highest level were never interrupted,464 commercial relations 
deteriorated even further, and scientific and technological cooperation declined due to a lack of funding. 
With exports and imports declining steadily from 1985 (US$1.2bn) onwards, commercial exchanges 
reached the lowest level in 1991 (US$355mn).465  
After President Itamar Franco took office in 1992, an active effort was made to reverse this scenario. This 
was matched by China’s eagerness to strengthen ties with LA in the wake of Tiananmen. The flow of 
Chinese high representatives to Brazil in the following year is clearly indicative of the relevance Brazil 
had assumed in that context (see table 5.1. below). Important cooperation agreements were signed, with 
special emphasis in the revitalisation of the joint satellite project, hydro-electric technological 
cooperation, the intention to foster iron ore exports to China, and the joint exploration of iron ore 
reserves. As a result, bilateral trade doubled from 1992 to 1993, exceeding again the US$1bn mark. While 
Brazilian exports to China continued to be concentrated in a few items, namely iron ore, metallurgical 
products and soya oil, imports from China diversified slightly in this period.  
Aside from the renewed dynamism in bilateral political and economic relations, political dialogue with 
China was also reinforced within multilateral fora framed by the new ambitions of both countries. This 
included China’s accession to the WTO and Brazil’s willingness to become a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council. Reflecting both countries willingness to upgrade relations, a long term 
strategic partnership agreement was signed during President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Brazil in November 
1993. 
In Brazil, President F. Henrique Cardoso (FHC, 1995-2002) made a serious effort to revitalise the 
relationship with China, having paid an official visit to China (12-17 December 1995) in the first year of 
his mandate. Nevertheless, and even though significant results were achieved in other areas - namely the 
successful launching of the first Sino-Brazilian satellite in 1999 - bilateral trade remained stable at just 
above US$2bn until 1997, and fell to US$1.5bn in 1999. This was mostly the result of an unfortunate 
combination of factors: the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the Chinese side, and the collapse in 
Brazilian exports due to the overvaluation of the Brazilian currency under the ‘Plano Real’. This led to a 
                                                           
464 President Yang Shangkun visited Brazil in May/June 1990, only a year after Tiananmen.  
465 MDIC/SECEX, “intercâmbio Comercial Brasil-China”, available online at: http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br 
(accessed 6 February 2011) 
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trade deficit with China for five consecutive years (1996 -2000). While Chinese exports to Brazil 
remained more or less stable at around US$1bn over this period, Brazilian exports to China fell to almost 
half of the 1995 level (US$1.2bn), reaching US$676mn in 1999.466  
Both countries realised, at this stage, the potential of a closer alliance, not only regarding the long-
standing goal of developing an independent policy vis à vis the traditional powers, but also in promoting 
economic synergies to advance their economic and scientific development. Nevertheless, it was not until 
the turn of the century, that bilateral relations started to come to real fruition. Indeed ten years after the 
establishment of the ‘strategic partnership’, its full meaning and the mechanisms to develop the 
partnership remained much undefined, as pointed out by Henrique Altemani.467  
5.1.2. Bilateral relations in the 2000s  
By the early 2000s, China’s dramatic economic expansion had already produced significant political clout 
at the world stage, elevating it to the status of a great power in the making. At this time, China’s economic 
scope was expanding to a global level - in search of capital, technology and commodities to fuel its 
growth. The gradual stabilization of the Brazilian economy towards the end of the decade (resulting from 
the economic monetary reform initiated in 1994 with ‘Plano Real’) coincided thus with the start of 
China’s quest for new markets and commodities supply sources overseas. In this context, China assumed 
an increasingly critical role in Brazil’s foreign relations under FHC, and his successor Lula da Silva.468  
The increased pro-activeness of Brazil towards China became particularly evident under President Lula 
(January 2003-2010), who perceived this partnership as a critical means to boost Brazil’s economic 
expansion and political leverage at the world stage. The core issue on Lula’s bilateral agenda, rapidly 
became the push for a greater dynamism of the economic and commercial features of the relationship, but 
in a way that would better suit Brazil’s economic interests.  
This flourishing phase in bilateral relations was accompanied by the intensification of high ranking 
bilateral exchanges, the institutionalisation of bilateral dialogue mechanisms and instruments, and a 
dramatic expansion in the volume of trade.  
5.1.2.1. Revamping political ties 
                                                           
466 MDIC/SECEX, Ibid. 
467 H. Altemani, op. cit. (2004), p. 18. 
468 Alexandre C. Leite, “As Relações Comerciais entre Brasil e China de 1979 a 2008: Lições de Estratégia Política 
e Económica”, p. 20, paper presented at: International Seminar on China, India and Latin America: Economy, 
Strategy and Foreign Policy, 19-21 June 2009, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
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Table 5.1 (below) provides a snapshot of the high level bilateral exchanges between the two countries 
over the last five decades. The table illustrates the periods in which exchange was more intense: the early 
1990s, around 2004 and after a few years break, exchanges seem to have resumed again in the context of 
the world economic crisis. 
Table 5.1. Selected China-Brazil high ranking official bilateral exchanges (1961-2010) 
Chinese Government dignitaries 
official visits to Brazil 
Brazil Government dignitaries official 
visits to China 
Year Name and rank Year Name and rank 
- - August 1961 Vice President  
J. Goulart  
October 1985 Premier  
Zhao Zyang 
March 1982 Foreign Affairs Minister  
J. Batista Figueiredo 
May 1990 President  
Yang Shangkun 
July 1988 President  
Jose Sarney 
March 1993 
 
 
May 1993 
 
 
November 1993 
Foreign Affairs Minister 
Qian Qichen 
 
Vice-Premier  
Zhu Rongji 
 
President 
Jiang Zemin 
 
 
December 1995 
 
 
President  
F. Henrique Cardos 
November 2004 President 
Hu Jintao 
May 2004 President 
Lula da Silva 
January 2009 
 
 
February 2009 
Foreign Affairs Minister 
Yang Jiechi 
 
Vice-President 
Xi Jinping 
 
 
May 2009 
 
 
President 
Lula da Silva 
March 2010 President 
Hu Jintao 
 
April 2011 
 
President Dilma Russeff 
(2nd half 2011) (Premier Wen Jiabao) 
 
Source: Elaborated by the candidate with data collected from: http://www.chinavitae.com ; 
http://www.macauhub.com.mo and http://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo  
In May 2004, the year both countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of bilateral relations, President Lula 
headed a mission of 430 delegates to China, the largest in his first mandate. President Lula set, as his 
main task, the strengthening of the economic-commercial axis, namely through the expansion of bilateral 
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trade and investments. 469 From the perspective of this thesis, a critical point in the agenda was the 
attraction of Chinese funding for infrastructure development in Brazil, since infrastructure bottlenecks are 
currently a serious constraint to the expansion of bilateral trade. In line with this, one of the eleven 
agreements signed laid down the foundations for joint construction of railroads and ports in Brazil to 
facilitate the outflow of iron ore, soya, ethanol and timber in particular.470 Furthermore, in the wake of the 
signature of a number of deals in the mining sector earlier that year (see trade and investment section 
below), attracting Chinese investment to the commodities sectors was also high on Lula’s agenda.471  
Shortly afterwards, in November 2004, President Hu Jintao paid an official visit to Brazil, heading a 
diplomatic mission integrating some 150 Chinese entrepreneurs. Beijing’s main interest at this stage was 
to push forward its formal recognition as a market economy, by Brazil. President Lula, however, made 
this dependent on an agreement to promote Brazilian meat exports (Chicken and beef), the guarantee that 
the initial agreement of purchase by Chinese airlines of AVIC II Embraer’s Jets would be respected, and 
that China would invest in Brazilian infrastructure development. 472  In his address to the Brazilian 
congress, Hu Jintao said that with efforts by both parties, China-Latin America trade could reach 
US$100bn by 2010, and announced that China was willing to double its investment in LA over the same 
period.473  
The following five years, however, saw a cool-down in relations, with nothing much happening in terms 
of bilateral exchanges. This trend only reversed in the context of the global economic downturn. 
Presidential meetings took place at the G20 summit in London (April), at the G8+5 meeting in Hokkaido 
(June), and in Copenhagen at the Climate Change Summit (December). At the bilateral level, high ranking 
                                                           
469 President Lula’s speech at Beijing University, “Política Externa Brasileira no Século XXI e o Papel da Parceria 
Estratégica Sino-Brasileira”, 25 May 2004, available online at: 
http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/politica_externa/discursos/discurso_detalhe3.asp?ID_DISCURSO=2362 
(accessed 16 February 2010). 
470 MoU on cooperation signed between the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Budget and General Administration, and 
the Ministry of Commerce of China, on 24 May 2004, available online at: 
http://www2.mre.gov.br/dai/b_chin_85_5305.htm (accessed 16 February 2010). 
471 Other important negotiations during this visit included the opening of the Chinese market for other major 
Brazilian productive sectors other than soya and iron ore, namely : diary and meat; the increment of exports of flex-
fuel cars to China, nuclear cooperation and the lowering of tariff barriers affecting Brazilian ethanol exports. 
472 Reuters, “Brazil reconhece China como economia de mercado”, 12 November 2004, available online at: 
http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/reuters/2004/11/12/ult1928u591.jhtm ; Sérgio Leo, “Brazil aumenta pressão para 
que China cumpra acordo”, 15 March 2005, available online at: 
http://www.defesanet.com.br/brasil/brasil_china_1.htm (accessed 16 February 2010). 
473 The Brazilian press wrongly reported Hu Jintao as saying that China would invest US$100 bn in LA by 2010, a 
mistake that was then used in several reports on China-Latin America relations. Jiang Shixue (CASS) in an 
interview with the BBC, 15 May 2007, available online at: http://blog.china.com.cn/jiangshixue/art/878278.html 
(accessed 16 February 2010). 
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exchanges in 2009 included Yang Jiechi (Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs) 474 and Vice-President Xi 
Jinping’s475 visits to Brazil in January and February, respectively, and President Lula’s second state visit 
to China in May. The intense interchanges at the highest level indicate that the crisis was perceived by 
both countries as an opportunity to strengthen the South-South axis, and to promote a new international 
financial architecture.  
President’s Lula’s second diplomatic mission to China took place from 18-20 May 2009. Although trade 
expanded at an unprecedented rate from 2004 onwards, the same fundamental problems remained at the 
economic level. In this context, Lula’s economic cooperation agenda in 2009 included the same items as 
five years before, namely, attracting Chinese investment to joint projects in Brazil with a particular focus 
on mining and infrastructure. Infrastructure had in fact became key in Lula’s last mandate within the 
framework of his programme to accelerate economic growth (PAC, Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento).476 This programme was launched in 2007, and became the iconic landmark of his last 
mandate, as well as the platform campaign for his successor, Dilma Russef. In addition to the signature of 
13 bilateral cooperation documents,477 major deals were inked in the field of infrastructure and oil.478  
On 14-15 March 2010, President Hu Jintao paid his second official visit to Brazil in the framework of the 
BRICs479 summit. In the joint declaration signed then, amongst other issues, reference was made to the 
opportunities for cooperation in infrastructure development opened by PAC. This was particularly in the 
transport and energy sectors, some Chinese enterprises having shown interest in participating in the 
bidding for the high speed train. Notably, the Brazilian side also expressed its openness towards the 
                                                           
474 In his meeting with Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, the parties discussed bilateral ties and major international 
issues of common interest, such as cooperation in the framework of the global economic crisis, the reform of the 
international financial system, the revitalization of Doha Round negotiations, UN reforms, and south-south 
cooperation. In: Lusa - Rio de Janeiro, “Brasil e China manifestem interesse em diálogo estratégico e defendem 
reforma da ONU”, 19 January 2009, available online at: 
http://tv1.rtp.pt/noticias/?article=151693&visual=3&layout=10 (accessed 16 February 2010). 
475 Mylena Fiori, Agência Brasil, “China e Brasil condenarão medidas protecionistas de países ricos em reunião do 
G20”, 19 February 2009, available online at: http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2009/02/19/materia.2009-02-
19.5480173551/view  (accessed 16 February 2010). 
476 For more details on PAC, check: http://www.brasil.gov.br/pac/ (accessed 16 February 2010). 
477 The areas covered, ranged from political and legal areas to science and technology, spatial and financial issues, 
agriculture products, trade, energy and ports. Other significant developments included the opening at last of the 
Chinese market to Brazilian poultry meat exports, and talks were held on bilateral exchanges to be done in their 
respective currencies (Real and Yuan) instead of using the American dollar - an idea launched by Lula during the 
G20 meeting. According to: Xinhua, “Brazil’s Lula, on China visit, secures 13 deals”, 20 May 2009, available 
online at: http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90783/91300/6661358.html ; Xinhua, “Brasil estuda comércio com 
China em reais e yuan”, 10 April 2009, available online at: http://br.china-embassy.org/por/jmwl/t556878.htm 
(accessed 16 February 2010). 
478 These deals are addressed in more detail below. 
479 Brazil, India, Russia and China - emerging countries dialogue platform. 
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participation of Chinese oil companies in the pre-salt area development. During his visit, 15 bilateral 
agreements were signed. Among these stand out an agreement between EBX (Eike Batista group) and 
WISCO (Chinese SOE mining company from Wuhan) regarding mining equity acquisition and port 
facilities construction; a strategic cooperation agreement between Petrobras, Sinopec and China 
Development Bank (CDB), and a contract signed by Petrobras and Sinopec regarding the transferrals of 
exploration rights in two oil blocks.480 
5.1.2.2. Bilateral trade – the raising importance of oil 
Prompted by China’s accession to WTO in 2001 and the stabilization of the Brazilian economy, two-way 
trade expanded at an unprecedented rate thereafter (see fig. 5.1. below). From little over US$2bn in 2000 
it reached US$9.2 billion in 2004 481 and US$36.5bn in 2008, overcoming two years ahead of schedule, 
the US$30bn target established by Hu Jintao during his first visit to Brazil. The third commercial partner 
of Brazil since 2004, China came second in 2008. In 2009, China became Brazil’s major trading partner, 
with a total trade volume of US$36.1bn (US$35.9bn with the US).482 China consolidated that position in 
2010, with bilateral trade expanding 52%, and reaching US$56.4bn (US$42bn with the US).483  
 
Source: MDIC-SECEX, available online at: http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br 
                                                           
480 All information in this paragraph, according to: Ministerio das Relacoes exteriores - Assessoria de Imprensa do 
Gabinete, “Visita ao Brasil do Presidente da Republica Popular da China, Hu Jintao - 14 e 15 de Abril de 2010 - 
comunicado a imprensa”, 15 April 2010, available online at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-
imprensa/2010/04/15/visita-ao-brasil-do-presidente-da-republica (accessed 5 December 2010). 
481 MDIC/SECEX, “intercâmbio Comercial Brasil-China”, available online at: http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br 
(accessed 8 February 2011) 
482 MDIC, “Ajustes na balança commercial colocam a China como principal parceiro comercial do Brazil”, 14 
January 2010, available online at: 
http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/noticia.php?area=5&noticia=9560 (accessed 8 February 2011) 
483 MDIC-SECEX, available online at: http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br (accessed 8 February 2011) 
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 As shown in the table 5.2 (below), China’s imports increased by nearly one-fourth in 2009, 
explaining the very small contraction in total bilateral trade value that year. The significant trade deficit 
that emerged in 2009 (US$5.1bn), resulted mainly from a sharp contraction in Brazilian imports from 
China, explained by the economic crisis context. In 2010, the normal trade path was resumed, with 
Chinese imports increasing by 47% and exports by 61%.484  
Table 5.2. China-Brazil trade (2000-2010)  
 
                               (US$ billions) 
Year Imports Exports Balance Total 
2000 1.1 1.2 0.136 2.3 
2001 1.9 1.3 - 0.573 3.2 
2002 2.5 1.6 - 0.967 4.1 
2003 4.5 2.2 - 2.385 6.7 
2004 5.4 3.7 - 1.731 9.1 
2005 6.8 5.4 - 1.481 12.2 
2006 8.4 8.0 - 0.412 16.4 
2007 10.8 12.6 1.873 23.4 
2008 16.4 20.1 3.641 36.5 
2009 21.0 15.9 - 5.093 36.1 
2010 30.8 25.6 - 5.193 56.4 
 Source: MDIC-SECEX, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br 
China’s share in Brazil’s total imports rose from 2.2% in 2000 to 13.7% in 2010, being presently the 
second source of Brazilian imports after the US (14.8%).485 Brazilian imports from China are mostly 
comprise manufactured goods (97% in 2007, over half of which are machinery, equipment and electric 
appliances) ,486 most of which directed to the industrial productive chain. China’s share in Brazil’s exports 
also grew substantially in recent years: from 1.8% in 2004 to 15.4% in 2010.487 China alone absorbed half 
of Brazilian exports to Asia (31%) in 2010, which had become its major regional exports destination in 
2009 (27% of total outflows), surpassing LA and the European Union. 488  
In 2010, trade with China accounted for nearly 15% of Brazil’s total foreign trade, up from a meagre 2% 
in 2000. As for Brazil, although its share in Chinese foreign trade remains modest, it has increased three 
fold over the same period (0.5% in 2000 to 1.6% in 2009). 
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The expanding trade with Asia and particularly China, is causing critical shifts in a very short period, not 
only regarding the expansion of primary goods share in Brazil’s exports, but also regarding Brazil’s 
economic partnerships. The most meaningful change in this regard, was the replacement of its long 
standing top trade partner (US). This implies a critical geopolitical change, not only for Brazil, but also 
for South America in general, since Brazil is the largest economy of the region.  
Brazil’s exports to China are increasingly concentrated in primary goods (84% in 2010, up from 59% in 
2004. This contrasts sharply with Brazilian imports from China, which gradually evolved to include a 
reasonably diversified chart, largely comprising manufactured goods. It is worth noting that the Brazil-
China exports structure contrasts with the general pattern of Brazil outflows to the rest of the world, 
which present a much more diversified structure. 
  
Source: MDIC-SECEX, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br 
Figs 5.2 and 5.3 (above) clearly illustrates that the dramatic increase in exports to China in the 2000s is 
mostly accounted for by primary goods. In 2010, Brazil’s commodities exports to China represented 46% 
of total bilateral trade value (US$25.8 billion of the total US$56.4 billion). Three commodities alone 
(soya, iron ore and oil) accounted for nearly 76% of export flows to China in 2010, up from 48% in 
2004.489 Although exports of added value products have shown a moderate rise since 2006, in particular 
semi-manufactured goods, the share of primary goods in exports to China is still rising at a much faster 
rate, meaning that this will remain a major trend in the years to come. 
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Even though this state of affairs does not seem to bother the Chinese parties, the diversification of its 
exports have become central in Brasilia’s bilateral agenda with China in recent years. This raises serious 
concerns, since over-reliance could make the Brazilian commodities sector more vulnerable to swings in 
Chinese demand.490 The status quo is to a great extent attributable to the belated awakening of the 
Brazilian executive in adopting an active stance to place its manufactured goods in the Chinese market.491 
Other reasons explaining the high concentration of commodities in exports are: the largely insufficient 
knowledge of each other markets, the high costs of transportation and logistics due to geographic 
distance, and the high tax burden and poor infrastructure in Brazil.492 
In 2010, iron ore (raw and semi-processed) accounted for 45% of export value to China, followed by soya 
complex which accounted for 26%, and crude oil 13%. Soya’s share (only entered the export chart to 
China in the late 1990) has remained more or less unchanged throughout the 2000s at around 30%, while 
iron ore and oil shares have been expanding at a faster pace in recent years (see Fig. 5.4, below). 
 
 *Figures do not include semi-processed iron ore and soya. 
 Source: MDIC-SECEX, available online at: http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br .  
Having vanished from bilateral trade in the early 1990s, oil resurfaced in the bilateral trade chart in the 
2000s, but this time with flows going in the opposite direction. After proving the potential of its pre-salt 
reservoirs Brazil is gradually emerging as a major oil producer (see appendix 1). Despite being a very 
recent feature, oil rapidly became the third largest component of exports to China. Representing only 
                                                           
490 Amaury de Souza, ‘Brazil-China: an uneasy partnership’, China Latin America Task Force, 14 February 2008, p. 
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491 Ernesto Heinzelmann, op. cit., p. 6. 
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0.5% of total Brazilian exports value to China in 2003, the oil share expanded to 13% in 2010. In terms of 
volume, oil exports have risen steadily from 940 thousand tons in 2004, to 2.9 million tons in 2008.  
 Table 5.3. Brazil oil exports to China (2000-2010) 
 US$ Million % of total Tons 
2000 36.1 3.33 227,867 
2002 0 0 0 
2003 22.3 0.49 123,997 
2004 210.1 3.86 939,624 
2005 541.6 7.93 1,859,420 
2006 835.9 9.95 2,333,408 
2007 839.9 7.81 2,185,109 
2008 1,702.5 10.38 2,900,324 
2009 1,338.3 6.37 3,843,263 
2010 4,053.5 13.17 8,294,694 
 Source: MDIC-SECEX, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br 
As demonstrated in table 5.3 (above), the fall in export value in 2009 merely reflects the oil price crash in 
the context of the economic crisis. In terms of volume, oil exports actually expanded by almost one-third 
that year, illustrating Beijing’s growing thirst for Brazilian oil - whose heavy grades suit China’s 
refineries. These figures expanded exponentially thereafter, and more than doubled in the following year 
to 8.3 million tons (US$4bn). Owing to this surge, China in 2010 became Brazil’s major oil export 
destination, and surpassing the US which had occupied that position since the early 2000s.  
 
 Source: MDIC-SECEX, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br 
The sharp increase in the volume of Brazil’s oil exports to China from 2009 to 2010, uncovers the takeoff 
of a new dimension in bilateral trade that is set to expand significantly in coming years, as Brazil 
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consolidates its position as an oil exporter. The potential of the pre-salt reservoirs will soon place Brazil 
amongst the world largest oil producers. As such, it is now regarded by Beijing as a very promising long-
term oil source. This new feature in Brazil-China trade, unmistakably illustrates the emergence of Brazil 
in China’s oil security strategy. 
5.1.3. Struggling to link infrastructure loans with access to oil  
In sharp contrast with the bright picture in bilateral trade, China’ engagement in Brazil’s resources 
sectors, has been struggling to take off throughout most of the past decade. Indeed, in spite all the 
framework agreements signed and official calls for Beijing to engage in infrastructure, and the 
announcement of several multibillion dollar deals targeting the mining and oil industry in Brazil, Chinese 
investment stock remained very small until the onset of the global financial crisis (see fig. 5.7. below).  
 
     
Sources: Brazil Central Bank/RENAI; MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of Chinese OFDI 2009. 
As shown in Fig. 5.6 (above), there are some discrepancies between both countries’ official statistics, the 
Chinese figures being a bit inflated for most years. Nonetheless, both sources seems to have registered a 
sharp rising curve from 2008 onwards. As a result, China jumped from the 36th position in 2008 to the 17th 
in 2009 - in terms of Brazilian foreign investors ranking.493 China’s official share in Brazilian investment 
inflows is, however, still very far from resembling the one in trade. According to Brazil statistics, it 
represented only 0.3% of the US$30.4 billion Brazilian FDI intake in 2009, far behind the five major 
                                                           
493 Folha de S. Paulo,”Investimento chinês cresce 72% até abril”, 3 August 2009, available online at: 
http://www.sistemacnt.org.br/portal/webCanalNoticiasCNT/noticia.aspx?id=6929be87-e476-41c0-9960-
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investors in Brazil: the Netherlands (US$5.7 bn or 19%), US (US$4.9 bn, 16%), Spain (US$3.4 bn, 11%), 
Germany (US$ 2.4 bn, 8%) and France (US$2.1 bn, 7%).494  
While according to statistics China’s actual investment seems to be directed to wholesale, light 
manufactured goods and services,495 the highest expectations are naturally set around the eminent Chinese 
engagement in mineral commodities exploration and related infrastructure development. In fact, as 
discussed above, since the early days of relations, China has shown a constant interest in investing in the 
mineral sector in Brazil; and Brasilia has over the past decade shown a strong interest in Beijing’s 
participation in much needed infrastructure development in the country. This is evidenced by Minmetal’s 
willingness in the 1980s to explore iron ore in Brazil, the long standing Chinese NOCs’ relationship with 
Petrobras, and the more recent Baosteel’s venture with Vale (formerly known as CVRD, 2001-2008) to 
build a steel plant in Maranhao - all of which failed to materialise.  
During Lula’s first visit to China in 2004, important cooperation was drafted, envisaging closer 
cooperation in the oil sector involving the oil parastatals of both countries.496 In addition to a short-term 
supply contract, Petrobras and Sinopec signed a ‘Strategic Cooperation Agreement’ to identify and 
develop downstream, upstream and midstream opportunities. Under this agreement, later that year 
Sinopec signed a contract with Petrobras to participate in the construction of a gas pipeline linking Rio de 
Janeiro and Bahia states (US$1.1 billion, Gasene, analysed in detail below) with funding from EXIM 
Bank. A compromise was also worked out with CNOOC to explore opportunities for closer cooperation in 
offshore oil exploration on the Chinese and Brazilian coasts - although nothing concrete came out of it. It 
was in the wake of these agreements, that Petrobras opened a representation office in Beijing in 2004. 
However, despite all the goodwill expressed by both parties and of the many agreements inked, nothing 
concrete was produced in terms of Chinese engagement in the Brazilian oil industry  or infrastructure 
sector (with the exception of the Gasene project). This is a curious phenomenon, with the same scenario 
also observable in the mining industry. 
Just before President Lula’s first official mission to China, major deals were announced in the mining 
industry, involving Vale and some of the major Chinese parastatals of the sector - China Alumina 
                                                           
494 According to data in: Banco Central do Brasil, Investimento Directo Estrangeiro, available online at: 
http://www.bcb.gov.br/rex/ied/port/ingressos/htms/index3.asp?idpai=INVEDIR (accessed 16  December 2010) 
495
 RENAI/Secretaria do Desenvolvimento da Producao, Conjuntura Macroeconómica do Investimento, 2009, p. 16, 
available online at: http://investimentos.desenvolvimento.gov.br/arquivos/RENAI-BOLETIM-06042009-FINAL-
SITE.pdf (accessed 16 February 2010) 
496 Folha de S. Paulo, “Petrobras vai quase triplicar a venda de petróleo à China”, 25 march 2004, available online 
at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u61142.shtml (accessed 16 February 2010) 
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Corporation (US$1bn to built a alumina factory to export to China), Minmetals (US$2 billion pig iron 
plant) and Baosteel (US$1-2bn to build a steel plates factory in Maranhão to export to the North 
American market).497 All of which are Chinese SOE’s and the projects were to be funded by Chinese 
policy banks. In this context, the Minister for Development, Luiz Fernando Furlan, estimated that Chinese 
investment in Brazil would reach US$5-8bn over the following three years.498 Heavy investments in 
infrastructure by Chinese consortia were also announced after that, namely the North-South railway and 
the rehabilitation of Itaqui Port (in Maranhão by a Chinese consortium headed by China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation -CITIC, a project valued at U$4bn).499 All these infrastructures had in 
common the purpose of facilitating the outflow of commodities from inland areas. None of these projects, 
however, saw the light of day. 
This reality is even more striking if one considers that contrasting with the constant postponement of 
Chinese investment in resources in Brazilian soil, investments have more swiftly materialised in the 
opposite direction. Indeed, and despite having no exploration concessions, Brazil’s largest mining 
company, Vale, has already eight JV in China in order to process nickel (5), coal (2) and pellets (1).500  
Throughout his second mandate, Lula’s executive became particularly active in courting Chinese 
investment to participate in its US$330 bn (R$504bn, the official figure in local currency) infrastructure 
development plan (PAC 2007-2010), aimed at boosting economic expansion.501 The lion’s share (55%) of 
the PAC budget is allocated to energy infrastructure, with major planned infrastructure in the oil and 
natural gas sector, contemplating the construction of four refineries and 4,526km of natural gas 
pipelines.502 In addition to domestic fund-raising through public and private organizations (with Petrobras 
and Vale assuming a significant share), the Brazil government has undertaken several missions abroad, 
with the purpose of attracting foreign capital for this massive undertaking. Sitting on the largest world 
                                                           
497 Denise Bacoccina, “Com dinheiro em caixa, Chineses investem no Brazil”, BBC Brazil, 4 February 2004, 
available online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2004/02/040204_chinesescl.shtml (accessed 
16 February 2010) 
498 “China investe de forma significativa no Brasil”, Observatório de Política Externa Brasileira, Nr.3, 24/04/2004 
to 30/04/2004, available online at: 
http://www.fcs.edu.uy/investigacion/observatorioFFAA/Pol%EDtica%20Exterior%20Brasil/Observatorio%20PEBr
asil%2003.htm (accessed 16 February 2010) 
499 Edla Lula - Agência Brasil, Xangai, “Chineses investirão na recuperação da malha ferroviária brasileira”, 27 May 
2006, available online at: http://www.ccibc.com.br/pg_dinamica/bin/pg_dinamica.php?id_pag=1015 (accessed 16 
February 2010) 
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foreign exchange reserves and with proven expertise in all these areas, China naturally emerged as a 
major target in this diplomatic endeavour. Several official missions have been dispatched to present the 
infrastructure projects that include 25 year concessions to potential Chinese funding institutions.503 In 
addition to infrastructure development, and according to interviews conducted in Brazil and in China, 
both sides seem to converge in identifying the agribusiness and oil sectors as the most promising in terms 
of attracting investment from China in the near future. 
Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES, responsible since its creation in the early 1950s for 
domestic infrastructure development) has been working since 2008 with major Chinese funding 
institutions, namely EXIM Bank, CDB and Sinosure (China export and credit insurance company), in 
order to identify and develop joint projects.504 Additionally, BNDES has been particularly interested in 
getting China’s sovereign wealth fund (CIC, China Investment Corporation) to invest in the oil and gas 
industry in Brazil.505 
According to Jiang Shixue, Brazil is naturally a very attractive investment market for Chinese 
entrepreneurs. Firstly, because of its natural resources’ endowment and, secondly because it is a means to 
enter the regional market (Mercosur) through the front door. 506 Over the years the strategic importance of 
the Brazilian resources sector to China, has been corroborated by numerous investment announcements 
and by the increasing relevance of commodities in bilateral trade. Moreover, the interest of both parts in 
making joint efforts to develop Brazilian mineral resources, has been repeatedly endorsed by both 
governments through the signature of numerous cooperation agreements.  
All this considered, in spite of having encountered in Brazil the apparent ripe conditions (lack of 
infrastructure and abundance of resources) and the necessary overture by the local government - China’s 
infrastructure-for-oil/mining formula struggled to succeed in that country. It was only in the context of the 
global financial crisis at the end of the decade, that China finally made a breakthrough in this regard. In 
2009-2010, major Chinese investments were announced, this time however most actually materialised. 
                                                           
503 Folha Online, “Chineses querem investir mais em projectos do PAC”, 11 July 2008, available online at: 
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Not surprisingly, the bulk of the investment volume announced in 2010 (nearly US$30 billion - if 
combining finalised deals under negotiation and announced) was directed at the oil and mining sectors.507  
Along with meaningful developments in the oil sector (which shall be discussed below), significant 
investments were also made in the mining and energy sector over the same period. In February 2010, 
Chinese state owned WISCO (Wuhan Iron and Steel Co.) acquired 21.5% of a private Brazilian mining 
company MMX (Mineracao e Metalicos SA, part of the Eike Batista group - EBX) for US$ 400 mn. 508 
During Hu Jintao’s visit to Brazil in April 2010, WISCO formalised a JV with the logistics arm of the 
same group (LLX), to build a steel mill in Açu port (Rio de Janeiro).509 The project in which WISCO will 
retain a 70% stake (EBX 30%) is estimated at US$4.7bn. Earlier in 2010, a Chinese company registered 
in the Cayman Islands and listed in Hong Kong, Honbridge Holdings, bought an iron ore project in 
Northern Minas Gerais state from Votorantim for US$430mn. 510 The Chinese company is also expected 
to invest an additional US$3.5bn to develop the project (mine, 470km mining duct, mining port at north 
Ilheus, Bahia state, and a pellets production plant). In mid March 2010, another Chinese company, ECE, 
acquired a private Brazilian iron ore company, Itaminas, for US$1.2 bn.511 Among other infrastructure 
investments announced in this period also figure the West-East railway and the port of Sul-Ilhéus in Bahia 
state.512  
Also in 2010, State Grid Corporation of China acquired seven Brazilian electricity distribution 
companies, for nearly US$1bn. 513  Throughout that year many other smaller investments in 
telecommunications, and the automotive and services sectors, were also announced.514 
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Although some of these deals are yet to be finalised and approved by both governments, they clearly point 
to a massive surge in China’s investment in Brazil in 2010, and has the potential to make China the largest 
foreign investor in the country. To a great extent this was prompted by the mounting financial needs of 
Brazil to fund its massive infrastructure plan against the backdrop of the global financial crisis.  
This state of affairs justifies a deeper analysis in order to understand, firstly, why Chinese resources 
enterprises enjoying full and active support from both governments have struggled throughout most of the 
decade to penetrate the Brazilian market; and, secondly, what explains the apparent success over the last 
few years. 
The next section throws some light on these issues and questions, by examining in detail China’s quest to 
engage in the Brazilian oil sector over the past decade. 
5.2. Assessing the performance of infrastructure-for-oil deals in Brazil 
As mentioned previously, oil is not a new feature in bilateral relations. Petrobras has expressed interest in 
participating in offshore oil exploration in China since the early 1980s, and throughout most of that 
decade oil exports to Brazil accounted for a sizeable share of bilateral trade. Throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s, however, oil practically vanished from the bilateral agenda. Contacts between Petrobras and 
the Chinese NOC continued, nonetheless, mostly sustained by interest in China’s offshore. From 2004 
onwards a renewed interest in the oil sector emerged on both sides. This is proven by short term oil 
supply contracts signed with Petrobras and a number of governmental agreements inked from 2004 
onwards, aiming at creating a favourable institutional environment to advance joint cooperation projects 
in this field. 515 Unlike in previous decades China has now assumed a proactive stance in this regard. This 
is mostly explained by the fact that Brazil became a net oil exporter in 2006, and that its reserves 
increased substantially following the pre-salt deposits announcement in 2007. Despite CNPC’s much 
more consolidated position in South America and CNOOC’s much longer contact’s record with Petrobras 
(mostly due to Petrobras’s long efforts towards starting China’s offshore oil exploration), Sinopec was the 
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first Chinese NOC to succeed in entering the hydrocarbons sector in Brazil - which happened 
downstream, through the construction of a natural gas pipeline.  
5.2.1. Failing before the global financial crisis 
The Southeast-Northeast Interconnection Gas Pipeline Project (GASENE) is part of the Petrobras Gas 
Production Anticipation Plan (PLANGAS in the Portuguese acronym) to expand, by 2010, supply to the 
south-eastern gas pipeline network, and by connecting this with the north-eastern network, ensuring 
supply from the southern basins’ gas fields, namely - Espírito Santo Basin whose production is expected 
to reach 18.7 million cubic meters per day by 2010. With a transport capacity of 20 million cubic metres 
per day, Gasene project has a total extension of nearly 1,400km, crossing three coastal states: Rio de 
Janeiro (RJ), Espírito Santo (ES) and Bahia (BA). The project comprises three sections (south to north): 
from Cabiúnas terminal (RJ) to Vitória (ES), Vitória to Cacimbas (ES)516 and Cacimbas to Catu (BA).517  
Gasene was presented as one of Brasilia’s major infrastructure projects to a MOFCOM delegation that 
visited Brazil in late April 2004. When Lula visited China in May 2004, Petrobras and Sinopec signed a 
strategic cooperation agreement to identify and develop joint projects in the oil and natural gas sector, 
listing the Gasene project as a possible start. Backed by the strategic agreement between both NOCs and 
the inter-governmental agreement to expand cooperation in infrastructure signed in June, and encouraged 
by Petrobras to enter the tender for the project,518 Sinopec submitted a bid. Notably, it was supported in 
this endeavour by a credit line from China EXIM Bank to BNDES, requiring SINOPEC to be the 
contractor for the project. Accordingly, later that year, in September 2004, a MoU was signed between 
Petrobras, Sinopec, EXIM Bank and BNDES, and including several generic dispositions regarding the 
loan conditions, the Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract, and the execution 
calendar in case Sinopec was the selected contractor.519 
During Hu Jintao’s visit to Brazil in November 2004, Dilma Rousseff, then Minister of Mining and 
Energy, announced that the Chinese proposal was the one offering better conditions in terms of the 
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repayment interest rate.520 The signature of Gasene cooperation agreement was part of Hu Jintao’s official 
agenda in Brazil, and Sinopec set up its Gasene team the following month. In April 2005, a subsidiary of 
Sinopec was established in Brazil (Sinopec International Petroleum Service do Brasil Ltda, Sinopec 
Brasil) to run its operations in the country, in accordance with the local laws. The inter-governmental 
framework, the actors and the procedures of this deal, point to the fact that China was trying to implement 
in Brazil, a pattern consistent with the infrastructure-for-oil formula it had been deploying in Africa.521 
Negotiations between BNDES and China EXIM Bank for the loan concession, however, stalled in early 
2005. According to BNDES this was because EXIM Bank had designed this credit line in similar moulds 
to its African loans, as it wanted to include in the contract a large share of labour, services and goods 
procured in China.522 Having a large industrial base, a thriving services sector, a massive labour force and 
very strict labour laws, and to that add the political context of a leftist government, BNDES was in no 
position to make concessions. Expectations were that the Gasene project would generate 12,000 new 
direct jobs and 36,000 indirectly.523 With powerful and very active worker associations, the importation of 
Chinese law was clearly unfeasible. In what concerns procurement of goods and services, BNDES had 
already established the limits in the MoU signed in September 2004, which referring to the EPC contract 
(part V) states: “Petrobras, under the guidance of the Brazilian Government, requires that Brazilian 
construction companies and material/equipment and services suppliers to be part of the EPC contract, 
resulting in minimum Brazilian content of 75% of the project.” 524 In March 2006, the Brazilian side 
decided to kick-start the project, resorting to provisional loans while negotiations with EXIM Bank 
continued.  
Notwithstanding this, Petrobras kept Sinopec ahead of the first phase of the project (GASCAV, Cabiúnas-
Vitória, 300km) and following long and difficult negotiations, the US$239mn EPC contract was finally 
signed in April 2006,525 with construction starting in June, almost a year behind the original schedule. 
                                                           
520 Gazeta Mercantil, “Chineses devem participar do gasoduto Sudeste-Nordeste”, 12 November 2004, available 
online at: http://www.camara.gov.br/mercosul/A_RelatorioAtiv/CE_23-nov-04.htm (accessed 16 February 2010) 
521 Around this same time, another inter-governmental deal of the same kind was being negotiated in the mining 
sector, involving a partnership between Baosteel and Vale for the construction of a Steel plant valued at US$5.5 bn, 
and to be mostly funded by CDB. The project never took off. 
522 Interview, BNDES/International Division, Rio de Janeiro, 23 July 2009. 
523 Petrobras, “Gasene project financing”, 14 December 2006, available online at: 
http://www2.petrobras.com.br/ri/spic/bco_arq/2890_financ_bndes_gasene_ing.pdf (accessed 16 February 2010) 
524 MoU between Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras, China Petrochemical Corporation - Sinopec, the Export-
Import Bank of China - China ExIm Bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social - BNDES, 
Beijing, 6 September 2004 - courtesy of the Brazilian Ministry of foreign Affairs, International Acts Division 
525 Reuters, “Petrobras assina contrato de US$239 mi com Sinopec para Gasene”, 17 April 2006, Available online at: 
http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/2006/04/17/ult29u47290.jhtm (accessed 16 February 2010) 
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Despite the problematic start, construction works went smoothly thereafter with only residual Chinese 
content and having Sinopec sub-contracted several Brazilian construction firms. The first phase of Gasene 
was successfully concluded in February 2008.  
With no signs of progress from EXIM bank in providing the necessary funding, in February 2007 
Petrobras cancelled Sinopec’s contract for the second phase of Gasene (GASCAC, Cacimbas-Catu, 946 
km).526 A new tender was launched and a handful of domestic companies had already been pre-selected 
when, following contacts at the governmental level, China Development Bank was authorised to replace 
EXIM Bank.527 Negotiations for the signing of the second phase EPC contract started in July, and the 
contract was signed on 27 December 2007.528 CDB signed a US$750mn loan with BNDES to fund 
GASCAC (with a total estimated cost of US$2.6bn).529 BNDES passed on the loan to Petrobras, which 
contracted Sinopec to run the project. Construction started officially in May 2008, following the sub-
contracting of domestic companies. The pipeline was successfully completed on schedule, just before Hu 
Jintao’s visit to Brazil in April 2010. 
From the point of view of China’s energy security concerns, Sinopec’s engagement in the Gasene project 
failed to produce meaningful results, as it did not facilitate China’s access to oil equity, nor secure any 
long term oil contracts. Although Sinopec had successfully entered the sector downstream, Sinopec’s 
major target in Brazil is actually upstream, according to Sinopec Brazil’s website regarding the 
company’s target for 2020: “become one of the world five largest companies in the sector of oil and gas 
and consolidate a position in the offshore segment in Brazil.” 530  The onset of the financial crisis, 
however, produced structural changes that would ultimately play in China’s favour. 
5.2.2. Succeeding in the crisis context  
Despite falling short in terms of China’s major oil diplomacy goals, the Gasene project secured a good 
foundation in Brazil, not only for Sinopec, but also for CDB. This certainly played a role when the 
Brazilian oil company approached CDB in late 2008 for another batch of funding, this time to develop the 
‘golden eggs’ – the pre-salt deposits.  
                                                           
526 Sinopec Brasil, “Landmarks of Gasene project” (accessed 15 April 2009), available online at: 
http://www.sinopecbrasil.com.br/pt/ (accessed 16 February 2010) 
527 Interview, BNDES/International Division, Rio de Janeiro, 23 July 2009. 
528 Petrobras, “Petrobras to begin construction of the third Gasene”, 27 December 2007, available online at: 
http://www2.petrobras.com.br/ri/spic/bco_arq/GaseneIng.pdf (accessed 16 February 2010) 
529 Folha Online, “Chineses querem investir mais em projectos do PAC”, 11 July 2008, available online at: 
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530Sinopec Brasil, “Mission and Vision”, available online at: http://www.sinopecbrasil.com.br/en/missao-visao.php 
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According to Petrobras’s 2009-2013 Investment plan,531 the first one to include the new pre-salt deposits, 
the company intends to invest US$28bn in exploration and production (E&P) in the pre-salt.532 Because 
of technical challenges, each well costs in average US$100mn to drill. Petrobras has developed the 
technological skills to undertake this endeavour on its own, but lacks the necessary funding. Nonetheless, 
like Angola, Brazil’s oil assets represent an advantage when it comes to raising funding in the 
international market. One year after the announcement of the pre-salt deposits, Petrobras started searching 
for funding abroad. 2008, however, turned out to be a bad year for this endeavour, due to the global credit 
crunch. In November 2008, on his way back from an unfruitful trip to the US and Japan, Petrobras CEO, 
José Sérgio Gabrielli, did a stopover in Beijing, where he met with the CDB president. Although the 
economic context was very unfavourable (with freefall in oil prices the sustainability of pre-salt 
exploration was hardly profitable), the CDB answer was immediately positive, having set the figure for 
the loan at US$10bn, to be taken as a first batch depending on its performance.533 In the following months 
the details of the contract were negotiated between both parties while the respective governments were 
brought in to give political backup.  
In February 2009, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Brazil, a significant number of bilateral agreements were 
signed relating to the resources sectors, namely a governmental cooperation protocol on energy and 
mining534 and a number of MoUs signed by Petrobras. Among the latter stand out an agreement signed 
with CDB for the extension of a US$10bn loan; one with CNPC to export 40-60,000 bpd of crude oil, and 
another with Sinopec to sell 60-100,000 bpd (2009-2010).535  
The US$10bn loan agreement was formally signed by CDB and Petrobras in May 2009 during President 
Lula’s visit to China. According to Petrobras’s CEO (quoted by Xinhua Agency), the interest rate of the 
loan is below 6.5%, and is to be repaid in cash over ten years. 536 In addition, a MoU was signed with 
Sinopec regarding cooperation in exploration, refining, petrochemicals and the supply of related goods 
and services. The US$10bn loan from CDB is the largest foreign funding ever obtained by Petrobras. The 
                                                           
531 Investment estimated at US$174.4bn, a 55% increase over the previous year plan. 
532 Petrobras, “Petrobras apresenta seu plano de negócios 2009-2013”, 23 January 2009, available online at: 
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533 Interview, Petrobras, Beijing, China, 1 September 2009. 
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19.5480173551/view (accessed 16 February 2010) 
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final loan contract was signed in November 2009537 and the first batch of US$3bn entered Petrobras’s 
account just before the end of that year.538  
The loan agreement also refers to China supplying “equipment and services in the areas of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) facilities, offshore drilling rigs and service ships.” 539 Allegedly, the loan agreement 
states that US$3bn of the remaining US$5bn batch should be earmarked for the procurement of 
machinery and equipment from China.540This, however, might be not as straightforward in practice, given 
that Brazilian legal dispositions require high levels of local content and public tenders to be undertaken. 
According to a Brazilian energy sector analyst, some difficulties regarding the loan already emerged 
during 2010 owing to Chinese content issues.  This state of affairs explains why no official announcement 
has yet been made regarding an extension of a second batch of US$10bn that has been profusely reported 
in the media over the past year, and the negotiation around which has been corroborated by Petrobras.541 
China does, however, have a very good technical capacity in the sector, and is thus likely to grab a 
significant share of the contracts in the end. There is actually a lot of Chinese oil industry equipment 
already being used by Petrobras, namely a new round oilrig engineered by Norway and which was built in 
China. 542 The issue, however, is that Brazil has now a strong interest in developing these industries 
domestically. In line with this, a Sinopec manufacturing plant to produce oil equipment in Brazil is under 
negotiation.543 
As collateral to the US$10bn loan, Petrobras signed a ten year oil supply contract with Sinopec’s trading 
company, UNIPEC, to provide 150,000 bpd in the first year and 200,000 bpd in the following nine years. 
Furthermore, shortly after the loan extension, Petrobras offered Sinopec partnership in two oil blocks.  
The two oil blocks are located off the coast of Northern Brazil, in the Amazonas River mouth (Pará-
Maranhão Basin: BM-PAMA-3 and BM-PAMA-8). Petrobras had gained 100% control over these two 
deep-water blocks (1,000 m) in 2001 and 2004 auctions. Sinopec is expected to participate in the venture 
                                                           
537 Petrobras, “Assinatura do contrato com China Development Bank Corporation”, 4 November 2009, available 
online at: http://www2.petrobras.com.br/ri/spic/bco_arq/Assinaturacontrato_CDBFinalPort.pdf  
538 Nielmar Oliveira - Agência Brasil, “Banco chinês repassará US$ 3 bilhões para Petrobras ainda este ano”, 9 
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539 According to: Interview, Petrobras, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 21 July 2009; Fareed Mohamedi - PFC Global Risk, 
“China: a new model in overseas oil strategy”, 11 September 2009, available online at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2009-09/11/content_18509242_2.htm (accessed 16 February 2010) 
540 Georges Landau, “Brazil-China”, in: Brazil Focus Newsletter, April 2010.  
541 Interview, Petrobras, Beijing, China, 1 September 2009. 
542 Interview, Petrobras, Beijing, China, 1 September 2009. 
543 Interview, Petrobras, Beijing, China, 1 September 2009. 
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with investment and equipment, and the JV is understood by Petrobras to be a trial before venturing 
together into ultra-deep water. 544  The stakes in those blocks, however, were not immediately made 
accessible to Sinopec. It took a year of negotiations between the two companies before final agreement 
was signed during Hu Jintao’s visit to Brazil in April 2010, whereby Sinopec was formally given access 
to 20% stakes in each block.545 The amount China paid for the stakes was not disclosed. The two blocks 
are still in prospection phase and after a few delays, the drilling is scheduled to start in BM-PAMA-3 in 
early 2011 and BM-PAMA-8 later that year. The delays were mostly due to difficulties in obtaining all the 
required environmental permits, since these blocks are located in a very sensitive area (Amazon River 
mouth). Although prospects are good, drilling operations will be costly (estimated US$100 mn for each 
well, same as in the pre-salt) and environmental and logistic challenges are massive (namely, drilling 
depth up to 6,000 m and subsea currents from the Amazon).546  
The year 2010 was auspicious for Chinese interests in the oil Industry in Brazil. In addition to the equity 
acquired as collateral to the CDB loan, Chinese NOCs also accessed important oil acreage in Brazil 
through mergers and acquisitions, benefiting from severe liquidity contraction of other players active in 
the Brazilian oil industry. 
In May 2010, Sinochem farmed in a 40% stake for US$3bn from Statoil’s Peregrino field547 in Campos 
basin (BM-C-7 block), 85 km from Rio de Janeiro. Notably, among the unsuccessful bidders figure 
CNOOC.548 Peregrino, in which Statoil retained a 60% operatorship stake,549 is a shallow-water field 
(100-120 m) estimated to have recoverable reserves of between 300-600  million barrels of heavy crude 
oil.550 It is expected to come on-stream in 2011, and its output to increase up to 100,000 bpd by early 
2012, with a life span of 30 years.551  
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Towards the end of the year, China acquired its most significant stake in Brazil’s oil industry to date - 
opening the door to pre-salt exploration. In October 2010, Sinopec signed an agreement with Repsol YPF 
SA, to buy a 40% share in its Brazil unit for US$7.1bn - the largest energy deal that year and Sinopec’s 
second largest overseas acquisition after Addax in 2009 (US$7.2 bn). Repsol Brazil had originally 
planned to issue a public offering of its shares to raise the capital needed to develop its acreage in 
Brazilian pre-salt. Its recoverable reserves in Brazil were then estimated at 1.2 bn barrels.552 The deal 
gave birth to Repsol Sinopec Brazil in December, creating one of the largest LA energy companies.553 The 
price Sinopec paid for the stake is, apparently, much higher than its real value. Wood Mackenzie had at 
that time valued Repsol’s assets in Brazil at US$1.6 bn.554 The high premium paid can only be explained 
by assumptions of high oil prices in the future, and high expectations about new reserves to be found. The 
high price paid for this asset also signals China’s eagerness to acquire acreage overseas. 
Repsol’s Brazil Unit was the third largest oil producer in Brazil in 2009, and is the second largest holder 
of exploratory rights after Petrobras in Santos, Campos and the Espirito Santo Basins, which cover the 
pre-salt area.555 Repsol has participation in 24 blocks, holding operatorship stakes in 11 of them.556 Most 
of its exploration rights (19) are located in Santos Basin, home to the mega Tupi well discovery in 2007 
(reserves estimated at 5-8 billion barrels). Among its assets figure one producing field, eight discoveries, 
and many exploratory projects and identified areas of potential. 557 The producing field, Albacora Leste - 
located in Campos basin - has estimated reserves of 565 million barrels of heavy crude oil (deep-water). 
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Production started in 2006558 and current output is 180,000 bpd, nearly 10% of Brazil total production.559 
In May 2010, evidence of oil was found under the pre-salt layer of the Albacora field. 560  
Other major finds in Repsol’s acreage took place in Santos Basin. These include Piracuca (BM-S-7), 
where Repsol holds a 37% stake, and with an estimated 550 million boe; 561 and Guara and Carioca (both 
in BM-S-9), where Repsol holds a 25% share. Guara alone is estimated to have recoverable reserves of 
1.1-2 billion barrels of oil, and is expected to start production in early 2013 with an output of 120,000 
bpd,562 which will make it the second largest producing well in that basin after Tupi. Carioca alone was in 
2008 reported to have potential reserves of 33 billion barrels, which would make it the largest find in the 
last 30 years. Petrobras, however, has been very cautious in putting forward a final figure, as it remains 
unclear how much of that reservoir is recoverable. Other relevant discoveries in that basin include Iguacu, 
Vampira and Panoramix.  
Table 5.4. Chinese NOCs oil acreage in Brazil  
Oil Asset Consortium Estimated 
Reserves 
(Barrels) 
Known 
Investment 
Progress 
Stage, Depth 
and Crude 
Grade 
Total 
Production 
(year start) 
Chinese 
NOCs net 
share 
 
SINOCHEM 
 
40% 
Block BM-C-
7: Peregrino 
 
Campos 
Basin  
(May 2010) 
 
 
 Satoil 60% 
(Op.) 
 
 
300-600 
million  
 
 
US$3bn  
 
Development 
phase; 
 
Shallow-water 
(100-120 m); 
 
Heavy crude 
(14-15 API) 
 
100,000 bpd 
(to start early 
2011) 
 
40% 
 
production:  
40,000 bpd 
(2011) 
 
reserves: 120-
240 million 
barrels 
 
SINOPEC  
 
 
Petrobras 
80% (Op.) 
 
Unknown  
 
 
Undisclosed  
 
Exploration 
phase (drilling 
 
- 
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20%  
Block BM-
PAMA-3 
& 
20% 
Block BM-
PAMA-8 
Para-
Maranhao 
(May 2010) 
 
 to start early 
2011); 
 
Ultra-deep 
water 
(up to 5,880 m); 
 
Crude grade 
unknown 
 
 
 
20% 
 
 
 
20% 
 
REPSOL-
SINOPEC 
(October 
2010) 
 
10% 
Albacora 
Leste 
(Campos 
Basin) 
 
 
37% 
BM-S-7 
Piracuca 
(Santos 
Basin)  
 
25% 
BM-S-9 
(Santos 
Basin)  
 
 
 
 
Guara 
 
 
Carioca 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Petrobras 
90% (Op.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Petrobras 
63% (Op.) 
 
 
 
 
Petrobras 
45% (Op.), 
BG Group 
30% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
565 million  
 
 
 
 
 
 
550 million 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1-2 
billion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Yet 
Unknown) 
 
 
US$7.1bn  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production 
phase; 
Deep-water  
(800-2,000 m); 
Heavy crude 
(20 API) 
 
Exploration 
phase; 
Pre-salt 
(5,175 m);  
Medium crude 
 
Development 
(found June 
2008); 
Pre-salt 
(2,141 m);  
Medium crude 
(28 API) 
 
Exploration 
Phase (found 
Sep. 2007); 
Pre-salt 
(2,151 m);  
Medium crude 
(26 API) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180,000 
(2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120,000 
(to start in 
2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4% 
Production: 
7,200 bpd 
Reserves: 
22.6 million 
barrels 
 
14.8% 
Reserves: 
81.4 million 
 
 
 
10% 
Production: 
12,000 bpd 
(2013) 
Reserves: 
110-200 
million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Chinese 
NOCs 
 
- 
 
- 
 
US$10.1bn  
 
- 
 
- 
 
Production: 
2011: 47,200 
bpd 
2013: 59,200 
bpd 
Reserves 
305-515 
million barrels 
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 Sources: Agencia National do Petroleo; Petrobras; Repsol; Statoil; various news reports (Upstream online, 
Offshore, Oil & Gas, Bloomberg). 
As shown in the table 5.4 (above), Chinese NOCs’ oil equity in Brazil only materialised in 2010, the most 
promising of which was through direct acquisition. Of these only one is in production phase (Albacora, 
Sinopec’s net share: 7,200 bpd), with another well scheduled to come online in 2011 (Peregrino, 
Sinochem net share: 40,000 bpd), and a third one expected to start producing in 2013 (Guara, Sinopec: 
12,000 bpd) - according to table 5.4, Chinese NOC total production is expected to reach nearly 60,000 
bpd that year. This summation is, however, an under-estimate as it only shows blocks declared 
commercially viable at the end of 2010.  
More recently, in November 2011 Sinopec signed a USD 5.2 billion deal to acquire 30% stake in the 
Brazil unit of Galp Energia (Portuguese oil company) (Ma 2011). Galp has stakes in 33 blocks in Brazil, 
four of which located in the pre-salt Santos Basin. It’s most valuable asset is a 10% stake in Lula field 
(former Tupi, or BM-S-11), the most promising in the pre-salt, which recoverable reserves are estimated 
at 8.3 billion barrels of oil and gas (Galp Energia 2011). Although at very early stages of production it is 
expected to reach 100,000 bpd by 2012.  
Furthermore, Chinese NOCs are also eying BG (British Gas) and OGX’s (hydrocarbons arm of Brazilian 
billionaire Eike Batista Group, EBX) oil assets in Brazil. With this in mind, and taking into account 
Chinese NOCs’ willingness to participate in the next oil auction (still to be scheduled) there is much 
potential for China’s equity in Brazil oil industry to expand further in coming years.  
The way Sinopec accessed this oil equity in 2010 is, however, raising some eyebrows in Brazil. This is 
mostly explained by the fact that in a very short period of time, Chinese state-owned companies obtained 
significant acreage through favoured access, mergers and acquisitions. This was therefore outside of what 
is regarded as the main legal instrument to enter the sector: through bidding in competitive oil auctions. 
The equity accessed as collateral (in association with Petrobras) has fed into the common perception in 
the oil industry in Brazil, that Chinese NOCs prefer to do business on a government to government level 
and directly with Petrobras, as in their view that increases their chances of being favoured in accessing oil 
equity.563 In the words of a former ANP president: “the Chinese want concessions, they do not enter 
bidding processes.” 564 
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 5.3. Chapter conclusions 
The China-Brazil axis is undoubtedly one of the most prosperous alliances in the southern hemisphere at 
present. This reality, however, took long to accomplish, with bilateral relations having lingered 
throughout three decades. The most striking and successful feature of contemporary relations is bilateral 
trade, with China having become Brazil’s major trading partner in 2009. During the 2000s, China-Brazil 
bilateral trade was characterised by dramatic growth rate and an increasing concentration of China’s 
imports in low aggregated value products. The commodities share in Chinese imports rose sharply over 
this period, being dominated by iron ore, which has had a relevant position in exports chart since the early 
days, and soya, the exports of which picked up in late 1990. The most significant shift in bilateral trade 
over this period, however, was the addition of a third commodity to the Brazil-China exports chart: oil. 
Oil’s share in terms of trade increased exponentially towards the end of the decade. In line with this trend, 
and given Brazil’s rising profile as an oil producer in the wake of the pre-salt discoveries, China’s interest 
in Brazil’s oil industry increased substantially towards the end of the decade.  
Even though the necessary conditions were present from the start (China’s financial might and thirst for 
resources on the one hand and Brazil’s infrastructure needs and abundant resources on the other), China’s 
infrastructure-for-oil formula has struggled to secure long term supply and facilitate the penetration of 
Chinese investment in Brazilian resources sectors. This is even more striking, considering that both 
parties have repeatedly expressed - throughout the decade - strong willingness to expand Chinese 
investments in Brazil’s mining and oil sectors. Although China managed to secure an infrastructure 
contract (Gasene project) for Sinopec through a CDB loan, it failed to meet its own oil diplomacy goals. 
The major benefit for China was the raising of Sinopec’s profile in Brazil, through the successful 
management of this project.  
The case study has shown, however, that Chinese economic incentives performed better in the crisis 
context. The extension of the US$10bn credit line to Petrobras, granted China a long-term oil supply 
contract and stakes in two blocks as collateral. Nonetheless, the collateral equity fell slightly below 
expectations, since these were minority stakes in shallow waters. Furthermore, these blocks are yet to start 
producing and took long to materialise. In sharp contrast, Chinese NOCs venturing on their own managed 
to secure much better assets that same year through farming in deals.  
Against this background, it could be considered that Chinese oil diplomacy failed to meet expected 
outcomes (long term oil supply and access to assets) in the first phase of bilateral relations, and even 
though it performed better in the crisis setting, success with regard to equity access, was still modest. 
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The final chapter will elaborate on the explanation of this state of affairs and on overall findings across 
the two cases studies.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Chinese energy companies launched several successful cooperation projects with 
resources-rich countries in the exploration and operation of energy sources, either 
through joint ventures or acquisition (…). Now we are offering these countries bank 
loans, and that's a new way of cooperation. 565  
Zhang Guobao (Deputy Minister of NDRC and Head of NEA) 
 
The above citation clearly demonstrates the critical role that economic incentives play in pursuing China’s 
energy security goals overseas.  As discussed above this is particularly evident in China’s oil diplomacy 
towards Angola and Brazil over the past decade. 
Infrastructure-for-oil loans surfaced as a default positive economic statecraft instrument, justified by the 
relative inexperience of China’s foreign policy makers in pursuing its energy security goals overseas, an 
endeavour that emerged for the first time at the turn of the century. It was not a carefully devised strategy 
based on detailed knowledge of the contexts it was targeting, but rather was rooted in China’s domestic 
experiences (the oil backed loans for infrastructure it received from Japan in the 1970s; its highly 
centralised domestic institutional structure) and strengths (financial muscle and booming infrastructure 
sector). The approach also works as a risk management tactic in unknown markets, and in a way to 
insulate its NOCs from direct competition with IOCs which have a significant technological competitive 
advantage - particularly regarding ultra-deep water exploration. This state of affairs largely explains why 
Beijing attempted to deploy the same template in both Angola and Brazil, in the initial stages of its 
ventures overseas.  
Based on the findings of the two case studies, the candidate distinguishes two different phases in the 
deployment of this particular economic inducement in Africa and South America. The marker that divides 
the two periods is a structural change that occurred at the international system level, and which affected 
                                                           
565 China Global Think Tank Summit, which took place in Beijing in an early July gathering of world energy 
leaders. Shangyu Foreign Trade and economic Cooperation Bureau, “Energy cooperation urged at think tank”, 
available online at: http://sywjmj.gov.cn/zsj/etzzx/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=2834 (accessed 15 January 2011). 
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all players - ultimately reflecting in their relations. This structural shift was the onset of the global 
financial crisis in late 2008, which profoundly impacted international oil markets, affecting behaviour in 
both demand and offer sides. This assessment is justified by the current research, which has shown that 
significant changes to the original template occurred over the crisis period in South America. For this 
reason, the validity of the hypothesis prior to the crisis is assessed first, followed by an analysis of the 
most relevant adjustments that were inflicted by the global financial crisis. 
6.1. Assessing the hypothesis prior to the crisis 
The analysis of the thread of events throughout this period, has clearly demonstrated the causal link 
between fundamental institutional differences in both regions, and the outcome variation of Chinese 
energy security goals, as proposed in the hypothesis. 
The analysis of Angola and Brazil’s institutional structures (chapters 3 and 4) has verified fundamental 
differences between them, largely rooted on their respective historical backgrounds. While in Angola the 
patrimonial state managed to consolidate through liberalisation, in Brazil the centralised rule installed by 
the developmental state was shattered by the liberalisation process. Despite the emergence of an 
institutional structure strongly suggestive of legality and democratic practice in Brazil’s oil industry, the 
changing balance between liberal and leftist forces, combined with weak institutional capacity and strong 
executive constraints, makes the structure somewhat unstable and more difficult to navigate. In Angola, 
on the other hand, despite the feeble institutional capacity of the structure, the combination of the 
Presidency’s absolute control over the state apparatus and resources, with insubstantial executive 
constrains, produced a highly centralised and clear-cut institutional structure in the oil industry. 
Owing to its highly centralized nature, the institutional and regulating structure of the oil sector in Angola 
has remained mostly unchanged and stable for over three decades. Concurrently assuming the role of 
virtual regulator and concessionaire, Sonangol was from the beginning placed at the core of the oil 
industry of Angola, at the expense of the Ministry of Petroleum. The linear and uncontested authority 
chain rooted in the Presidency-Sonangol nexus, ensures the executive easy control over developments in 
the sector.  
In sharp contrast, the oil industry in Brazil presents a much more fragmented institutional structure. It 
encompasses several layers of authority, namely the Presidency, the Congress and the Senate, the energy 
advisory body (CNPE), the responsible ministry (MME), the regulating agent (ANP), the Union states 
and the public company (Petrobras). Moreover, the regulatory framework is also much more complex in 
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Brazil, owing to an intricate and sometimes conflicting set of regulations - the Oil Law, and 
environmental and labour rules.  
The critical impact of the underlying institutional structure upon the original infrastructure for oil 
template, is proven in the first instance by the sharp contrast in negotiation processes regarding the first 
credit lines extended to Angola (EXIM Bank, US$2bn for various infrastructure projects) and Brazil 
(EXIM Bank, initial US$239mn for an gas pipeline) in 2004. The detailed analysis of both case studies 
has shown that, while there was a swift negotiation progression and almost immediate disbursement of 
funds in Angola, in Brazil the process was contentious and lengthy, taking three years to settle. This was 
largely due to EXIM Bank’s demands regarding Chinese content, which collided with Brazilian labour 
regulations and industrial policy. This was never an issue in Angola, where the agreement was readily 
settled on 70% Chinese content (services, equipment and labour).  
The case studies also demonstrated diverging outcome patterns regarding China’s oil security goals. 
While in Angola Sonangol assumed the role of loan guarantor enabling China to secure long-term supply 
through repayment in kind; in Brazil the Union assumed the role of guarantor and the deal produced no 
long-term supply contracts, either as collateral or as reimbursement.  
The study of the Brazil and Angola cases also revealed that in both instances Beijing pushed for a close 
association of Sinopec with the local NOCs on the fringes of the loan, ultimately envisaging the 
achievement of favoured access to oil acreage. In line with this, Sinopec signed cooperation agreements 
with both Sonangol and Petrobras within the broad loan negotiations framework, which confirms that 
Beijing approached the two countries in a similar way. However, only in the Angolan case was an actual 
close association between the two NOCs enacted in the form of a JV (Sonagol Sinopec International), and 
immediate access to oil assets was produced (50% of block 18) shortly after the loan signature. In sharp 
contrast, in the Brazilian case, the partnership between Petrobras and Sinopec remained only on paper, 
and no oil assets were produced for Sinopec. 
The analysis of the Brazilian case clearly points to the underperformance of infrastructure-for-oil strategy 
in Brazil. Firstly the deal (Gasene project) materialised in very different terms of what was originally 
conceptualised by China. In order to secure the gas pipeline construction contract for Sinopec, Beijing 
was forced to sacrifice the fundamentals of its infrastructure funding model (namely regarding Chinese 
content), to accommodate the complexities of local institutional constraints. Secondly, the deal did not 
produce long-term supply contracts or any oil equity as collateral. This state of affairs exposes the 
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unsuitability of this specific instrument of Beijing’s positive economic statecraft towards Brazil’s 
decentralized and more regulated institutional framework. 
In contrast, the analysis of the Angolan case study, has clearly shown how the perfect match between 
China’s infrastructure-for-oil formula and the Angolan centralised institutional structure concurred to 
produce a successful outcome with regard to China’s energy security goals. The close elite ties built up 
through the inter-governmental platform of the loans extension (and also through the personal 
connections established by Sinopec through the Hong Kong clique), were undoubtedly a critical element 
in ensuring success in such a highly centralised environment. Another issue ensuring success was the 
Angolan executive’s strong grip over Sonangol (fully state owned), and hence its larger latitude to 
manipulate developments in the oil industry.  
Unlike in Angola, the high level contacts between the two governments were not sufficient to secure the 
expected results in Brazil. This is explained by the fact that Brasilia’s influence over the oil industry is 
curtailed by the semi-private nature of Petrobras, and the checks and balances that have been put in place 
during liberalisation of the sector. Even though Brazil’s federal government has a controlling stake in 
Petrobras, it does not have full ownership of the NOC. The fact that Petrobras is also accountable to its 
private shareholders means that it is less susceptible to political influence in its decision making. In 
addition to this, in spite of Petrobras’s virtual monopoly over the local oil industry, the sector is managed 
by a separate regulatory body responsible for oil auctions, contracting and overseeing developments in the 
industry. This state of affairs thus limits the possibilities for Chinese interests to penetrate the sector by 
special favour. 
Against this backdrop, it could be concluded that the hypothesis is fully verified. Due to its elite-based 
approach and specificities (i.e. Chinese content) the extension of infrastructure-for-oil loans works best 
(regarding energy security goals) in institutional contexts where there is a high degree of control of the 
executive over the oil sector (i.e. Angola), and conversely it performs poorly in more liberalised contexts 
(i.e. Brazil).  
In the broader regional frame, the above suggests that although Beijing had correctly identified similar 
key prerequisites in Africa and South America for the deployment of infrastructure-for-oil loans, namely 
the need to upgrade much depleted infrastructure and generous resources endowment, it failed to take into 
account structural differences in the social, economic and political environments, which ultimately 
dictated different degrees of success. The much more liberalised institutional structure and sophisticated 
regulatory framework that is commonly found in South America, which contrasts sharply with what it 
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encountered in Africa (more similar to China’s own domestic structure), largely explains the lower 
performance of this formula in South America.  
6.2. Adjusting infrastructure-for-oil deals in the context of the financial crisis  
The research conducted uncovered that significant changes have emerged in 2009-2010 regarding China’s 
oil diplomacy in Brazil. These changes have largely been a result of new synergies that emerged in the 
context of the global financial crisis. First and foremost, China’s position as a global lender improved 
dramatically in tandem with the credit crunch in the international financial markets, particularly so in 
developing regions where many governments were facing low credit ratings in a context where 
infrastructure and resources development had become a critical element to sustain the economic growth 
cycle. Secondly, Chinese companies were the only ones with abundant financial resources in a period 
where many resources assets were placed on the market by western NOCs in financial difficulty. This 
state of affairs opened a window of opportunity for Chinese NOCs to expand their resources asset 
portfolios in both regions.  
In Brazil, Petrobras greatly needed funds to develop newly found pre-salt reservoirs, and the economic 
crisis context finally placed China in a position where it would be favourably considered. After many 
years of unsuccessful attempts to access oil acreage through the infrastructure-for-oil formula, 
developments in Brazil during 2009 and 2010 showed that Beijing’s economic incentives have finally 
adjusted to local institutional constraints.  
The revised formula is, however, largely rooted on the original template and devised to pursue the same 
oil security goals. Although the US$10bn loan extended by CDB to Petrobras in 2009 is not to be repaid 
in oil, it has an oil supply contract attached (signed between Petrobras and Sinopec) covering the duration 
of the loan repayment; and secondly, Petrobras offered Sinopec partnership in E&P activities in two deep-
water blocks as collateral to the deal. The similarities in the approach are justified by the fact that at this 
particular point Beijing still perceived the close partnership with Petrobras as its best chance to enter the 
promising pre-salt reservoirs. This perception was further strengthened by the suspension of annual oil 
auctions in 2008, and that Petrobras’s grasp over the pre-salt was expected to be reinforced by the new 
regulatory framework being drafted.  
On the other hand, there are a number of changes in the above-mentioned deal that reveal some degree of 
adjustment to the specificities of the local institutional structure. Firstly, the loan was directly negotiated 
and extended to the NOC and not to the Brazilian executive, and although lower than commercial rates, 
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the interest rate was higher than Chinese concessional loans. Secondly, the deal was not aimed at 
infrastructure but rather to finance development of the pre-salt reservoirs. Thirdly, the loan is not to be 
repaid in oil shipments. Lastly, building on the experience with the Gasene credit line, the Chinese 
content was reduced to a minority parcel, in order to cope with the local content restrictions imposed by 
the Brazilian regulations. The above developments show, therefore, that China had at last realised the 
unsuitability of some features of its positive economic statecraft in the institutional framework in Brazil.  
The acreage collateral to the Petrobas loan, however, took a long time to materialise. Sinopec underwent a 
long negotiating process with Petrobras (May 2009 to April 2010) regarding the acquisition of 20% stakes 
in two oil blocks. In addition, the blocks are still in the development stage and out of the much more 
promising pre-salt belt. This state of affairs shows that although China achieved better results after 
adjusting its strategy to fit the institutional framework in Brazil, the outcome was still much less 
successful than in Angola. 
This strategy has thus proven to have short-term prospects of securing meaningful oil equity in Brazil, 
especially in the pre-salt. Indeed, and even though Brazil has a real interest in expanding its oil exports to 
China and in fostering Sino-Brazilian JV in the sector (particularly in downstream, midstream and to 
produce oil equipment in Brazil), its interest in forging partnerships with Chinese NOCs for E&P in the 
pre-salt is in reality, limited. This is mostly because, first, the companies are seen as pursuing Chinese 
state interests; and secondly, that Chinese NOCs lack the necessary technological skills and expertise to 
qualify as critical partners in the initial development phases of the pre-salt. In this setting, Petrobras is 
more likely to privilege partnerships with oil IOCs over Chinese NOCs, which might only get supply and 
service contracts and some marginal equity in exchange for funding.  
Even if China has found that its funding provided a bargaining instrument to enter the Brazilian oil 
market, the future leverage of this instrument will depend on how badly Petrobras needs Chinese funds. 
With its swelling oil reserves and production, Petrobras will likely have no difficulty in raising funding 
domestically and in international financial markets. This was recently proven by the US$70bn issue of 
new shares in 2010. 
In this setting, and having no prospects of developing the necessary top-end drilling technology in the 
short run, the best option for Chinese NOCs is thus to participate in coming bidding rounds or to buy 
equity from other players divesting in the sector. And looking at recent developments, they seem to be 
finally reaching that conclusion. 
206 
 
In 2010 the international economic crisis context opened a window of opportunity for Chinese companies 
to grab oil equity in Brazil outside intergovernmental agreements. With most IOCs facing serious 
liquidity shortages in a setting where large investments needed to be made to develop pre-salt acreage, 
many assets were placed in the market in 2010. It was in this framework that Sinopec accessed its first 
acreage in the much sought after pre-salt reservoirs. This happened through a merger with Repsol Brazil, 
without any inter-governmental supporting platform or any special favour from the local NOC. 
Similar developments surfaced in other South American countries. The signing of a number of 
infrastructure loans in 2009 and 2010 (Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina) alongside direct acquisitions and 
mergers, suggests though that the revised infrastructure-for-oil formula remains a resourceful instrument 
for China in pursuing its oil security interests in South America. According to available information on 
these new infrastructure loans, and although Chinese engineers are to oversee operations, the labour is 
largely local and so is the bulk of local content (contractors and equipment). In the same way, South 
American governments tend to retain the majority stake in resources joint ventures with Chinese State 
companies, a trend mostly explained by the nationalistic nature of a significant number of regimes in the 
region. Like in Brazil, and Venezuela excepted, none of these loans are to be repaid in oil, although some 
of them entail supply contracts as collateral covering the repayment period (Brazil and Ecuador). 
Interestingly, unlike in Africa, this type of Chinese positive economic statecraft seems to be privileging 
oil-producing countries in South America, having left out until now major mining producers such as Chile 
and Peru. In addition, the swift acquisitions in 2010 suggest that the acquisition of oil equity in the region 
is becoming more rooted in market rules, and less so in inter-governmental platforms. 
The impact of the financial crisis produced a very different set of nuances in Angola. As discussed in the 
Angola case study, following the souring of relations with Sonangol in the sequence of the Sonaref 
episode in 2007, Sinopec attempted to expand its oil portfolio in Angola by venturing on its own when the 
economic crisis began. However, the direct acquisition strategy that proved so fruitful in Brazil, failed to 
produce results in Angola, as Sonangol blocked its bids to acquire new oil assets in that country. In this 
context, and with no licensing round expected in the near future, recent developments indicate that 
Beijing has returned to its original model (based on solid inter-governmental relations and a strong 
partnership with the local NOC). This is demonstrated by the extension of new infrastructure-for-oil credit 
lines (US$10bn) in 2009, and Sinopec’s attempt (March 2010) to revitalise its partnership with Sonangol 
through the cosmetic change in ownership of its 55% stake in the JV (SSI).  
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Unlike in Brazil, the crisis context in Angola forced Beijing to return to its original approach. Recent 
developments, as discussed in the Angola case study, suggest that in face of this shift, Luanda is making a 
new overture to accommodate Chinese energy security interests. This demonstrates that this particular 
instrument of China’s positive economic statecraft is as well fitted now as it was in 2004, for the 
centralised institutional framework that characterises the Angolan oil industry.  
In both Angola and Brazil cases, the changes introduced were ultimately adjustments to the surrounding 
institutional structure, which further confirms the hypothesis put forward at the beginning of the thesis. 
However, it is important to stress that in spite of the adjustments of the means, China’s energy security 
goals remain the same – to secure long-term supply and favoured access to oil equity. In theoretical terms, 
this means that what is ultimately at stake here is in fact the lesser form of learning that occurs at the 
tactical level, dubbed adaptation.  
6.3. Emerging trends, challenges and future prospects  
As demonstrated above, the adjustments that took place in China’s economic statecraft allowed Beijing to 
pursue its oil security goals more efficiently in South America. As China learns with practice, and adjusts 
its strategies to fit different institutional structures, its economic statecraft is bound to assume distinct 
characteristics in each region.  
Since corporate strategies have proved to work better in the more liberalised South American context, 
direct acquisition and mergers are becoming the norm for China in accessing oil equity in this region. 
Notwithstanding this, the provision of soft loans remains a resourceful tool here, particularly to secure 
long-term oil supply contracts - a goal that remains paramount in Chinese energy security since most of 
its NOCs’ acreage overseas is yet to start producing. Moreover, the recent negotiation spree in terms of 
loans for infrastructure (Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia - all oil producing countries) signals China’s 
eagerness to pursue this positive economic statecraft formula in the region. However, as discussed above, 
Chinese soft loans in the region (either for infrastructure or resources development) are assuming a few 
distinguishing features, namely a reduced share of Chinese content and, with the exception of Venezuela, 
the loans are not to be repaid in kind. 
Conversely, China’s access to oil acreage in Africa is likely to remain very reliant on the provision of 
preferential credit for infrastructure to resource-rich countries, and not many changes are expected 
regarding its major defining features. Even though Chinese NOCs are also becoming more aggressive in 
African oil markets, the farming in strategy has met with mixed results (i.e. successful acquisition of 
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Addax in 2009; blocked bids for stakes in Angola and Libya in 2009; and no relevant oil assets through 
direct acquisition in Africa in 2010).  
Against this background, the extension of preferential credit lines is expected to remain as a major 
Chinese positive economic statecraft tool for pursuing its energy goals in both regions. The major 
difference is that Chinese loans to South America will tend to emphasise securing long-term supply (as 
collateral contracts rather than repayment in kind) over access to acreage, while in Africa these types of 
loans will still serve both goals. 
Even though the gradual consolidation of market-orientated strategies in accessing oil acreage is to be 
expected in both regions, Chinese economic statecraft still actually plays a significant role in this regard. 
China’s ‘policy banks’ are likely to remain a key vector in pursuing the central government’s broad 
resources security strategy, not only by providing this type of loan, but also by funding NOCs’ overseas 
expansion strategies. This backup will be particularly important in the post-crisis setting, as Chinese 
companies will most likely have to pay then a significant premium for assets. This will be in order to 
offset its technology gap vis à vis western competitors, a trend that was already emerging before the onset 
of the crisis.  
Despite the initial success of the new approach in South America, there are many challenges ahead for 
Chinese NOCs. Among these stand out the lack of expertise and of top technology, particularly regarding 
ultra-deep water exploration. Although the deep pockets of Chinese NOCs may offset this factor to some 
extent, it will not be sufficient to grant them operatorship stakes, nor access to the most profitable fields. 
Another major challenge is NOCs scarce experience in managing complex cross-border mergers and 
navigating heavily regulated markets. This is a particularly daunting challenge in countries with 
overlapping jurisdictions and complex regulations, such as Brazil. Even though this annoyance is to some 
extent avoided through farming in agreements, Chinese NOCs will eventually have to tackle the issue 
when they start bidding in the coming oil auctions.  
The parastatal status of Chinese NOCs also raises concerns among some target countries, limiting in some 
cases their expansion prospects. A sovereign state company buying into another state’s resources, does not 
sit well with most recipient countries. Although this type of resistance has been until now more common 
in the West (CNOOC-Unocal in the US in 2005; Chinalco-Rio Tinto in Australia in 2009), some concern 
in this regard is already surfacing in Brazil following swift acquisitions by Chinese NOCs in Brazil in late 
2010. Finally, the regulatory instability of the resources sectors of some countries in both regions (e.g. 
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Venezuela and Nigeria) also raises serious challenges to this particular instrument of Chinese economic 
statecraft.  
Notwithstanding all these issues, prospects are now much better than before the crisis. Chinese interests in 
South American resources markets are bound to expand further in the near future, and are therefore 
expected to close the gap with Africa in coming years.  
6.4. Wider implications 
In addition to the above conclusions relating to the aim of this study, the research has demonstrated that - 
contrary to the belief that economic statecraft is a less efficient foreign policy instrument - in China’s case 
this tool has been quite effective in pursuing its oil security interests in developing regions. This justifies 
the need for more research on other forms of economic inducements used by China (e.g. namely the ones 
under the category of Chinese foreign aid), and their efficacy regarding the economic and political goals 
they pursue. A more comprehensive analysis will also help elucidate the efficacy of China’s positive 
economic statecraft in building up long-term alliances (Mastanduno’s structural linkage), and how this 
feeds into the expansion of its soft power, and ultimately its peaceful rise at the world stage.  
This study has also shown that despite China’s inexperience as a global economic player, its strategies are 
extremely resilient, being constantly refined through practice, and as a result they are becoming much 
more efficient. Furthermore, the research has demonstrated that experiences on the ground are providing 
an important feedback in this regard. This state of affairs clearly illustrates that in regard to China’s oil 
diplomacy, important learning takes place at the implementation level, justifying therefore the urge to 
further unpack the dynamics and synergies at place in this particular phase. It should be noted, however, 
that even though China’s infrastructure-for-oil formula experienced significant changes, these were, 
ultimately, mere tactical adjustments since the goals and normative underpinnings remained mostly 
unchanged, a finding that ultimately feeds into ‘China’s socialisation’ debate.  
Another conclusion particularly relevant for Chinese foreign policy studies, is that the changes verified in 
this particular case only surfaced when a structural shift occurred (the global economic crisis). This 
suggests that despite Beijing’s agency in putting forward these economic inducements, the refining of the 
oil diplomacy strategy thereafter, has been to a large extent pushed by structural constraints and the pro-
activeness of its agents (NOCs) on the ground.  
The analysis has also exposed the high degree of pragmatism behind this particular instrument of Chinese 
positive economic statecraft, which knits together oil security, south-south cooperation, and ‘go out 
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policy’ goals. In this regard, this thesis has also something to say about how critical Beijing’s political and 
financial backing has been in the globalisation of its SOEs, unveiling the emulation of the formula that 
was successfully developed by Japan and South Korea in the twentieth century. 
This thesis has revealed that Chinese oil diplomacy is becoming increasingly resourceful and assertive in 
the two regions under analysis, and that positive economic statecraft will continue playing a key role in 
this regard. The deployment of the same type of economic inducements by China in other regions during 
the crisis period, namely in Russia and Kazakhstan, allows for further comparisons which would be 
extremely useful for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics and efficacy of this particular 
policy instrument, in pursuing Beijing’s energy security goals.  
All considered, in spite of China’s increasingly efficient undertakings to expand its oil acreage in Africa 
and South America, it is still far from achieving the ultimate goal of minimising dependence on market 
fluctuations, since production from its equity is still largely insignificant when compared to its major 
competitors that have been active in these regions for decades. As China’s interests spread out on the 
global stage, the geographical scope of its economic statecraft is likely to expand further and to become 
more versatile. Its efficacy regarding oil security goals will, however, depend increasingly on Beijing’s 
awareness of the target countries’ institutional frameworks and expectations, on favourable structural 
conditions, and in more liberalized markets, increasingly on the competitiveness of its own NOCs. 
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APPENDIX 1:  OVERVIEW OF THE ANGOLAN OIL INDUSTRY 
 
Angola is Africa’s third largest oil producer behind Nigeria and Algeria. It sits on the third 
largest proven crude reserves in the continent. At the end of 2009 Angola accounted for 19% of 
African oil output and held the equivalent to 11% of its known reserves. 1 
 
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 
As shown in the charts above Angola’s position in the African oil industry has expanded 
remarkably over the past ten years, having production and reserves more than duplicated. In the 
process, it overtook Algeria in terms of proven oil reserves as well as Libya regarding oil output. 
Moreover, it is closing fast the oil production gap with Algeria and even Nigeria, with whom it 
has been disputing the position of largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2008.  
                                                           
1 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, June 2010, available online at: 
http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622 (accessed 17 August 2010) 
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Source: World Bank Office in Luanda, Angola Macro Brief, April/May 2010 
In spite having a larger output capacity and reserves, Nigeria has seen its production fall in 
recent years mostly due to the instability in the Niger Delta.  
In contrast, Angolan oil industry expansion has been favoured by the peaceful setting since 2002, 
the stable political environment and its solid record in terms of contract stability.  In this 
auspicious context, FDI into the Angolan oil sector has expanded in recent years, having gone up 
from US$2bn in 1999 to US$16.5bn in 20092 and is expected to reach US$18bn in 2011.3 
Around 83% of 2009 FDI was directed to E&P activities in the upstream sector. This sharp rise 
in investment explains to a large extent the expansion of Angola’s oil output and reserves over 
the past decade, which have projected Angola from a medium oil producer in the 1990s to one of 
the most promising oil producing states at present.  
In a political move to ascertain its ascending relevance in the world oil industry, Angola joined 
OPEC in January 2007. This, however, has proved to be a costly move. In 2009 Angola was 
forced to downsize production from its 2 million bpd potential to 1.560m bpd in order to respect 
its quota, as part of OPEC’s efforts to stop the fall in oil prices. Notwithstanding, figures indicate 
                                                           
2 Ministério dos Petróleos, Relatório de Actividades do Sector Petrolífero 2009, Luanda: Gabinete de Estudos e 
Estatística – MINPET, July 2010 
3 Africa 21, ‘Ministro Angolano dos Petróleos anuncia no Brasil licitações para novas concessões’, 27 October 2009, 
available at: http://www.minpet.gov.ao/NoticiaD.aspx?Codigo=8745 (accessed 17 August 2010) 
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that Angola has exceeded its OPEC quota by around 20% (1.75 million bpd), following the 
footsteps of other fellow OPEC members like Venezuela and Iran.4  
According to Business Monitoring international Oil and Gas forecast (first quarter 2011)5 Angola 
boosts the greatest oil output growth potential in Africa. This is mostly due to its sizable oil 
reservoirs, the large number of IOCs present in the industry and decent licensing terms. Its oil 
production is forecasted to grow from estimated 1.81 million bpd in 2010 to 2.38 million bpd in 
2015. It is expected to reach peak production in the following year (2.45 million bpd) and 
gradually fall down to 2 million bpd by 2020.  
  Major characteristics and developments in the Angolan oil industry 
Angola’s oil exploration is organised in three depth bands that cut across four sedimentary basins: 
Congo (Cabinda and Lower Congo), Kwanza, Benguela and Namibe. Band A, onshore and 
shallow waters (up to 200m deep) include blocks 0 to 13; band B, in deep-waters (200m-1,500m) 
encompasses blocks 14 to 30; and band C in ultra-deep waters (over 1,500m) which integrates 
blocks 31-45.  
At the time of independence exploration was concentrated in the Cabinda enclave and onshore 
the Kwanza Basin, with five operating areas and three operators.6 Production remained at around 
150,000 bpd until 1984 when it passed the 200,000 bpd barrier, steadily rising to 475,000 bpd in 
1990.7 Presently there are 35 blocks in operation, of which eleven are in production (three in 
Cabinda onshore and offshore; and the remaining in the Lower Congo Basin shallow and deep 
waters). 
Although oil exploration in Angola started onshore and in shallow waters around Cabinda (block 
0 - Chevron), the bulk of Angolan oil activity is presently concentrated in deepwater blocks in 
the Lower Congo Basin. Benguela and Namibe (South coast) basins remains much under-
explored having yielded no significant commercial discoveries 
                                                           
4 EIU, Angola Country Report, September 2009, p. 13 
5 Business Monitor International, ‘Angola Oil and Gas Report Q1 2011 – Executive summary, January 2011, 
available online at: http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?r=1501380  (accessed 21 January 2011) 
6 Duncan Clarke, ‘Petroleum prospects and political power’, in: Angola’s War Economy, ed. by Jakkie Cilliers and 
Christian Dietrich,  Pretoria:  the Institute for Security Studies, 2000, p. 198 
7 Data according to BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2009  
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This state of affairs was prompted by the advancement of deepwater technology from the mid 
1980s onwards. The high-potential of deep water deposits in the lower Congo Basin started 
attracting increasing interest in the late 1980s. When Sonangol open an oil auction for 17 
deepwater blocks in 1993, the oil majors flocked to the country to secure the most promising 
blocks. Among these figure block 14 (Chevron), 15 (ExxonMobil), 17 (Total) and 18 (BP) which 
have combined estimated reserves of 10 billion barrels.8 The high successful exploration rate of 
these blocks throughout the 1990s generated fierce competition when ultra-deepwater blocks 31 
to 34 were auctioned in 1999, which resulted in record high signature bonuses (combined sum of 
US$935mn).9 Although the exploration success rate has been smaller than the previous ones, 
these blocks (still under exploration) have estimated reserves of nearly three billion barrels. 10  
Through these two oil auctions western major IOCs - Chevron, Texaco (which later merged), 
Total, ExxonMobil, Shell, BP and AGIP secured important stakes in the country’s booming oil 
industry. Through its Cabinda assets Chevron dominated the oil production scene throughout the 
1990s. Nonetheless, other major players that possess the funds, technology and the expertise to 
explore deep (200m to 1500m) and ultra deep (over 1500m) offshore wells, have seen their share 
in production increase substantially in the 2000s.  
Some NOCs, like Pedco (Korea), Petrogal (Portugal), Petrobras (Brazil), Petronas (Malaysia), 
Norsk Hydro (Norway) also entered Angola’s oil industry in the late 1990s. Most of them focus, 
however, in shallow waters (less than 200m), onshore blocks and smaller stakes in deepwater 
blocks operated by the majors.   
The licensing round that followed (2005-2006) auctioned expired segments of the 1993 bid, 
namely attached to blocks 15, 17 and 18 - dubbed the golden blocks. Attesting the increasing 
value of Angola’s Lower Congo Basin, three blocks alone (15/06, 17/06 and 18/06), attracted a 
record sum of over US$3bn in signature bonuses.  
                                                           
8 Christopher Brown – Wood Mackenzie, ‘A Golden decade for Angola’s deepwater’, Penn Energy, available online 
at: http://www.pennenergy.com/index/petroleum/display/5955590589/articles/offshore/volume-69/issue-12/west-
africa/a-golden_decade_for.html (accessed 17 August 2010) 
9 Tony Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2004 (2nd ed.), p. 145 
10 Christopher Brown – Wood Mackenzie, op. cit 
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The attractiveness of the Angolan oil industry is further enhanced by the very high exploration 
success rate (60% of exploration wells in 2008 struck oil,11 twice the world’s average for ultra-
deep waters) and the good quality of Angolan oil (medium to light crude, with low sulphur 
grades). The success of Angolan deepwater offshore has brought cutting edge deepwater 
technology into the country, namely floating production, storage and offloading units (FPSO) 
and subsea sectors. 
Until the early 2000s Chevron’s operated blocks 0 and 14 off Cabinda’s coast accounted for the 
bulk of Angolan oil production. Although Cabinda still accounts for a significant part of national 
production (15%) its output has stabilised in recent years. According to Ministry of Petroleum 
data the major producing block is currently block 15, with an output of 227 million barrels in 
2009 (600,000 bpd; 35% of total). Combined, the three deepwater blocks (15, 17 and 18) in 
Congo Basin accounted for nearly 70% of Angola’s total oil production in 2009. All of them are 
operated by western oil majors. The new shining stars are deepwater blocks 15 and 17, with most 
oil originating from Kizomba (15) and Girassol (17) oilfields that came on stream in 2005 and 
2006 respectively. Block 17 is operated by Total (40% stake) and the consortium include Esso 
(20%), BP (17%) and Norsk Hydro (10%). Block 15 is developed by a consortium led by 
ExxonMobil through its subsidiary ESSO Angola (40% stake), BP (27%), ENI (20%) and Statoil 
(13%). 12 
Even though a considerable part of Angolan oil production is accounted for by western 
companies Sonangol’s share has increased significantly since the early 1990 when it assumed its 
first operatorship. As of 2009 Sonangol accounted for 38% of Angolan oil production. 13 In 
recent years Asian countries have been absorbing an increasing share of Angolan oil exports. In 
terms of volume, 51% of Angolan oil exports went to Asia in 2009, with China accounting for 
the bulk of it (39%). The second regional destination of Angolan oil in 2009 was North America 
                                                           
11 Ministério dos Petróleos, Relatório de Actividades do Sector Petrolífero 2008, Luanda: Gabinete de Estudos e 
Estatística – MINPET, July 2009 
12 All figures in this paragraph according to: Ministério dos Petróleos, Relatório de actividades do Sector petrolífero 
2009, July 2010, p. 15 
13 Ministério dos Petróleos, Relatório de actividades do Sector petrolífero 2009, July 2010, p. 15 
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with 26% (US accounting for 20%). The rest of Angolan oil is headed to Europe (16%), Africa 
(4%) and South America (2%).14 
In line with its diversification strategy, Luanda, has been seeking to branch out its oil partnership 
portfolio in recent years. Part of this strategy were two licensing rounds (2005/2006 and in 
2007/2008) that offered small and marginal fields as well as onshore exploration. One of the 
aims was to attract new comers such as Indian, Chinese and Japanese companies that lack the 
deep sea exploration technology. The licenses were successful having attracted big and small 
contenders from all over the world. Angola’s oil future, however, lies in ultra-deep waters.  
The 2007 licensing bid included onshore (Cabinda Central, adjacent to block 0 in Cabinda; 
Kwanza blocks 11 and 12), shallow water (block 9, offshore Benguela Basin), deep water (19, 20 
and 21, located in the Kwanza basin) and ultra-deep water blocks (46, 47, 48, to the west of 
Congo Basin). The pre-selection was completed in early 2008, having 43 candidates pre-
qualified for operator and 38 for non-operating shares. The auction, however, was suspended in 
2008, initially due to the upcoming legislative elections (as it could raise legitimacy issues) and 
afterwards due to the sharp drop in oil prices in late 2008.  
In the wake of the massive oil reservoirs found off the coast of Brazil in 2007, interest started to 
grow in a new oil exploration frontier in Angola: the pre-salt. Available data points to a close 
match between the continental shelves of Brazil and West Africa (Namibia, Angola, Congo and 
Gabon). Geological similarities predict huge hydrocarbon reserves of light oil in the pre-salt 
layer, which seem to be particularly auspicious in the Angolan sequence. Unlike in Brazil, 
though, the pre-salt layer in Angola is expected to encompass offshore and onshore fields 
(4,000m deep) alike, 15 around the Kwanza Basin and probably extend to the south (Benguela 
and Namibe Basins). The scarcity of available geological data to the south of Lower Congo 
                                                           
14 Ministério dos Petróleos, Relatório de actividades do Sector petrolífero 2009, July 2010, pp. 29-30 
15 Peter Howard Wertheim, ‘ Geological similarities with Brazil pre-salt attract investments to Africa’, Offshore 
Magazine, 10 July 2010, available online at: http://www.offshore-mag.com/index/article-
display.articles.offshore.volume-70.Issue_7.latin-
america.Geological_similarities_with_Brazils_pre_salt_attract_investments_to_Africa.QP129867.dcmp=rss.page=1.
html (accessed 17 August 2010) 
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Basin makes this a high risk endeavour,16 with chances of success at around 30% at this stage.17 
However, if major discoveries like in Brazil are made, Angola’s hydrocarbons reserves and 
output could well double.  
This has led to increasing pressure over Sonangol to release the pre-salt.18 Given the challenges 
involved (extremely high financial costs and technological capacity), in 2010 Sonangol 
shortlisted 13 companies with proven expertise to bid for 11 new ultra-deepwater blocks 
(Kwanza and Benguela basins) for pre-salt exploration. The list of successful bidders was 
released in January 2011. The operators include BP, Total, ENI, Statoil (first operatorship in 
Angola), Repsol, Conoco-Philips and Cobalt International Energy. Other equity partners are 
Exxon, China-Sonangol and Sonangol E&P, which has participation in all blocks. Among 
companies invited that did not acquire any equity stand out Chevron, Maersk Oil and Petrobras. 
Signature bonuses and PSA contracts negotiations are expected to be concluded by mid 201119 
and exploration is likely to start in the last quarter of the year.20 
With the opening of this new frontier, it is highly unlikely that the frozen 2007/2008 oil auction 
will be reopening any time soon. A significant number of the pre-qualified companies will now 
be fully engaged in the pre-salt, seriously compromising their financial and technical capacity to 
bid for and develop other new blocks. 
                                                           
16 The cap rock (salt layer) could be faulted in which case oil would have leaked out and the deposits will be filled 
with water instead. 
17 Interview by email, geologist working in the Angolan oil sector, 22 February 2011. 
18 Sonangol, ‘Treasure in the salt cellar’, Universo, September 2010, pp.46-49 
19 ‘Angola takes pre-salt plunge’, Petroleum Economist, 17 February 2011, available online at: 
http://www.petroleum-economist.com/default.asp?Page=14&PUBID=46&ISS=25743&SID=727825 (accessed  28 
February 2011) 
20 ‘Exploration of pre-salt layer in Angola expected to begin in last quarter of the year’, Macau Hub, 28 February 
2011, available online at:  http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/news.php?ID=11055 (accessed  28 February 2011) 
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APPENDIX 2: OVERVIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN OIL INDUSTRY 
 
According to BP data, as of 2009, Brazil held the second largest hydrocarbons reserves in the 
region (after Venezuela) and was South America’s second largest oil producer, accounting for 
over 30% of South America oil output. 1 
 
  
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 
As shown in the charts above Brazil’s oil industry has staged an impressive expansion over the 
last decade, having almost doubled its oil production and reserves. In the process Brasilia has 
steadily closed down the production gap with Venezuela.  Despite holding much larger oil 
reserves, Caracas has seen its output decline over the same period, mostly resulting from the 
wave of nationalisations affecting the sector under Chavez populist government which led to a 
contraction in investments.  
                                                           
1 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, June 2010, available online at: 
http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622 ( accessed 17 August 2010) 
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According to EIA, in 2010 Brazil overtook Venezuela as the largest hydrocarbons liquids 
producer, with an output of 2.7 million boe (includes oil and natural gas; Venezuela: 
approximately 2.4 million boe). According to the same source, Venezuela oil output was only 
slightly higher than Brazil’s (2,025 million bpd) in 2010. This state of affairs suggests that Brazil 
might soon become the leading oil producer in the region. 
According to Business Monitor International,2 Brazilian oil output is expected to grow 110% 
over the 2010-2020 period, reaching an estimated 4.53 million bpd by the end of the 10 years 
forecast (Venezuela output is forecasted to reach  4 million bpd in the same period).  
Major characteristics and developments in the Brazilian oil industry 
Brazil oil E&P activities spread across 16 sedimentary basins, 11 of which are located on the 
continental shelf. The offshore basins stretch along the coastal line of the country from the 
Amazon River mouth in the north to Porto Alegre state in the South. As one may see in the chart 
below, since 1980 the bulk of the country’s oil production has been originating offshore (91% in 
January 2011). 3  
 
                                                           
2 Business Monitor International, ‘Brazil Oil and Gas Report Q1 2011 – Executive summary, 25 November 2010, 
available online at: http://www.marketresearch.com/product/display.asp?productid=6001446 (accessed 16 January 
2011) 
3All figure as of January 2011. Unless otherwise stated all figures in this and the next paragraph according to ANP, 
Boletim de Producao de Petroleo e Gas Natural – Janeiro 2011, 1 March 2011, available online at: 
http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=44246&m=&t1=&t2=&t3=&t4=&ar=&ps=&cachebust=1299677123875 (accessed 5 
March 2011) 
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Source: Petrobras website (1960-2000), ANP website (2010) 
Campos Basin (Southeast coast, off Rio de Janeiro state) accounts for the bulk of oil output 
(85%), followed by Potiguar (2.9%, North East coast) and Espirito Santo (2.6%, Southeast, off 
Espirito Santo State). As of January 2011 there were 301 concessions, operated by 23 different 
companies (75 offshore and 226 onshore). Five fields in Campos Basin (Roncador, Marlim Sul, 
Marlim, Marlim Leste and Barracuda) account presently for half of Brazil’s output (2.1 million 
bpd as of January 2011). Roncador is presently the largest producing field (303,000 bpd).  
Most of Brazilian oil is produced in deep and ultra-deep waters (up to 6,000m) and its crude is of 
medium density (average API gravity was 23.8 in January 2011). Exploration success rate is 
around 55%.4  
The steady growth of Brazil’s oil output was in a great deal pushed by its fast expanding 
domestic demand and the quest for self sufficiency. In this context, the state was at the forefront 
of the industry’s development through Petrobras, who has traditionally channelled the bulk of 
investments in E&P activities in the sector (99% in 2009).5  
Although the first commercial well came on stream in 1941 (onshore) and exploration activities 
continued uninterruptedly in Bahia and other states under CNP in the following years, it was 
only after Petrobras took over operations (1953) that the oil industry started to produce 
meaningful results. In 1954, Petrobras was producing 2,700  bpd representing then a meagre 3% 
of national oil demand. 6 In 1968 Petrobras initiated offshore exploration. The first oil well was 
discovered the following year near the state of Sergipe (in the northeast of the country, next to 
Bahia). In 1974 the first important discovery was made in Campos Basin. Production jumped to 
178,000 bpd, covering only 29% of domestic demand. By 1984 oil output was 500,000 bpd 
supplying 45% of internal consumption. Between 1984 and 1996 other major fields were 
uncovered in Campos Basin, namely Marlim, Albacora, Barracuda and Roncador, raising 
                                                           
4 Petrobras, ‘Os campos de Petroleo no Brazil’, 
http://www2.petrobras.com.br/Petrobras/portugues/plataforma/pla_campos_petroleo.htm (accessed 17 August 2010) 
5 According to data in: ANP, Anuário Estatístico Brasileiro do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis 2010, 
available online at: http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=31286 (accessed 17 August 2010) 
6 Unless otherwise stated, data in this and the following paragraphs according to BP, Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2009. With the same 2.7% share (2,4bn b/d), Brazil was in 2008 the seventh largest global consumer along 
with Saudi Arabia and ahead of South Korea and Canada (2,6%). 
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production to 1 million bpd in 1998 (58% of national consumption). Following the end of 
monopoly in the 1990s, Petrobras expanded prospection operations to other areas looking for oil 
in new basins in the Southeast, namely Santos and Espírito Santo, and in older basins where 
deepwater exploration was yet to be made (Bahia, Sergipe and Alagoas). 
With the new fields in Campos Basin coming on stream, oil production soared. In 1998 the 1 
million bpd barrier was overcome and five years later, in 2003, production reached 1.5 million 
bpd. Virtual self sufficiency was finally achieved in 2006 when crude output finally matched 
national demand (around 1.8 million bpd),7 whereby Brazil officially became a net oil exporter. 
The announcement of the massive Pre-salt oil reservoirs in November 2007 marked a turning 
point in Brazil oil industry. These reserves are located 250-350km off the Southeast coast of the 
country (Espírito Santo, Rio and S. Paulo states) covering an area of 149,000 km2 across Espírito 
Santo, Campos and Santos Basins. The oil deposits are found at depths of over 5,000m, under a 
2,000m salt layer, raising huge technological challenges. Unlike the current oil produced by 
Brazil, this is mostly light crude. First large field to be uncovered was Tupi in Santos Basin in 
2007 with an estimated 5-8 billion barrels. The second one was Iara, with reserves estimated at 
3-4 billion barrels.8 The largest find (Libra) was made in late 2010 and is estimated to hold up to 
15billion barrels of oil. 9 These finds clearly demonstrate the high potential of the Brazilian oil 
industry. 
When Tupi was discovered the president of Petrobras, José Sérgio Gabrielli, estimated that total 
pre-salt deposits could expand Brazil’s oil and gas reserves up to 70-100 billion barrels. This 
would place Brazil’s reserves among the 10 largest in the world (was then 24th in the ranking), 
                                                           
7 Virtual self sufficiency has to do with the fact that Brazil refinery complex, mostly assembled during the 
developmental state when it was a net importer, was built to process light grades of crude, while most crude 
produced in Brazil has a higher density. This means that most of its oil output is exported and a large share of its 
refining needs still have to be met by imports. 
8 Revista Digital, ‘Reservas dobram com Tupi e Iara’, 11 September 2008, 
http://www.newslog.com.br/site/default.asp?TroncoID=907492&SecaoID=508074&SubsecaoID=538090&Templat
e=../artigosnoticias/user_exibir.asp&ID=182842&Titulo=Reservas%20dobram%20com%20Tupi%20e%20Iara 
(accessed 17 August 2010) 
9 Rafael Rosas, ‘Libra pode ter ate 15 bilhoes de barris’, Valor, 29 October 2010, available online at: 
http://www.valoronline.com.br/online/petrobras/4426/329885/libra-pode-ter-ate-15-bilhoes-de-barris-diz-anp  
(accessed 10 December 2010). 
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somewhere between Nigeria and Venezuela. 10  Although the pre-salt production at present 
(72,000 bpd in January 2011) 11 accounts for only a small share of Brazil total oil output, it is 
expected to double the country’s current production over the next decade. In an interview in mid 
2009 Gabrielli estimated that, in order to achieve the goal of adding 1.8 million bpd to national 
production by 2020, Petrobras will have to invest US$111 billion until 2020 in the development 
of the pre-salt area.12  
As production expanded in Campos basin and new discoveries were made, Brazil’s oil industry 
rose in value in the international market having IOCs started venturing in the sector in the mid 
2000s through the annual tenders initiated in 1999. Nonetheless, Petrobras retained a dominant 
position in the sector. The NOC operates 93% of all producing fields accounting for nearly 92% 
of total oil production in January 2011. 13 Out of the 20 major producing blocks, only two are not 
operated by the NOC: Ostra (4.1% of total) operated by Shell, and Frade (3.3%) operated by 
Chevron. The remaining 20 operators account for less than 1% of Brazil’s oil output. 
Shell and Chevron are presently the largest foreign players by production. Other IOCs that 
entered Brazil’s oil industry in the 2000s include Repsol, Anadarko, Devon, Statoil, BG group, 
Maersk Oil. Numerous domestic private oil companies have also ventured in the oil sector 
through these auctions. Among these stand out OGX – the oil arm of millionaire Ike Batista 
group – which include former officials of Petrobras and has significant equity, namely, in 
Campos and Santos Basins. Among NOCs, it is worth noting that ONGC from India also gained 
through tender operatorships in two blocks in Espirito Santo and Campos basins, respectively. 
In such a bright scenario the 11th oil licensing round scheduled for the second half of 2011 is 
expected to attract a serious amount of interest, particularly among the IOC’s and Chinese 
companies.
                                                           
10 Kelly Lima, ‘Brasil pode ter 8ª maior reserva de petróleo do mundo´, Exame, 8 November 2007, 
http://portalexame.abril.com.br/ae/economia/m0143013.html (accessed 17 August 2010). 
11 ANP, Boletim de Producao de Petroleo e Gas Natural – Janeiro 2011, 1 March 2011, op. Cit.  
12 Folha Online, ‘Petrobras investirá US$ 111 bilhões no pré-sal até 2020’, diz Gabrielli, 9 June 2009, 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u578513.shtml (accessed 17 August 2010) 
13All figure as of January 2011. Unless otherwise stated all figures in this paragraph according to ANP, Boletim de 
Producao de Petroleo e Gas Natural – Janeiro 2011, 1 March 2011, op. cit.   
 
